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Fall 1978

Lincoln P. Bloomfield — Planning Foreign Policy

Harvey G. Zeidenstein — The Reassertion of Congressional Power

Demetrios Caraley — Congressional Politics and Urban Aid: A 1978 Postscript

Richard P. Nathan
Paul R. Dommel — Federal-Local Relations under Block Grants

Henry Bienen — U. S. Foreign Policy in a Changing Africa

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From the Managing Editor:

In this issue. . .

LINCOLN BLOOMFIELD reviews the experience of policy planning staffs in the United States State Department and in foreign governments and sharply questions their effectiveness. Bloomfield concludes with suggestions for how to improve the incorporation of long-range thinking into foreign policy making.

HARVEY G. ZEIDENSTEIN surveys the provisions legislated by Congress from 1972 to 1977 to restrict the freedom of action of presidents in foreign policy, military deployments, weapons procurement and sales, intelligence activities, and impoundment of funds. He shows how some of these provisions go beyond strengthening the influence of Congress in its traditional legislative role and extend to giving Congress vetoes over specific administrative acts.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY examines congressional voting on urban aid issues in 1977 and concludes that, contrary to what some policy makers have claimed, support for pro-urban programs did exist in the 95th Congress and was primarily dependent not on the number of "urban" constituencies, but on the size of the Democratic majority and the willingness of President Carter to mobilize it. Caraley also shows the extent to which snowbelt vs. sunbelt voting cleavages replaced more traditional ones.

RICHARD P. NATHAN and PAUL R. DOMMEL report on changes that occurred in the pattern of federal-local relations as a result of the consolidation in 1974 of federal categorical aid programs for physical development into "community development block grants." They find that more decentralized decision making has occurred under the block grant system, but that as the program progressed, there was evidence of increased federal control.

HENRY BIENEN analyzes interests in southern Africa in relation to the nation's interest in Africa as a whole. He argues that Africa has become too differentiated, and relations between African states too complex, for the United States to have a single African policy.

LEON V. SIGAL views newsmaking during presidential election campaigns as the product of interaction between two organizations: one composed of newsmen, the other of campaigners. He concludes that the news coverage that results from current organizational routines and journalistic conventions may favor the candidacy of outsiders over that of Washingtonians.

DOUGLAS WALTER JAENICKE reexamines the origins of the Federal Trade Commission Act within the context of progressive thought and argues that the act was a victory neither for equal opportunity nor for big business.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Planning Foreign Policy: Can It Be Done?

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD

Zbigniew Brzezinski, writing in 1969 after a two-year tour of duty in the State Department Policy Planning Council (as it was then called), was highly critical of the secretary of state for persistent neglect of his planners. Professor Brzezinski's recommendation was that the staff be "reduced in size, upgraded in status, and closely related to the Secretary."[1] The model, as in most subsequent American (and other) efforts at foreign policy planning, was George Kennan's pioneer planning staff of the late 1940s. That group—the original "S/P", or State/Planning—numbered around six, was high in status, close to the secretary of state, and considered, erroneously as I shall argue, to personify a Golden Age of planning for others to emulate.

An even more critical view of U.S. foreign policy planning was advanced in the same period by another professor of government. Henry A. Kissinger wrote in 1966:

> What passes for planning is frequently the projection of the familiar into the future . . . Lip service is paid to planning; indeed planning staffs proliferate . . . since planning staffs have a high incentive to try to be 'useful,' there is a bias against novel conceptions . . . true innovation is bound to run counter to prevailing standards.[2]

But after Professor Kissinger had become Secretary of State Kissinger, he used other words to describe the same function: "Our analytical and conceptual

[1] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Purpose and Planning in Foreign Policy," *The Public Interest* (Winter 1969): 63–66.

[2] Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," *Daedalus* (Spring 1966): 503–529.

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD is professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His last assignment in eleven years of State Department service was as a policy planner on U.N. affairs. Among his books are *The Foreign Policy Process: Making Theory Relevant* and *In Search of Foreign Policy: The Humane Uses of Power*.

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capabilities have been greatly enhanced by giving the Policy Planning Staff a central position in the organization and by staffing it with the best available talent."[3]

Whether wittingly or not, Secretary Kissinger adopted approximately two-thirds of the Brzezinski prescriptions. His planning chief, Winston Lord, was unquestionably close to the secretary of state, and S/P played an active role on a wide range of problems with a staff that was expanded to a record size of twenty-nine.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and his planning chief, Anthony Lake, decided early in their administration to correct some of the defects, chronicled below, that have generally plagued earlier policy planning. It is too early to judge, but the evidence is accumulating that efforts to bring policy planning closer to the ideal of a speculative, wide-ranging, future-oriented, independent-minded, in-house policy critic are once again subordinated to the chronic and perverse pressures of short-run crisis management.

Indeed, the history of official planning efforts both in the United States and in many other countries leaves one with nagging doubts about the possibility, even with the best will and brains, of fostering within *any* foreign ministry the ideal of policy planning to be found in textbooks, speeches by high officials, and State Department directives.

It should be emphasized that the problem is not the failure to produce some kind of master plan to be slavishly followed. That is neither possible nor desirable. A reasonable definition of policy planning asks: What are the qualities most desirable for a better policy process that are most absent from day-to-day diplomacy?[4] I would argue that there are three: speculative projections into the medium- (two to five years) and long-term (eight to ten) future; government-wide (rather than agency-bound) analyses of cross-cutting "global interdependence issues"; and built-in challenges to established premises of foreign policy—a need underscored by self-created policy disasters from the Bay of Pigs to the Vietnam War. But in the real world, even when such criteria are acknowledged they have a habit of bending to the universal bureaucratic imperative of maximizing influence with busy operating officials who are committed to carrying out policies dictated by the elected leadership.

The failures in recent years of the United States and other major governments to anticipate, let alone forfend, major convulsions in the international system

[3] Henry A. Kissinger, speech, June 27, 1975.

[4] Few analysts have sought to develop objective criteria for foreign policy planning. Perhaps the best treatment in political science literature is found in I.M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), and Robert Rothstein, *Planning, Prediction, and Policy Making in Foreign Affairs* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972). See also Linda P. Brady, "Planning for Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis," *International Journal* (Autumn 1977). A different kind of analysis is found in "Organizing for Foreign Policy Planning" by the present author in *Report of the Commission of the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs* [Murphy Commission], (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), Appendix F, vol. 2.

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correlate disturbingly well with the direct testimony of policy planners about weaknesses in their own efforts. Both support the conclusion that foreign policy planning, whatever else it has achieved, by and large has failed to emphasize the qualities that most distinguish it from the normal policy-making process. The universal nature of this failure strongly suggests that its cause is not to be found in the quality of the people involved, which is often extraordinarily high. Rather, it would seem to lie in the very nature of foreign policy making institutions and their bureaucratic processes.

Early Expectations

S/P was originally set up in 1947 to perform four main functions: 1. to formulate long-term programs for the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives; 2. to anticipate problems for the Department of State; 3. to study and report on broad politico-military problems; 4. to evaluate and advise on the adequacy of current policies.[5] Let me take these briefly in turn.

1. "Long-term," if it is to mean anything beyond a year or two, has, on the testimony of many planners, little or no respectable place in the official scheme of things.[6] Planners have in practice invariably limited their time horizons to six months to a year or so. A few have, of course, tried to project trends and events much further into the future. But their pains were often rewarded with such epithets as "theoretical," "unrealistic," or "irrelevant"—to cite words used over and over again in interviews with planners (and non-planners) in country after country.

The reference in mission 1 to "objectives" surfaces another problem. With rare exceptions, broad U.S. policy goals tend to be spelled out in cliché form, and the search by operating agencies for clearly defined policy objectives to guide them often ends in frustration. Policy "ad hocery" that assumes everyone knows what the goals are works well enough when there is a broad domestic consensus. But it does not when overall national priorities are moot, as they increasingly have been since the late 1960s. Nothing could be more dangerous than to fill this gap by defining various regions as "vital" to the United States on the basis of where Air Force One happens to be at a given moment.[7]

2. As for anticipating problems in an effective way, some recent transformations in the external world have clearly caught Americans flatfooted.

The towering contemporary issues of economic and functional interdependence, along with acute North-South alienation, were long foreseen by some policy planners (and by even more outsiders). But it is sobering that in the 1950s S/P included only one economist, and had no organized way to analyze

[5] Department of State Order of May 5, 1947 establishing the Policy Planning Staff.

[6] See the author's report of approximately three dozen interviews with past and serving planners, predominantly American, but also including several British, French, and other planners: "Policy Planning Redefined: What the Planners Think," *International Journal* (Autumn 1977).

[7] Or, it might be added, where some Cubans happen to be.

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scientific and technological changes. Until the 1970s the (then) Atomic Energy Commission was responsible for basic international planning in the nuclear field, and pressed its bias toward ever expanding nuclear uses rather than analyzing their long-range security implications and consequences. The Treasury Department for long was the designated official worrier about the "dollar gap"—and sponsor of "shocks."

With minor exceptions, planners in State during the 1950s and '60s simply did not go deeply into issues of energy, food, environment, or monetary policy, in the crucial sense of focusing top-level attention on projections and forecasts aimed at anticipating system-wide disorders. By the first half of the 1970s, studies of food, energy, proliferation, and other cross-cutting problems were made, but only after they had become foreign policy crises. It took the Middle Eastern war of 1973 to focus top officials on the exigent "interdependence agenda."

One reason for S/P's uneven focus was the historic allergy of secretaries of state and their political deputies to other than political-security matters. That bias invariably inclined the departmental pecking order in favor of the traditional geographic bureaus. The planners, tied as they have had to be to other people's notions of what is important, tilted accordingly. A better balance began to develop in the top-level agenda with Kissinger's important speech in 1975 to the U.N. 7th Special Session;[8] nevertheless in the late 1970s the Arab-Israeli conflict, Southern Africa, and superpower relations remained dominant, while North-South and "functional" politics were still clearly secondary to presidents and secretaries of state. Planners had to juggle their deep involvement in North-South issues alongside the pressures to come up with ideas on the priority areas.

This biasing structure of policy priorities was often accompanied by a lack of independence to tackle taboo subjects. During the Dulles regime through most of the 1950s, China policy, French anti-Americanism, military force composition and weaponry, human rights covenants, and commodity agreements were all off limits to State Department planners. Over the entire two decades prior to 1971, China policy was not something planners ventured into more than once (nor was the deepening Vietnam involvement). Even the PARA system,[9] an interesting experiment in quasi-formal planning techniques, excluded from its coverage the most policy-sensitive foreign countries.

3. In one prime sector—politico-military affairs—the planners have been both active and often influential. S/P gets an "A" for its long-time earlier efforts to coordinate planning with the Department of Defense. Indeed, the *only* continuing interagency liaison established by S/P over three decades was with the Pentagon, through lunches with the Joint Staff, exchanges of personnel, and in-house expertise. Some might argue that this emphasis contributed to distor-

[8] "Global Consensus and Economic Development," Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, September 1, 1975.

[9] Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation.

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tion of overall U.S. policy perspectives. But for a long time top-level U.S. policy perspectives *were* predominantly politico-military.

4. Current policies have rarely, if ever, been systematically evaluated within the government with the independence of mind that is essential to produce responsible "first-order" critiques of current national strategies.[10]

Doubtless that is natural. But it would be difficult to contend that, even at secondary levels, anything resembling consequence-oriented planning or high-level adversary debate went into misguided policy initiatives ranging from the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 that astonishingly misread Mid-East realities, the disastrously ill-conceived 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the 1965 Dominican Republic intervention, the 1970 Cambodia "incursion," the 1971 Connally-Nixon shocks, the neglect and patronizing of European allies, the counter-OPEC threats of early 1974, and the short-sighted support until 1975 of losers and racists in Africa, to the protracted involvement in a disastrous war no official dared to challenge.

The American Experience

Clues to the puzzle of planning can perhaps be found by examining its three-decade-plus history. In April 1947, George F. Kennan, who had been detached from the National War College to work on the sudden and urgent problem of aid to Greece and Turkey, was instructed to set up a planning staff without delay. The reason for urgency was the desperate situation in Western Europe. Secretary Marshall emphasized that if the United States didn't take the initiative to improve matters, others would. Kennan was ordered to assemble a staff, and to make recommendations within ten days or two weeks on U.S. actions regarding Europe. The only advice the general gave him was to "avoid trivia."[11] The Kennan planning staff has ever since been taken as a paradigm of planning.

Paul Nitze, who succeeded Kennan, was close (as Kennan had not been) to Secretary Acheson, and under his direction S/P drafted NSC paper #68 which, whether one agrees with it or not, nevertheless laid out a comprehensive cold war posture for the United States that came close to being an integrated policy plan.[12] Nitze's special relationship with Acheson also engaged him in current policy situations, most notably negotiations to end the 1951–52 crisis of Iranian oil precipitated by the lachrymose Premier Mossadeq. This pattern of cooptation

[10] With rare exceptions, government analysis invariably accepts as *given* the first-order premises of policy ("the United States should have a continuing military presence in Europe/Asia"; "socialism is contrary to American values"; "Congress will never support purely humanitarian programs"; "the triad is essential to strategic deterrence"; "the United States cannot accept a Palestinian state until Israel does," etc.) Analysis normally focuses on implementation, tactics, and on second- or third-order options.

[11] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925–1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 313.

[12] See *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1950, vol I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977) pp. 234–292.

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of planners for real-time crisis operations has recurred many times; ironically, it meant that top officials found the planners to be too valuable to "waste" on planning.

As the cold war unfolded, the locus of foreign policy planning shifted to the National Security Council. In the 1950s S/P became essentially a staff operation for the secretary of state in his capacity as a leading NSC member, and the NSC Planning Board tended to preempt the planning function.[13] Nevertheless, planning chief Robert Bowie accompanied Secretary Dulles to most international meetings, and was frequently invited to Dulles's house on weekends to discuss broad issues "with no holds barred," in Bowie's words.

Secretary Herter, whose tenure was brief, was prepared to make use of planners (and also encouraged outsiders to help them).[14] But Herter's planning director, Gerard Smith, on his own testimony, had "no use for the ivory tower."[15]

The NSC precipitately declined under presidents Kennedy and Johnson, but planning did not consequently flourish back at State. In the early 1960s, rival centers of planning sprang up both in the NSC and in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (DOD/ISA).

Secretary Rusk's first planner, George McGhee, took particular pride in his contribution to settlement of the then burning West New Guinea (West Irian) conflict—like Nitze's Iranian negotiation a useful firefighting exercise, but hardly "planning." In that period the staff was also preoccupied with the mounting Berlin crisis.

Walt Rostow, who succeeded McGhee, placed a substantial emphasis on his major specialty, developing nations (plus its ultimately deformed twin, counter-insurgency). In writing of his work in S/P, Rostow also stressed "expansion of work done with the military and in politico-military planning . . . ," arguing that "the traditional sharp distinction between diplomacy and the application of military power has ended."[16] This argument (which some would claim contributed to an eventual distortion of American policy) was entirely consistent with the view of Rostow's superiors. What is less certain is the interest of the secretary of state in the planning efforts of either Rostow or his successor, Henry Owen.

[13] Robert R. Bowie, *Shaping the Future* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).

[14] Herter expressed great interest in the new technique of political gaming and asked the author, then newly at MIT, to include members of S/P in our adaptations of the so-called RAND game, while ruling out in-house State Department games for fear of incurring congressional ridicule. S/P members participated in all ten senior MIT POLEXes. Only one subsequent S/P chief, Walt Rostow, ran the risk of sponsoring a full-blown in-house "State game." See "Games Foreign Policy Experts Play: The Political Exercise Comes of Age" by the present author and Cornelius J. Gearin, *Orbis* (Winter 1973).

[15] This and subsequent statements, when not accompanied by a citation, were made in conversations with the author. The unfortunate lack of literature in this area has required the use of this imperfect form of scholarship.

[16] Walt Rostow, "The Planning of Foreign Policy," in E.A.J. Johnson, ed., *The Dimensions of Diplomacy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964), p. 153.

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In early 1969, State Department planning underwent a temporary metamorphosis. The new Republican secretary of state and his under-secretary found themselves attending White House meetings equipped with departmental positions inferior in quality to the superlative staff preparations of President Nixon by his new special assistant, Henry Kissinger. Between the notional value of twenty-one inherited policy planners, and the felt need for coordination of the Department's scattered policy process, it was no contest. For four years the broader policy planning function became a vestigial appendix to the new Policy and Coordination Staff (S/PC). William Sutterlin, who ultimately replaced William Cargo as S/PC director, recommended that the planning function be restored and the coordinating function be assigned elsewhere.

The Policy Planning Staff was revived under Secretary of State Kissinger, who named as its head one of his most trusted assistants from the NSC staff, Winston Lord. Opinions differ within the State Department and even among Lord's planners as to how much of what S/P in fact did could properly be called planning. But there can be no doubt that Kissinger placed an extraordinarily high value on Lord's services, and at the close of the administration in an unprecedented action he bestowed the Department's Distinguished Honor Award on the entire staff.

In his remarks to the staff on that occasion, Kissinger said that S/P had "a tremendous impact on precisely the areas that somebody in my position most needs help." Calling it "the most creative since the days of George Kennan," Kissinger described the staff's contributions to the resolution of issues cutting across bureaus such as the North-South dialogue, nuclear nonproliferation, China policy, and Latin America. The award cited S/P's

> vision in early identification, analysis and prescription for new problem areas affecting the U.S. national interest; for ensuring a broad range of policy alternatives for decision by the President, the Secretary and other Department Principals; for perceptive examination of decision-forcing developments and the consequences of alternative courses of action; for a flow of analytical studies on all major regional and functional subjects bringing to bear global and longer-range perspectives; for the central role in a continuing stream of public speeches and remarks for the Secretary . . . For encouraging dissent and new ideas within the Department and promoting a foreign policy dialogue with academia . . .[17]

Certainly some things had changed. By 1977 the average staff age had dropped by more than six years (to 42) during Lord's tenure. New strength was acquired in a number of areas including economics. Undoubtedly S/P in that period was one of the ablest and most energetic groups ever assembled on the seventh floor of the State Department. Despite Kissinger's oft-remarked capacity for doing his own conceptual thinking (in which he had rarely sought aid in his previous career), on his testimony he benefited in many ways from the work of his planners.

[17] Remarks by Secretary Kissinger in presenting the Distinguished Honor Award to the Policy Planning Staff, Thomas Jefferson Room, Department of State, January 17, 1977. See also Jan Kalicki, "The State Department Policy Planning Process," *International Journal* (Autumn 1977).

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It does not necessarily detract from that remarkable record to question on other grounds a few of the specific substantive policy accomplishments cited in the nomination of S/P for the Department's highest award.

Credit was given and surely deserved for "establishing the intellectual basis for American policy in dealing with international energy, food and commodities problems . . . ," and for being "the catalyst at every stage in the evolution of the U.S. Government's new approach to North-South problems," notably in the form of a comprehensive analysis made in early 1975. Mention is also made of shaping the guidelines for the 1974 Washington Energy Conference and the 7th U.N. Special Session in September 1975.

But it does not seem unreasonable to remark that by early 1975 everyone *but* Dr. Kissinger had already recognized how late in the day it was for the United States to respond to the multilevel rich-poor confrontation. Many others, including the Congress, have properly taken credit for the splendid policy program embodied in Kissinger's speech to the 7th Special Session of the General Assembly. And if S/P "took the lead" for the ill-fated Washington Energy Conference in February of 1974, it must take equal blame for misjudging the prospects of a consumer country anti-OPEC coalition. We are entitled to criticize planning that, measured by policy results, failed to recognize that a proper bargain on commodities and resources could realistically be made only if there were participation in decision making by other than the Western rich countries. Does it seem unfair to ask why the planners were not out in front arguing that case, rather than taking credit for a conference preordained to failure?

The same might be said of the "broad new strategy" on nuclear nonproliferation that led to collective action by the nuclear suppliers. The London effort was a good one as far as it went. But again, its limits were severe so long as key recipient countries were excluded from the top table of international decision making. Members of S/P were known to be sensitive to the changing geometry of world power and world psychology, and in fact planned to start with a small group and then broaden it. But one also recalls the well-known preference of Secretary Kissinger for a far more limited decision-making circle based on military power and political alliance. (Kissinger was hardly alone in that seventh floor view.)

Listing "China policy" as a key S/P contribution was a richly deserved testimony to Winston Lord's personal efforts once U.S. policy changed in 1971. But it should not be forgotten that rewards given planners for their contribution to an altered China policy once it became popular at the top followed three decades of chastisement of planners for trying to make the same contribution when it was not.

Perhaps planners should also have been slightly embarrassed to see listed among their major contributions U.S. policy toward the Helsinki conference on European security. In fact the United States was dragged with the greatest reluctance to the CSCE without anything resembling a coherent policy for Europe, and seemingly unmindful that the human rights focus would emerge as Helsinki's most important consequence.

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S/P's contribution to Kissinger's speech at Lusaka in 1975, belatedly shifting U.S. African policy, similarly deserves full credit. But 1975 was extraordinarily late in the day to get off the collision course U.S. policy had unswervingly followed until then (despite some U.S. government planning exercises during the prior decade which clearly foreshadowed failures for the West and successes for the Soviets. Such results were ignored by policy makers and planners alike until disaster befell in Angola, as it may well in Rhodesia).

In presenting the S/P award, Secretary Kissinger unwittingly confirmed my thesis when he said that "over the last three decades the Policy Planning Staff had fallen into disuse . . . considered sort of a long-hair exercise . . . By definition it was considered not to have any relevance to what serious people might do." Some of Winston Lord's predecessors might have taken exception to this blanket dismissal of all that had come before. More to the point, one is left with the sense that, despite the *rélance* of which S/P could feel justly proud, some of the inherent structural difficulties and obstacles to planning still remained unresolved.

The Vance S/P under Kissinger's former critic, Anthony Lake, like its predecessor was younger than in earlier days, also strong in economics, relatively free to fix its own agenda, and anxious to cultivate good relations with the operating bureaus (although not at the expense of its overriding concern to be useful to the prime consumers—the secretary of state and his immediate deputies).

The staff shrank to twenty-two. It took on the job of coordinating "PRMS" (the Carter-Brzezinski version of staff studies for the NSC), and saw its chief travel widely with the secretary, as Bowie had with Dulles and Lord with Kissinger. On reflection, that pattern was altered with the hope that influence would not thereby suffer.

Like all its predecessors the Lake S/P recognized early the need to feel—and to be—"relevant," chiefly by tying all planning functions to what it called "policy hooks." At the outset all its energies were naturally focused on helping to formulate new policies; at that time it expressed open-mindedness toward building into the system some self-correcting mechanism for the inevitable post-honeymoon period. Both Secretary Vance and Director Lake were aware on taking office of current criticism of the planning function, and both were interested in curing its chronic defects.

But at least as of this writing, the demands of day-to-day operational diplomacy have, as so many times in the past, tended to swamp attempts to refine and restructure the planning approach. Once again, as before, the chief planner tends to be caught up in helping senior officials to work out short-term "fixes." It must also be said that while policy planners are expected to help define broad policy goals, they have a special problem given the sometimes contradictory priorities and programs of the Carter administration. (Another level which serves a potentially valuable function is that of bureau planners; like the senior planning staffs, their capacities are wholly determined by the interest of the particular assistant secretary.)

With yet another strong-minded and articulate academic installed as the

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presidential assistant for national security affairs, some of the action that with Kissinger's move to State in 1973 had flowed to Foggy Bottom, gravitated back to the NSC staff. Dr. Brzezinski and his staff developed a four-year projection early in 1977, and the PRM study memoranda initiated in the staff represented a form of "tasked planning" which reexamined some fundamental policy issues. But clearly the vision of feet-on-the-desk, long-range thinking has yielded, as it had before, to participation in the urgent policy questions coming before an activist president. Soon the staff's "alert" and "critical" lists carried a maximum time frame of six months. Like S/P (from which several of Brzezinski's NSC staffers were drawn), a group of bright and capable people was once again swept away by (and doubtless drawn to) operational demands from the front office which under the prevailing system inevitably determined whether they would be deemed relevant and useful.

Presidents themselves are not immune from the illusory dreams of leisurely long-range planning as distinct from operations. When President-elect Richard M. Nixon presented Professor Kissinger to the press at the Hotel Pierre headquarters on December 2, 1968, he emphasized that his new assistant would spend much of his time in long-range planning, adding that "I don't want him to get down to the situation room in the White House and spend too much time there going through cables."[18]

Fifteen months into the next administration, while engaged in preparing for a two-day session with President Jimmy Carter at Camp David designed to improve admittedly inadequate decision-making procedures, one presidential aide was quoted as saying that "the White House, frankly, has not functioned as efficiently and effectively as it ought to with regard to long-range planning, policy planning. We have not done what the White House is supposed to do in terms of making decisions. We have not provided the general direction that the Government needs and the White House is supposed to provide."[19]

Some inescapable conclusions emerge from these vignettes. First, "successful" planners are those considered most "relevant" by the secretary of state and other policy makers. Second, whether planning ever approximates the ideal model is entirely up to the secretary. Third, to be "relevant," and thus "influential," planners simply cannot (or will not) get too far out of line with established policies. Two supplemental points: Inside information is a form of power in bureaucracies and therefore, to be in the know, planners have to remain close to operations. And to foster that relationship, they eschew experimental, theoretical, or methodological unorthodoxies, or flights into the future that in the foreign service subculture would invariably brand them as unsound.

The end result has been that many a planner has volunteered (or has been drafted) to help with current crises and to perform operational tasks. Other planners, correctly perceiving that they were out of the main stream, either retreated to write "think pieces" few operators would take seriously, or lowered

[18] *New York Times*, December 3, 1968.
[19] *New York Times*, April 15, 1978.

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their sights and assumed a low profile, cautiously steering between the regional bureaus that might feel threatened by competition, and a seventh floor chief impatient with concerns remote from his daily pressures. The Planning Staff often as not has tended to become a high-grade pool of spare hands, available to take on some chores on current policies which the operating bureaus are too busy to handle. With this drastically amended definition of the planning function, most planners can point to substantial accomplishments in the form of policy innovations and solutions.

However useful those things, we can legitimately ask: Is it policy planning? How could its original model have, in Secretary Kissinger's words, so "fallen into disuse"? It is not always remembered that the part played by the Kennan S/P in the dazzlingly successful Marshall Plan involved neither adversary challenge to top-level policy, nor tensions between present needs and future orientation. In the case in point, the Kennan staff contributed as a *first-class task force* to a *one-time job* for which there was a clear and present need—and thereafter lost momentum.

It is not always recalled that two years and some months later George Kennan resigned from his post in protest over losing direct access to the secretary of state, by then Dean Acheson. He recorded in his private diary some conclusions about the planning process that are worth rereading:

> Pondering today the frustrations of the past week, it occurred to me that it is time I recognized that my Planning Staff, started nearly three years ago, has simply been a failure, like all previous attempts to bring order and foresight into the design of foreign policy by special institutional arrangements within the department . . . The reason for this seems to lie largely in the impossibility of having the planning function performed outside of the line of command.[20]

In this reflection on his days as, in his inimitable phrase—"Court Jester"—George Kennan surfaced problems that have chronically beset the planning function, and which remain essentially unresolved: the dilemma of isolation versus involvement; the necessity for a conceptually minded secretary of state; and chronic uncertainty as to the planner's influence.

Policy Planning Abroad

Over the past two decades a number of planning staffs have been established in foreign ministries around the world, most of them in imitation of the American model.

In 1957 the British Foreign Office set up a policy planning function which in 1964 became a full-fledged planning staff.[21] It was charged (in the words of the Plowden Commission) not to "make plans" but to foresee choices Britain might face over a five-year stretch, and to formulate broad lines of

[20] *Memoirs*, 1925–1950, op.cit., p. 467.

[21] Since 1968 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

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policy. To give it a structured place, it worked through the permanent under secretary's Planning Committee attended by all the deputy under secretaries and other senior officials. That committee meets monthly to consider papers prepared by the planners.

The British planning staff, unlike S/P, decided to remain small (around five). Like S/P, it has worked on some major policy issues. (Indeed, it recently acquired an extraordinary means of weighing policy priorities, through a rule that no new funds may be approved in the international sector without the planners' comments.)

Nevertheless, like S/P the FCO staff has generally had to function within a definition of relevance that is congenial to nonplanners. In London, as in Washington, policy planners tend to gravitate toward involvement in current problems. The British staff (like S/P) has enjoyed some success in focusing its operational colleagues on consequences of current government decisions. But its influence is uncertain, and there remains a strong sense that at least until recently British policy planning has been a tender plant growing in an alien environment.

An interesting contrast is found in the Central Policy Review Staff—the so-called "think tank"—set up by Prime Minister Heath under the direction of a brilliant and unorthodox biologist at Cambridge University, Lord Victor Rothschild, with a staff of twenty-four.

In many ways that group came close to realizing the ideal model of a planning staff, complete with unorthodoxy (even heresy), continuous tension with the bureaucracy, and strong in-house challenges to policy. (Its terms of reference were written by the then cabinet secretary, Sir Burke Trend, in a way that, in the words of a British admirer interviewed by the author, was "characteristically lucid but incomprehensible," thus guaranteeing flexibility.) Its record on foreign policy has been mixed.

Initially the head of the think tank had an unquestioned pipeline to the prime minister and other cabinet ministers. The staff busied itself with complex trends and interdepartmental issues (such as the Concorde) which, in its chief's words, "tend to leave the cabinet confused," and became deeply involved in the country's choice of nuclear reactors. Indeed, until a ministry of energy was created it provided most of Britain's official forward thinking on energy.

Lord Rothschild required that his planning papers review what the government said it would do; what in fact it did; what it did not do; and what to do about it—a striking example of the "postaudit" which surely should be included among planning functions. Confronted with a new and less sympathetic British government, Lord Rothschild decided that four years was enough. His replacement by a man of different style suggests that the feeling may have been mutual.

Yet the iconoclastic tradition dies hard. Two years later the CPRG under Sir Kenneth Berrill generated a storm in the stately precincts of Whitehall with a 442-page report recommending the virtual abolition of her Majesty's diplomatic service on grounds of irrelevance to Britain's shrunken role and the priority need

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for specialists to work on the complex "interdependence" issues of trade, energy, and resources.[22]

The French, perhaps because of the newness of their experiment (or perhaps because planning is more congenial to the Cartesian than to the muddling-through tradition), may have had a more positive experience than the Anglo-Saxons.

Following establishment in the 1960s by Jean Laloi of a hybrid group to focus on East-West relations—a group successfully absorbed by the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy—a proper planning staff was organized in 1973 under Foreign Minister Jobert, based on the Kissinger-NSC model, but also inspired by the successful Commissariat du Plan. The disappearance from the scene of "the Big Planner"—General de Gaulle—had left a vacuum: the energy crisis furnished the occasion to challenge conventional analysis. Jobert recruited planners (known familiarly as the "Joboys") who could take advantage of their new-found leverage to demonstrate the outmoded thinking of others and the necessity that the Foreign Ministry get involved in economic policy. The first chief was a professor of economics at the École Polytechnique, the other two original members were a systems analyst and scientist. Even the name suggests a more avant-gardist approach: "Centre d'Analyse et de Prevision."

The staff, subsequently grown to nine (a mix of outsiders and insiders) aimed at integrating national, international, and multilateral components of policy. Like other planning staffs, the French one was excluded from certain of the most crucial questions (since the United Kingdom entered the European Community, the French prime minister has been the main coordinator of France's European planning). But its members are often influential.

Other experimenters have had a less successful time of it. The Japanese Foreign Ministry, after several abortive attempts, decided in 1960 to concentrate a policy planning function in the office of the deputy vice-minister. Ten years later, in the same quest for better planning, the International Data Department of the Foreign Office was substantially upgraded. But Japanese observers note that the regional bureaus (like their counterparts in Foggy Bottom) are jealous of their bailiwick.[23] The Australian Department of External Affairs, which set up a planning staff in 1971 to think beyond normal boundaries, ran afoul of the same issues of turf, and became absorbed into the Executive Secretariat.

In the late 1960s a "pre-planning" staff was set up in the Belgian Foreign Ministry in much the same spirit: *someone* in the diplomatic establishment should be freed to look ahead, take a broad view, and challenge policy. Alas, there too it failed. The top operating officials saw no need for long-range planning. In their off-the-record words, any thinking that had to be done could be done perfectly well by the operators. (Belgium is in process of trying it again, this time with some interest in quantitative approaches.)

[22] See *The Economist*, January 21 and 28, 1978.

[23] See Haruhiro Fukui, "Foreign Policy-Making By Improvisation: The Japanese Experience," *International Journal* (Autumn 1977).

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Canada in August of 1969 established within the Department of External Affairs a Policy Analysis Group, "to develop and analyze major foreign policy alternatives for Canada, with particular attention to long-range considerations." The PAG group had much going for it—a compact size (five); location in the hierarchy directly under the permanent head of the External Affairs department; and a verbal commitment from Prime Minister Trudeau to a planning and systems approach to policy matters.

The PAG has devoted recent attention to defining Canadian goals and—innovatively—to domestic problems (such as unemployment) having international significance. But in Ottawa as elsewhere planners experience the dilemma of overinvolvement versus irrelevance.[24]

The Dutch planning staff of five, set up in late 1971, analyzes long-term trends in foreign affairs, proposes policy alternatives and, like many other planners, also writes speeches and performs odd chores for high officials. Norway's six-person staff (which worries that it is too large) took the lead in setting Norwegian policy guidelines on North-South and other interdependence questions, as well as on human rights. But its director recently devoted approximately half his time to serve as chairman of the U.N. Commodities Stabilization Committee in Geneva.

Many of their counterparts' frustrations have been encountered by Sweden's foreign ministry planners (unaccountably located in the division of disarmament and nuclear export affairs). But like the British, the Swedes have experimented with a higher-level think tank charged with introducing into political decisions a better sense of the long-term. The Secretariat for Future Studies was created by the prime minister in 1973 with a staff of four that included a mathematician, scientist, and educator. They too report that busy politicians have little time for, and are not easily accessible to "thinkers." But that unit shows an enthusiasm rare for frustrated planners (except for a few like the new, young Malaysian policy planning staff which takes pride in its recent ten- to twenty-year regional projections).

Indeed, most planning staffs, at least in their candid moments, admit to a mixed record at best; at worst to living proof of the pervasive foreign office belief that, at root, planning and operations are essentially inseparable. When a genuine success story is encountered (such as the role of the Federal Republic's then planning director, Egon Bahr, in the late 1960s in formulating the *Ostpolitik*), it often turns out to involve, not a planning exercise in the strict sense, but a first-rate *task force* product—like the Kennan S/P's Marshall Plan. The FRG record since is described as "mixed."[25]

Even Peking shared the common experience. Chou En-lai is reported to have included in his newly reconstituted Foreign Office in 1949 a policy planning

[24] See also Daniel Madar and Denis Stairs, "Alone on Killer's Row: The Policy Analysis Group and the Department of External Affairs"; and G.A.H. Pearson, "Order Out of Chaos? Some Reflections on Foreign Policy Planning in Canada," both in *International Journal* (Autumn 1977).

[25] On the FRG's experience, see Ernst W. Gohlert, "Planning in German Foreign Policy," ibid.

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staff under the direction of Ch'iao Kuan-hua (who later became foreign minister). But in 1952 it was dropped because, according to reports, it did not seem "useful."

One might imagine the genuine article ought to be found at least in Moscow, the home of The Plan. And undoubtedly planning *is* done where power and initiative is located, that is, in the Central Committee staff. It is reported that there are also around eighty fairly high-level "planners" in the Foreign Ministry (in a section entitled "Administration for Foreign Policy Actions"). But the kind of planning they do is what might be called "operational"; the same is said to be true for policy planners in the German Democratic Republic (and in a perverse sense, from time to time in the United States as well). Operational planning connotes coordination and action responsibility, rather than anything resembling futurism, cross-bureaucratic integrative thinking, or—a fortiori—challenges to current policy.

Ironically, Soviet experts seem to have assumed that it is the Americans who have mastered the art (or science, as they would say) of foreign policy planning. Just as Soviet leadership reached out eclectically in the 1920s for American assembly line know-how, and in the 1940s for more powerful U.S. models of economic behavior, so in the 1960s Soviet analysts intensively studied supposed American policy planning methods, with particular emphasis on innovative techniques of analysis and forecasting.[26] The further irony is that official U.S. planning remains largely innocent to this day of social science methodology, including that most assiduously studied by its Soviet counterparts.

The Planner's Dilemma

Even this brief survey of some foreign experiences reassures us that the problem is not distinctly American, or a reflection of inferior American talents. For in one foreign office after another, the logic is inexorable. Politicians and diplomats are busy and focused on short-term problems. Policy planners, to be influential, must do what their bosses find relevant. Relevance is defined by policy makers as that which helps them to deal with their burdensome agendas, their exigent heads of government and critical publics, and their crushing deadlines. The planner's success more often than not varies in direct proportion to his willingness to help solve current puzzles, to present ideas in ways congenial to the operator's idiom and mind-set, and to be loyal to the basic policies of the administration. This enables him to gain influence. But the more successful he is in gaining influence, the less successful he becomes as a planner. Like a clergyman in a rich parish, he comforts the afflicted but rarely gets around to afflicting the comfortable, except in minor ways.

Now and then planners do fulfill the ideal. But that cannot be relied on,

[26] See for example Vitaly V. Zhurkin, "The United States And International Political Crises," *USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology* (translation), no. 12, December 1970.

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since planning is defined by the whims and style of one individual for whom the alarm clock always seems more relevant than the calendar. Real life planning functions range across a limitless continuum from philosopher to analyst to speechwriter to prophet to kibitzer to negotiator to dreamer to staff coordinator. Planning is what someone labelled a planner happens to be doing at any given moment. The consequence is that most of the time a Gresham's law is at work, with operations consistently driving out planning.

So long as this situation continues unchanged, planners will usually remain marginal people, tolerated by the system so long as they don't become irritating, valued to the extent that they make the operator's life easier not harder, and ignored when they start to become intellectually rarefied, methodologically unfamiliar, or politically heretical.

Some experienced diplomats have cautioned that planning is not really possible in foreign affairs. A legitimate fear of excessive rigidity moves professional diplomats to argue against contingency planning (former Secretary of State Dean Rusk cautions that "policy planning must be in the subjunctive mood.")[27] Sometimes of course that argument is a convenient way to sweep under the rug the whole idea of improved analytical tools. Yet, as Sir Harold Nicolson put it, "nobody who has not watched 'policy' expressing itself in day-to-day action can realize how seldom is the course of events determined by deliberately planned purpose . . . "[28]

The circumstances in which policy planning was created, given the high military component of policy in the 1940s, suggests the possibility that General Marshall (and all others since then who have tried to establish foreign office planning) were misled by the relatively successful history of military planning. It is universally accepted that war plans require definition of potential adversaries, identification of contingencies to be prepared for, and logistical wherewithal. The plans may be disastrously wrong-headed, the strategies left over from previous wars, the anticipated contingencies irrelevant to the future. Nevertheless, the military cannot land on a beach without extensive advance planning. But a political leader can land on the front pages—or in a war—with no preparation, leadtime, or plan.

It is the inherent nature of foreign policy-making institutions that makes it so difficult to isolate a planning function in a way that would be natural and

[27] Letter to the author dated August 21, 1974.

From a subsequent letter dated June 9, 1978: I think I would have to say that the notion of planning is an essential ingredient in any policy maker's mind—at whatever level in the policy making he or she might work. Most foreign policy decisions, for example, are about the future—trying to shape the course of events somewhat more in one direction than in another. But Providence has not given us the capacity to pierce the fog of the future with accuracy, and so the planning point of view must involve a continuing process of revision and adjustment. A brilliant plan which is no longer relevant is not much help; however, the planning effort may be an invaluable experience for those who participate in it and who look over the results. It does help, for example, to discover the questions which might otherwise be ignored.

[28] *The Congress of Vienna* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946), p. 19.

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obvious in, say, an army or a post office department. In fact each desirable quality of planning is contravened by a distinctive institutional feature of the foreign office system, which is hierarchical, politically loyal, careerist, traditionalist, and incrementalist. More simply put in the form of Bloomfield's law, "nothing happens until it has to."

And of course if a desk officer is doing his job well, he should in a real sense *be* his own planner. In carrying out day-to-day line responsibilities, a good operating official should be constantly evaluating trends in his sector, forecasting future area developments, and drawing the attention of superior officers to pitfalls and opportunities, all from the standpoint of understood national interests, goals, and objectives. Those interests, goals and objectives are often hard to find (which is one of the central problems in planning). But even if they have to be invented, the action officer—like the planner—is expected to articulate them as a foundation for policy recommendations. "In the final analysis," said a definitive report on foreign policy making, "a top executive must do his own planning."[29]

None of this is to say that in the postwar decades there were not either major policy successes, or that policy planners were not often of major assistance in helping resolve particular policy dilemmas. But we are left with the nagging suspicion that foreign office planning may be doomed, by deep structural flaws in its very conception, to perpetual shortfall in living up to its officially defined purposes. The question is inescapable: Is there really a unique task to be performed by people called planners, in contradistinction to other intelligent and thoughtful people who bear operational responsibilities?

The Continuing Need for a Genuine Planning Function

It is tempting to conclude from this gloomy recital that at least for the United States the time has come to strip the veil from the policy-planning myth, call a spade a spade, and release the planners to seek gainful employment. But logical as that may seem, nothing could be more damaging to the future conduct of American foreign policy. The conclusion that the policy-planning function is unworkable and should be scrapped is logically correct—but wrong.

Equally powerful logic argues that today, when uncertainty and complexity have multiplied beyond recognition as never before, the case for proper policy planning is far more compelling than it was thirty-plus years ago when the world looked two-dimensional. The multiple interconnectedness of global life gives an increasingly unrecognizable face to foreign affairs. It is not traditional forces which have created potent expectations for the world's majority and paralyzing instabilities for its embattled minority. But foreign offices are full

[29] *Administration of National Security—Basic Issues*, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Cong., 1963, p. 6.

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of experts on diplomatic relations, not interdependence. Crisis managers take justifiable pride in their capacity for rapid response. But it is the over-the-horizon problems, left unanalyzed and unintegrated into present policies, which guarantee incessant surprises for the "practical" diplomats.

Professor Thomas Schelling of Harvard once posed the dazzling riddle of how to make a list of questions one would never have thought to ask. Such a task eludes both conventional organization structures and specialist mind-sets. No organizational form or professional specialty exists today that knows how to deal effectively with the linkages between trade, investment, food, and military security; how to integrate the mind-boggling capacity for electronic data manipulation with levels of human misery and intercultural antagonism; or how to tie warm homes and electoral votes in northern climates to war and peace in the Middle East, the South China Sea, and the west coast of Africa. When enormous political and social stakes ride on food supplies, the state of current intellectual and conceptual arts was typified by the admission that U.S. government analysts have "no methodologies to alert policy-makers to adverse climatic change," and "no tools to assess the economic and political impact of such a change."[30]

It is overwhelmingly apparent that foreign affairs henceforth need to be dealt with not just in vertical segments, one compartmented from the other, but horizontally, across traditional agency and subject lines—and across the even more rigidly guarded boundaries between "domestic" and "foreign." Responsible powers must, if they are to act rationally, be equally guided by integrative thinking across the barriers of agency, tribe, state, region. Large and small powers alike need new mental and conceptual tools for their survival in a world essentially beyond their control. Rather than being embarrassed at seeming "unrealistic," planners must be formally mandated to work within time frames well beyond the ken of day-to-day diplomacy and strategy.

Traditionalists argue that the future is unknowable, random events change history, and, as an anonymous wit put it, life is what happens while you are making other plans. But this short-changes what can be done in an age in which the same future is daily mortgaged through fateful decisions by businessmen, weapons designers, and determined groups aspiring to political power.

Trend-lines look different depending on how one projects them[31]—and on what one then decides to do to try to alter the outcomes. Econometric analysis is not always right. But it predicts better than either Adam Smith or Karl Marx was able to. Political gaming and other social science tools cannot tell one what will happen. But if done well, they put the official mind into a

[30] CIA working paper entitled "A Study of Climatological Research as it Pertains to Intelligence Problems," declassified May 1976, *New York Times*, February 2, 1977.

[31] Examples are given in "Short-Order Futures" by Lincoln P. Bloomfield in *Forecasting in International Relations: Theory, Methods, Problems, Prospects*, ed. Nazli Choucri and Thomas W. Robinson (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, forthcoming)..

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believable future long enough to subject favorable policies to strain and to raise with participants hitherto unexamined alternatives.

An equally compelling case exists for doing that which most runs against the smooth grain of the bureaucracy: challenging first-order policy premises that may be reinforcing a faulty policy edifice. Justice Holmes pointed out that men naturally try to suppress opposing views. Writing of one of America's most traumatic cases of officially imposed policy myopia, Barbara Tuchman observed that "to halt the momentum of an accepted idea, to reexamine assumptions, is a disturbing process and requires more courage than governments can generally summon."[32] In the present era, a whole succession of later-regretted policies was accounted for by President John F. Kennedy when, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, he told Clark Clifford: "I have made a tragic mistake . . . not only were our facts in error, but our policy was wrong *because the premises on which it was built were wrong*."[33]

In sum, in a global political atmosphere that often seems to resemble a gas-filled coal mine, modern governments cannot afford not to create and nurture a role, sharply distinguished from that of the workers battering away at the coal face, for the canaries who give early warning of potential disaster.

Squaring the Circle

If the preceding analysis is accepted, planning will be defined in terms of two different functions, neither of which has been done well. The first distinctive task is to study the unfolding future—short, middle, and long term—free of agency bias, with the aid of modern analytical tools to supplement the experienced diplomat's *fingerspritzengefühl*. The other is enough independence of mind—and the clout to back it up—so that, particularly as an administration ages, bad news about the leadership's favorite policy assumptions can be delivered without the messenger returning to the planning office with his head tucked under his arm.

But it is painfully evident that an official planning staff, even if it wished to, cannot go beyond certain now-familiar bounds in trying to fulfill these functions. Long experience in the United States and elsewhere confirms that planners are unlikely to even try to do any of them if a particular secretary of state or minister of foreign affairs chooses not to acknowledge their value. Ideally, then, foreign policy planning should not be confined to an organizational setting in which, for deep structural reasons, it cannot realize even an approximation of the ideal.

A superficially tempting way out of the dilemma would be to transfer S/P from the State Department to the White House, so that it could embrace

[32] Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911–45* (New York: Macmillan, 1971) p. 354.

[33] *New York Times*, May 17, 1970 (emphasis added).

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the entire executive branch, including primarily domestic agencies doing things which increasingly affect, and are affected by, foreign relations.[34] One can envisage an Americanized version of the British "think tank," generating two-tiered official planning, with government-wide planners challenging State Department staffs and vice versa. Indeed, were it not for constitutional constraints, logic might even commend joint executive-congressional policy planning in order to prepare the U.S. government for the monumental agenda of cross-cutting problems that lies ahead.

The recent Murphy Commission report was, however, probably correct in concluding that the function had best be left in the Department of State—but improved. But the commission did not go far enough in breaking new ground demanded by the implications of its own analysis. Several linked propositions mark the path to a solution.

Planners inside the government must obviously give top priority to helping policy makers with their current headaches. Someone else, then, should be available to go further than S/P can in criticizing, thinking unthinkable policy thoughts, and peering into the longer-term future.

In-house planners must operate in secret if they are to have the trust of their colleagues. Someone else, then, should be available to help think about the same range of issues in freer contact with public opinion groups, members of Congress, and the academic and intellectual world. Inside planners must respect the government's division of labor. Someone else must be free to tread on forbidden turf when necessary to do greater justice to planning problems that know no agency bounds. *What is needed is a combination of inside and outside.*

If S/P supplies to the secretary of state and the principal seventh floor officers a kind of "loyal opposition" to keep them alert to implications and consequences of current policy decisions, S/P in turn needs a "loyal opposition" to help it go beyond the well-known constraints of in-house planning, in the direction of the ideal.

In-house planning must maintain its vital link to policy, and to action authority which alone can implement the planner's insights. Outside help, less tied to the hierarchy and more tenuously linked to authority, could, if adequately plugged in to S/P, ensure greater scope, more flexible and imaginative time horizons, freer methodological experimentation, and insistent independent-mindedness.

Outside counterparts could help keep the insiders intellectually honest. Inside planners would, in turn, help to keep the outsiders reasonably—but not bureaucratically—earthbound.

My modest proposal, then, is that a group of knowledgeable individuals of independent mind, with secure home bases outside of the government, be added on to the official planning function as a kind of "outside wing." Their

[34] Other options, along with elaboration of the recommendation that follows, are found in the author's "Organizing for Policy Planning," which appears in the *Report* of the Murphy Commission, op. cit.

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mandate would be to help the policy planners in ways that will maximize the possibility of fulfilling S/P's only partially achieved goals.

An outside wing of part-time planners would be small (and S/P itself might consider a further slimming down). Its members would be appointed as consultants, where possible without pay, with the understanding that they were independent of government. The wing would be so organized (for example, three-year appointments) as to ensure that it would not be eliminated when the policy going gets rough.

Contacts with S/P would be regular, preferably as often as two days of intensive meetings every month. The group would bring in others as needed, ad hoc. But its members would be fully cleared so there would be no inhibitions at the regular discussions.

Such an outside wing would appraise planning papers; suggest reordering of planning priorities when those priorities excessively reflect current operational needs; propose planning agenda items that from the inside might seem too distant or irrelevant; help supply more unorthodox inputs into planning (which, like the rest of the foreign policy "establishment," tends to feature white males); and provide perspectives on policy issues which draw on non–State Department and domestically oriented, concerns.

Such an outside planning wing could itself do or oversee tasks inside planners virtually never do: make long-range projections, and conduct post mortems on past planning products from S/P files in order to supply a more systematic learning experience that might throw new light on planning successes and failures. While primarily a "creative critic" of official planning, to the extent it was part of the political process it might at times act as a political ally of S/P through influence on top officials on behalf of good planning ideas (or to warn top officials against obvious misuse of their planning staffs).

Individually members would exploit their home bases, whether research institutions, businesses, labor, public organizations, universities, or whatever, to bring to the effort specialized knowledge about potentially useful and relevant work done elsewhere. To the extent possible, members would themselves try to translate and "process" that work in order to convey it in usable ways to in-house planners.

The outside wing would on occasion meet together separately to brainstorm certain of its ideas before taking them up with S/P. But it would not form an outside "cabal," and members would bring individual contributions to S/P.

One additional potential contribution of the "add-on" function would be to focus foreign office planners on methods and techniques of analysis of which, on a virtual worldwide basis, they tend to remain ignorant and toward which they are often hostile.

Much theoretical and methodological work in the social sciences is unfortunately irrelevant to the needs of real-world planning, either because it is not applicable, or is still in the theory-building stage, or because some of it is excessively primitive and even shoddy.

Other work, I would contend, is potentially relevant but remains under-

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utilized. The reason is that planners don't know how to use such tools, or because the work is not intelligible to any but a handful of academic cognoscenti, or because scarce official resources invariably favor projects with the highest short-term payoff. Some useful external research has been commissioned by the State Department at the behest of the Policy Planning Staff, and some contacts with scholars are regularly maintained by both planning and research units of the State Department. But policy planning the world over is notoriously laggard in using or applying social science research tools, even the potentially valuable ones.

One such technique is mentioned with some diffidence, since I have been personally associated with it. This is the so-called political game. Assuming it to be well designed and aimed specifically at policy-planning purposes,[35] a game can, if conducted properly, constitute a stimulating technique for pretesting, so to speak, proposed policy strategies, as well as for examining in depth inadequately considered alternative policy outcomes. Political games can be a powerful tool for eliciting more useful reactions to the planner's central question of "what if?" than conventional discussions or individual analyses. Apart from well-known group pressures for consensus, usual methods have no systematic way of introducing either the clash of antagonistic wills or the dynamics of moves beyond the first action and reaction—undoubtedly the two chief features of games.

It can be speculated that the negative German and Brazilian reactions to the Carter administration's abrupt demands to cancel the agreed nuclear fuel cycle deal might have been better anticipated had the move been "gamed out" in advance; similarly, the negative Soviet reaction in the same period to substantial changes in SALT II (the hazards of which Moscow had specifically cautioned the newly elected leadership against in the fall of 1976).

One could conceive of simple but provocative games centered on proposed arms sales and transfers to countries in volatile regions, in order to get a sense of possible regional consequences that go beyond the usual short-term assumptions of "stability" or "balance."[36]

In fact virtually all U.S. government political gaming has been conducted by the Pentagon, perhaps because it has far more funds than the diplomatic

[35] The design, methodology, and results of efforts to tailor the political game for planning purposes are reported in *Anticipating Conflict Control Policies: The CONEX Games as a Planning Tool* by the present author with C.J. Gearin et al., MIT Center for International Studies, Pub. No. C/70-10, Cambridge, Mass. A summary is found in "Games Foreign Policy Experts Play," op. cit.

[36] Again, with apologies reference is made to an MIT report, which the government paid for but never made serious use of, containing important game-experimental findings concerning the possible effects of introducing arms assistance in various ways into local conflicts. See *Anticipating Conflicting Control Policies*, op.cit. A review of all senior political games put on at MIT from 1958 through 1970 (many of them comparable in problem and participants to the Pentagon's) showed that *forecasts of future events embodied in the scenarios* were almost uniformly wrong, but that, once given a certain genre of crisis, *the intragame* developments were uncannily correct in light of history.

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branch. Not unnaturally, since 1961 (when the Joint Chiefs of Staff set up an agency for government-wide political and military gaming), the emphasis has been on predominantly military crises. But today what is needed are planning exercises on issues that have *not* become crises, as well as on nonmilitary sectors such as food, energy, and civilian technologies, which we now know can have profound security implications. The Pentagon's gaming effort should be purposefully redirected to become a far more effective tool for policy planning, perhaps by assigning S/P the guiding role in developing scenarios and insisting on more rigorous techniques of design and evaluation.

To give another example, computer systems are being developed widely outside the government for a broad range of activities including, for example, early warning of international conflict. But apart from some abortive experiments in the late 1960s and early '70s, little or no support has been given by the State Department to bringing this effort to a stage of usability by those officials who are trying to do complex planning tasks using pencil, paper, and imperfect human memories. Many otherwise interested officials have been turned off by excessive claims. Unfortunately, some computer enthusiasts see their machines as substitutes for experience and judgment, rather than as fast, efficient—and stupid—aids to intuition. The result has been to leave our diplomatic arm, apart from sophisticated communication mechanisms, a decade behind other sectors of American society.

It is not hard to think of many potential defects and weaknesses of the proposal for an outside wing. There is no dearth of external critics; why not just listen to them? Universities and private research organizations can obviously do some of these things. The proposed "wing" might not have had any effect on some policy failures. Official roles are focused on action, outsiders are often unrealistic about what is possible and not possible. If too tied to the system, outsiders may become co-opted by it, pull their punches, and meanwhile be downgraded elsewhere as "administration people." Regardless of what top officials say early in an administration, they may want to disregard *both* inside and outside critics when the time comes for "hunkering down" against the inevitable policy storms.

Such criticisms can be readily acknowledged as at least partially valid. But after all is said and done, the gulf remains between the "thinking" side and the "doing" side of foreign policy making, as does the obligation to seek new remedies.*

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The Reassertion of Congressional Power: New Curbs on the President

HARVEY G. ZEIDENSTEIN

The confrontations in the 1970s between the Nixon-Ford administration and the Democratic-controlled Congress have left a legacy of restrictions on various kinds of presidential activities that are now operating on President Carter but which did not exist to limit "imperial" presidents in the era from Franklin Roosevelt to Lyndon Johnson. These restrictions came as a reaction to what became recognized as a gradual erosion of congressional checks and balances against presidents since the 1930s. They represented Congress's attempt to resurrect its disused legal powers to participate in policy making—especially in the areas of declaration and termination of national emergencies, war-making, foreign policy, intelligence operations, budget policy, and impoundments of appropriated funds.

Our concern is with executive-congressional relations in legitimate and routine policy activities. Criminal or other impeachable offenses by presidents are neither legitimate nor (we assume) routine. Consequently, restrictions unique to Watergate or to the attempted impeachment of former President Richard Nixon fall outside the scope of this study. Nonetheless, we are left with a lengthy catalog of restrictions on the president.

Varieties of Restrictions on Presidential Actions

Through a variety of measures, Congress has increased its ability to restrict presidential actions and to hold the president and the executive branch more accountable to itself by allowing for formal congressional disapproval in some

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instances, requiring to be provided with critical information in others, and mandating that certain presidential initiatives cease automatically in other cases in the absence of congressional action to affirmatively approve those initiatives.

TERMINATION OR CONTINUATION OF EMERGENCY AUTHORITY

In 1973 a Senate special committee found some 470 provisions of federal law that could be triggered during a "time of war" or a "national emergency" declared by Congress or the president.[1] Many were as innocuous as those providing for the presentation of soldiers' medals during conflict and assistance for current school expenditures in cases of certain disasters.[2] Other laws—such as those allowing the president to order private plants to manufacture necessary products "in time of war or when war is imminent," and to maintain lists of plants capable of war production—were potentially more sweeping in granting authority to the executive.[3]

Presidents have been far more willing to declare emergencies than to end them, so emergency periods, and the laws operative in them, typically have lasted many years beyond the end of the original emergency. This motivated passage of the National Emergencies Act in September 1976.[4] The act leaves most of the 470 wartime and emergency laws intact, but creates a system for declaring and terminating national emergencies.

Declaration is by the president. Of the three methods of termination, one (discussed later) is up to Congress and two leave the initiative to the president. As in the past, an emergency can be ended by presidential proclamation. A new wrinkle is that an emergency will terminate automatically in one year unless the president informs Congress within ninety days before the end of the year that the emergency is to continue.[5] As both methods are subject to presidential discretion, their purely legal restriction on his authority is minimal to nonexistent. But their effect may be important politically. A president who does not end an emergency, or who continues it, is subject to questions. Not the least of which is why an emergency still exists a year after his administration presumably has been working on it.

CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS BEFORE MILITARY OPERATIONS

In November 1973 Congress overrode a Nixon veto and enacted the War Powers

[1] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations and the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, *The National Emergencies Act (Public Law 94-412), Source Book: Legislative History, Texts, and Other Documents*, Committee Print, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Nov. 1976, p. 5.

[2] 10 *USC* 3750 and 20 *USC* 241-1.

[3] 10 *USC* 4501, 4502, 9501, and 9502.

[4] PL 94-412, 90 *Stat.* 1255; 50 *USC* 1601.

[5] 90 *Stat.* 1257, sec. 201 (5) (d).

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Resolution.[6] The Resolution's avowed purpose is to "insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply" to sending American armed forces into hostilities or into situations where immediate involvement in hostilities is likely, and to the continued use of armed forces in hostilities or threatening situations.

Among other things, the Resolution requires the president "in every possible instance" to "consult with Congress" before he introduces armed forces into hostilities or into situations leading to hostilities. He also must consult regularly with Congress until the forces have been withdrawn from combat or the threatening situation.[7]

The extent of consultation before the president commits forces to hostilities is open to varying interpretation. In reporting the War Powers Resolution, the House International Relations (then Foreign Affairs) Committee stated that it expected the president himself to seek congressional advice and opinion while his decision is still pending. The committee flatly rejected the notion that consultation occurs when a president informs Congress of decisions already made.[8]

But in the May 1975 rescue of the American merchant ship *Mayaguez*, what the administration called "consultation" was the White House informing about twenty congressional leaders after President Ford had ordered U.S. Navy jets and Marines to engage Cambodian forces. In the few hours between Ford's order and the first shots of combat, the leaders were able to submit their views to the president. But their opportunity to "advise" came after the military operations approved by the president had begun.[9]

Except for the grumblings of a few ultradoves, Congress winked at Ford's minimal consultation, largely because the rescue was considered a success. As the then Senate Majority Whip Robert Byrd told the president, he "might have been in a lot better position, had this operation not been successful," if he had actually sought advice from Congress.[10] But this observation would be nearly as trenchant had there been no legal requirement to consult, as President Truman learned when the Korean conflict went sour.

In a purely legal sense, then, the consultation provision adds no new curbs on the president's freedom to act. Even if he followed the intent of the law by seeking congressional advice before making up his mind, the president is not bound to accept it. On the other hand, future presidents may follow Ford's precedent of defining after-the-fact briefings as consultation. The lesson of *Mayaguez* seems to be that in the future, as in the past, consultation—or lack of it—will be viewed in the context of existing political circumstances rather

[6] PL 93-148, 87 *Stat.* 555; 50 *USC* Supp. V (1975) 1541.

[7] Ibid., at sec. 3; ibid., sec. 1543.

[8] U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *War Powers Resolution of 1973*, House Report No. 93-287, 93d Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 1963 [sic] [1973], pp. 6-7.

[9] Harvey G. Zeidenstein and Hibbert R. Roberts, "The War Powers Resolution, Institutionalized Checks and Balances, and Public Policy," a paper presented at the Southern Political Science Association Convention, Nashville, Tenn., Nov. 6-8, 1975, pp. 103-105.

[10] *New York Times*, May 16, 1975, p. 15.

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than according to a consistent legal definition. If the president embarks on a military venture opposed by Congress, or one that foments opposition because it fails, then lack of consultation will be a convenient legal springboard for criticism.

SENATE CONFIRMATION OF OMB HEADS

In 1970 President Nixon through a reorganization plan enlarged the old Bureau of the Budget into the more powerful Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which became a potent force for executing presidential policies. Among the more controversial policies was gutting domestic programs by impoundment—ordering the bureaucracy not to spend money appropriated by a liberal Democratic Congress.

Although the director and deputy director of OMB exerted far more authority than cabinet officers, they were appointed by the president without the advice and consent of the Senate. This changed in March 1974, when President Nixon approved an amendment to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The new measure exempted the incumbents, but required that future directors and deputy directors of OMB receive Senate confirmation.[11]

The Senate's role is probably a minor foray into the executive's domain. Although confirmation hearings can be used to quiz prospective OMB heads on their views toward facets of fiscal policy, prospective appointees with enough political skill for the job probably will evade or finesse the more pointed questions. Also, traditionally, the Senate is strongly inclined to confirm whomever the president chooses for his administration. Bert Lance is a case in point. In its eagerness to recommend Lance's confirmation, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee was ignorant of or indifferent to his personal financial ethics.

For the near future, the Lance affair probably will make the president and the Senate more sensitive to personal ethics as grounds for withholding confirmation. For serious questions about the ethics of a potential presidential appointee would be of mutual concern to the president and the Senate. Both could be criticized in the media, as they were several months after Lance's confirmation. To avoid this, we expect the executive to rigorously screen an appointee's personal affairs before his name is submitted to the Senate. The Senate confirmation process will become a fail-safe device to backstop the executive's investigation. If this reading is correct, confirmation gives the Senate not a new check, but an added responsibility.

On the other hand, Congress may have gained an increased expectation that OMB directors will testify candidly before its committees. Many on Capitol Hill believe that administration officials confirmed by the Senate are less protected by executive privilege than officials appointed exclusively by the president.

[11] PL 93-250, 88 *Stat.* 11; 31 *USC* 16.

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PRESIDENTIAL REPORTS TO CONGRESS

Three recent laws obligate the president to inform Congress about his current or anticipated activities with respect to executive agreements, national emergencies, and deploying U.S. armed forces abroad.

Stung by revelations that the Johnson and Nixon administrations had made secret executive agreements with foreign governments, in 1972 Congress reacted by requiring the secretary of state to send it the text of any international agreement, other than a treaty, within sixty days after the agreement became effective. However, if the president judged that public disclosure would injure national security, the text would be submitted only to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee "under the appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President."[12] In effect, the president would inform Congress, or at his discretion only two of its committees, of faits accomplis. And short of a leak, they would be kept secret from the public as long as the president wished.

Still, Congress gained a significant inroad. It can modify or hamstring executive agreements by refusing the funds to implement them. Even secret agreements known only to the two foreign policy committees are not immune. These committees could register strong displeasure, even threats, with the administration. For example, without public disclosure of the secret details of an agreement, either committee could sponsor legislation which, in general language, nullifies its purpose. Such measures could be debated by Congress in secret sessions.

When the president declares a national emergency, the National Emergencies Act forbids him from exercising any statutory authority available during emergencies unless and until he informs Congress of the specific laws under which he proposes to act.[13] This alerts Congress to the president's probable future activities. To help Congress monitor the executive's ongoing activities during an emergency or declared war, all of the president's significant orders and all executive agency rules and regulations are to be filed, indexed, and promptly sent to Congress, by means to insure their confidentiality where appropriate. Finally, every six months during an emergency or declared war, and within three months after it has ended, the president must inform Congress of the total expenditures directly attributed to the emergency or war.[14]

When Congress has not declared war, the War Powers Resolution requires the president to inform Congress in writing within forty-eight hours after he has introduced U.S. armed forces into any of three situations: hostilities or circumstances where immediate involvement in hostilities is likely; the territory, air, or waters of a foreign nation while equipped for combat, except for such

[12] PL 92-403, 86 *Stat.* 619; 1 *USC* Supp. V (1975) 112b.
[13] PL 94-412, 90 *Stat.* 1257, at sec. 301; 50 *USC* 1631.
[14] Ibid., at sec. 401; ibid., sec. 1641.

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deployments which are nonhostile; or a substantial increase in the number of combat-equipped forces already stationed in a foreign country.[15]

The president's report must specify the reasons he introduced armed forces, the legal authority justifying their introduction, and the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement. The president must also give Congress any additional information it requests, and report every six months while American forces are involved in any of the three situations requiring his original report.[16]

The War Powers reports, as such, are not a severe encroachment on the president's authority. But the information given (or omitted) can be a basis for significantly influencing Congress's decision to support or throttle the president's military initiatives.

CIA REPORTS TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

As a civilian agency, the CIA is outside the jurisdiction of the War Powers Resolution. Consequently, the Resolution does not require the president to inform Congress of covert CIA operations, such as the secret war in Laos in the 1960s and a variety of other CIA military and political activities intended to establish or protect friendly regimes abroad.

This gap was plugged by other measures compelling CIA accountability to selected congressional committees. First came an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, sponsored by Senator Harold Hughes and Representative Leo Ryan, which took effect on December 30, 1974.[17] Except for gathering "necessary intelligence," the Hughes-Ryan amendment prohibits the spending of money by or for the CIA for operations in foreign countries, "unless and until" the president finds each operation is important to national security, and the president reports, "in a timely fashion," a description and scope of each operation to the "appropriate committees" of Congress, including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee. Presidential approval and reports of covert operations are not required during military operations resulting from a declared war or from the president acting under the War Powers Resolution. The Hughes-Ryan amendment does not require written reports.[18] Acting as the president's delegate, the director of the CIA gives oral briefings to "appropriate" committees.[19] There are currently

[15] PL 93-148, 87 *Stat.* 555, at sec. 4; 50 *USC* Supp. V (1975) 1544.

[16] Ibid., at sec. 4; ibid., sec. 1544.

[17] PL 93-559, 88 *Stat.* 1804; 22 *USC* 2422.

[18] U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Harold Hughes interpreting the intent of his amendment, 93d Cong., 2d sess., Oct. 2, 1974, vol. 120 *Congressional Record*, part 25, p. 33490.

[19] Mitchell Rogovin, Special Counsel to the Director of CIA, to A. Searle Field, Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Jan. 6, 1976, in U.S., Congress, House, *Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Risks and Control of Foreign Intelligence, Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence*, Part 5, 94th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. and Dec. 1975, p. 2020. This committee, chaired by Representative Otis Pike, investigated the CIA.

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eight of them: the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, the Senate Foreign Relations and the House International Relations Committees, the Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense, and Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence, which have oversight and legislative jurisdiction over the entire intelligence community. The Senate Select Intelligence Committee was created in May 1976, its House counterpart fourteen months later. Both succeeded temporary committees in each house—one chaired by Senator Frank Church, the other by Representative Otis Pike—which investigated the CIA in 1975 and disbanded in 1976.

A Hughes-Ryan report is not a prerequisite for a covert operation, so the committees may be briefed after the operation has begun.[20] However, as former CIA Director William Colby testified to the Senate Government Operations Committee early in 1976, on the day the CIA is informed that the president has signed a finding approving an operation, the CIA calls the committees' staffs to notify them that there is a finding to report at the committees' convenience. "We make a point of getting that notice out immediately."[21] Colby said he has reported as early as the next morning with some committees and some weeks later with others, depending on the committee.[22]

Because of the Hughes-Ryan amendment no president or his apologists will be able to disclaim responsibility for any CIA operations in peacetime and as a result, the president is given stronger incentive to closely monitor the CIA and prevent it from undertaking operations without his authority (the so-called "rogue elephant").

Although the Hughes-Ryan amendment does not legally require reports until after covert operations have begun, the Senate has used the power of the purse to persuade the CIA and other intelligence agencies to give the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence advance notice of future covert activities also. The committee was established in May 1976 by Senate Resolution 400.[23] One section of the resolution expresses the "sense of the Senate" that executive agencies should keep the Select Committee informed of their intelligence activities, "including any significant anticipated activities," although prior notification is not a precondition to implementing the activity.[24]

No "sense of the Senate" resolution has legal force outside that chamber. But the Senate gave its Select Intelligence Committee exclusive jurisdiction over all authorization bills for the CIA, and shared jurisdiction with other committees

[20] Rogovin to Field, ibid., p. 2016.

[21] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, *Oversight of U.S. Government Intelligence Functions, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Government Operations*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Jan. and Feb. 1976, p. 130. Hereafter cited as Senate hearings, *Oversight of Intelligence*.

[22] Ibid.

[23] U.S., Congress, Senate, 94th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 122 *Congressional Record*, No. 74, S 7563–S 7565 (daily ed., May 19, 1976). Hereafter cited as Senate Res. 400 with appropriate section number.

[24] Senate Res. 400, sec. 11 (a).

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over authorizations for the intelligence activities of other agencies in the intelligence community.[25] With its hand on the money authorizing spigot, it is not surprising that the committee has been fully briefed on covert operations prior to their implementation. The committee has even voted on every proposed covert operation.

In addition to its control over authorizations, the Select Intelligence Committee may make intelligence information available to any other committee or member of the Senate. With the approval of the full Senate, the committee may inform the public of information the president wants to keep classified.[26] These powers give the committee a strong bargaining position with the executive. After being briefed on a proposed covert operation, the committee reaction, if any, can include the following:

—Comment to the executive branch;
—Referral of information to other committees, if appropriate;
—Public disclosure, if supported by a closed session vote of the Senate; and
—Funding restrictions.[27]

When the House created its own Select Intelligence Committee by passing House Resolution 658 in July 1977, it used language that was, in most parts, identical to that in Senate Resolution 400.[28] But in a notable departure from the Senate resolution, the House measure does not express the "sense of the House" that intelligence agencies should alert the House Intelligence Committee to anticipated activities. Without this mandate, it is too soon to tell whether the House Intelligence Committee will expect to receive prior notification of covert activities, although it is equal to its Senate counterpart in controlling authorizations, and equivalent to it is sharing classified information with other lawmakers and the public.

MANDATE FOR COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

By providing a mechanism for public disclosure of classified information, the resolutions creating the Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees give these bodies a check against the president far stronger than what the other six committees have from the Hughes-Ryan amendment alone.

Each Intelligence Committee may vote to disclose any information it receives from the executive branch. After informing the president of its decision, a committee can release the information in five days unless the president objects

[25] Senate Res. 400, sec. 3 (a) and (b).

[26] Senate Res. 400, sec. 8.

[27] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Annual Report to the Senate of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate*, Senate Report No. 95-217, 95th Cong., 1st sess., May 18, 1977, p. 18.

[28] U.S., Congress, House, 95th Cong.; 1st sess., vol. 123 *Congressional Record*, No. 119 H, 7104-H 7106 (daily ed., July 14, 1977). Hereafter cited as House Res. 658, with appropriate section number. Note that this resolution amended the *Rules of the House of Representatives* by adding "Rule XLVII. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence."

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personally, in writing, states the reasons for his objection, and certifies that the threat to the national interest of disclosure outweighs any public interest in the information. If the committee still favors disclosure, it can vote to refer the matter to its parent body, the Senate or the House, as the case may be. Within four days of the referral, the parent body goes into closed session (required in the Senate, only if voted upon in the House). The Senate has a maximum of nine days to vote for one of three actions: to approve or disapprove disclosure of all or part of the information, or to refer all or any part of the information back to its Intelligence Committee, in which case the committee makes the final decision whether to go public.[29] The House procedure allows two hours of debate (rather than nine days), then requires a vote on whether to approve the recommendation for disclosure made by its Select Intelligence Committee. If the House votes against the recommendation, it is sent back to the Committee for further recommendation.[30] In both houses, the final vote is taken in open session without debate and without divulging the classified information at issue.[31]

The provision for public disclosure approved through these procedures is meant to inhibit the president from illegal or highly unpopular intelligence operations.

CENTRALIZING OR "DE-FRAGMENTING" COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT

Friendly critics have argued that Congress's decentralized committee system leaves it impotent in any face-off with the executive, and incapable of adopting a coherent policy of its own. Fractionalized legislative and budgetary authority by numerous, sometimes competing, committees and subcommittees has led to desultory oversight of executive agencies, to some committees sitting on information that should be shared with their parent chambers, and to ineffective coordination by each house over the total legislative and fiscal output of its committees. In sum, Congress has been constipated by an inefficient decision-making structure and process. While this condition has often hurt the president by delaying his legislative agenda and hobbling executive programs, in other circumstances it has left him or executive agencies immune from congressional checks and balances.

Oversight of Intelligence. As a case in point, both the executive and Congress were unhappy with what passed for oversight of intelligence and counter-intelligence activities. After experience with the Hughes-Ryan amendment, the executive implored the House of Representatives, in the words of Speaker Tip O'Neill, "to establish a process that could provide valid oversight of all intelligence activities . . . and at the same time reduce the possibilities of leaks that might occur from the Hill."[32] O'Neill was urging his colleagues to create the

[29] Senate Res. 400, sec. 8 (b).

[30] House Res. 658, sec. 7 (b) (7).

[31] Ibid., and Senate Res. 400, sec. 8 (b).

[32] U.S., Congress, House, 95th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 123 *Congressional Record*, No. 119 H, 7115 (daily ed., July 14, 1977).

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Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence fourteen months after the Senate Select Intelligence Committee was established. The anticipated benefits to the House were expressed by Representative Edward Boland, Democrat of Massachusetts. Noting that seven committees had some form of jurisdiction over various agencies in the intelligence community, Boland observed:

> All of them can secure access to the most vital secrets of our Nation, but none of them currently [July 1977] views the activities of the community as a composite.
>
> None of them, in practice, have developed a critical overview of the functioning and work-product of the entire community.
>
> [These committees] would . . . agree, I believe, that because of the lack of a strong, unified vehicle in this House—and previously in the other body—abuses occurred in the operations of some intelligence agencies, most notably the CIA.[33]

Traditionally, legislative jurisdiction over the FBI was held by the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. The Armed Services Subcommittees on Intelligence had comparable authority for the CIA and Defense Department intelligence agencies. Despite the contribution of the CIA in the formation and implementation of foreign policy, there was no role for the Senate Foreign Relations and the House International Relations Committees. Appropriations for intelligence activities were, and still are, processed by Appropriations subcommittees. But no total sum was available to Congress, for intelligence funding has been scattered throughout the budgets of several agencies.

This disjointed structure was rebuilt by establishing the Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees. Each combines unified oversight of all intelligence agencies with a mandate to share information with other committees and members of Congress. To insure liaison among other committees with jurisdiction in the field, the membership of both Intelligence Committees must include representatives from each of four committees in their respective houses: Appropriations, Armed Services, Judiciary, and Senate Foreign Relations or House International Relations.

To reduce the chance that the Intelligence Committees will fall into a protective relationship with the agencies they are supposed to monitor, no member may serve more than eight years on the Senate committee or six years on the House committee, and a third of the members of each committee is to be replaced every two years.

Congressional Budget Policy. Nothing has the universal impact on all policy areas as the federal budget and the fiscal policy it represents: levels and incidence of taxation, spending, and debt. Yet until the mid-'70s, congressional budgetary decisions were clumsily arrived at and muddled in intent. Consider these historic problems:

> —Congress lacked sufficient information and expertise to effectively evaluate the president's annual budget. Most information and analytical skills rested principally in the president's Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and in the executive

[33] Ibid., H 7119.

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departments which compiled the budget and were therefore able to defend it in Congress. Congress had no institutional staff agency comparable to the OMB.

—Congress could not coordinate revenues and expenditures. One set of committees wrote the tax laws (Ways and Means in the House, Finance in the Senate), another set the spending bills (Appropriations Committees in each house). This decentralized jurisdiction, coupled with Congress' proclivity to spend money and reluctance to raise taxes, contributed, said the critics, to chronic budget deficits and inflation.

—There was little or no coordination of expenditures. Each house's Appropriations Committee was (and is) fractured into some thirteen specialized subcommittees, each autonomous in the amount of appropriations it recommended. Total spending was the sum of whatever their recommendations happened to be, as modified and adopted by Congress on a piecemeal basis during the legislative session. There was no disciplined look at total spending or its effect on inflation, budget deficits, the national debt, and federal borrowing to pay interest on the debt.

—More importantly, perhaps, Congress had no mechanism for incorporating its own clear priorities for its spending, no coherent policy which dictated hard choices about where to spend a limited amount of money, because there was no predetermined limit. Since the president's budget reflected his priorities and hard choices, he was in a stronger position to argue with Congress when they disagreed, and to receive public support when he vetoed spending bills on the grounds of dampening inflation.

These chronic problems were addressed by the decision structure and process created by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which became fully effective in 1976.[34] Without getting into their fine points, the cardinal provisions of the Budget Act can be summarized as follows:

—It establishes a new fiscal year beginning October 1. Since the president sends Congress his annual budget in mid or late January, this gives Congress more than eight months to work on it, instead of the less than six months available under the old fiscal year beginning July 1.

—To match the technical knowledge and expertise of the president's OMB, the Act creates the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), empowered to secure information from executive agencies. The act also establishes Budget Committees in each house of Congress which, utilizing the staff studies of the CBO and staff studies of their own, recommend coordinated levels of revenues and expenditures and priorities for spending. In effect, these three new bodies were created to help Congress establish its own budget ceilings (targets) which, under the Budget Act, may not be exceeded.

—The Budget Committees' recommendations are embodied in concurrent budget resolutions reported to their respective houses. A first resolution sets tentative or "target" ceilings for appropriations and actual expenditures (outlays) in each functional category, as well as ceilings for total appropriations and outlays, revenues, a budget surplus or deficit, and the national debt, and is due by April 15.

—By May 15, standing committees must report new authorization bills, and Congress must adopt a first concurrent budget resolution. (As a concurrent resolution, it is not submitted to the president for approval or veto.) This resolution guides, but does not bind, subsequent congressional budgetary decisions. However, the CBO and the Budget Committees keep score on how close spending and revenue bills come to the first

[34] PL 93-344, 88 *Stat.* 297; 31 *USC* 1301.

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resolution's ceilings. And in the Senate, at least, Budget Committee Chairman Edmund Muskie is not above jawboning his colleagues into fiscal restraint.

—By September 15 Congress must adopt a second, binding, concurrent budget resolution, which either affirms or revises the first resolution passed on May 15. If the money bills passed in the preceding four months do not conform to the ceilings in the second resolution, it can dictate changes in the amounts of appropriations, revenues, and the public debt. These changes are called reconciliations. Congress must then adopt a reconciliation measure to implement the second, binding, concurrent resolution and may not adjourn until this is done.

Despite some shakedown problems, the new budgetary process puts Congress on a level at least approaching the presidency in making—and taking responsibility for—policy decisions on spending and revenue raising. To the Carter administration, pledged to seek a balanced budget, the Budget Act can make Congress a competent ally. But should Congress break with the president, it would be a formidable adversary.

STOPPING THE PRESIDENT BY CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Some of the laws defining the president's authority in selected policy areas have permitted Congress to remove his authority by adopting a concurrent resolution. Although they require a majority vote in each house, concurrent resolutions are not sent to the president, so they cannot be vetoed. Three recent laws provide for veto-proof concurrent resolutions.

The National Emergencies Act requires future national emergencies to end on the date specified in a presidential proclamation or in a concurrent resolution, whichever date comes first. No later than every six months after the emergency is declared, Congress must consider whether to end it by concurrent resolution. When the emergency ends, so do the president's special powers granted him by numerous statutes triggered by the emergency.[35]

The War Powers Resolution states that "at any time" U.S. armed forces are engaged in hostilities abroad without a declaration of war or specific statutory approval from Congress, such forces shall be removed by the president if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.[36] Because of another provision of the War Powers Resolution discussed below, such a concurrent resolution would be practical only during the first sixty days of a conflict.

The National Emergencies Act and the War Powers Resolution contain similar rules for giving concurrent resolutions fast consideration in Congress. Unless waived by a majority vote in either house, these rules protect concurrent resolutions from committee pigeonholes in both houses and filibusters in the Senate.[37]

[35] PL 94-412, 90 *Stat.* 1255; 50 *USC* 1621.

[36] PL 93-148, 87 *Stat.* 555 at sec. 5(c); 50 *USC* Supp. V (1975) 1545 (c).

[37] PL 94-412, 90 *Stat.* 1255; 50 *USC* 1622 for National Emergencies Act. PL 93-148, 87 *Stat.* 555 at sec. 7; 50 *USC* Supp. V (1975) 1547 for War Powers Resolution.

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In 1974, Congress amended Section 36 of the Foreign Military Sales Act to require the president to give Congress advance notice of any offer to sell arms or services valued at $25 million or more. By the mid-1970s, the United States had become one of the leading exporters of armaments, but Congress had had little to say about what weapons were sold to which countries. Congress had twenty days to reject any offer to sell arms by concurrent resolution, unless the president stated that an emergency required the sale in the national security interests of the United States.[38] (The quick transfer of weapons to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur war is an example of the kind of emergency Congress had in mind.)

After some experience with this law, Congress determined that twenty days gave it insufficient time to investigate an arms sale, and that the $25 million floor allowed a series of smaller arms sales to escape its scrutiny.[39] So in 1976 Congress further amended section 36 by giving itself up to thirty days to pass a concurrent resolution disapproving the sale of major defense equipment valued at $7 million or more, as well as any arms or services of $25 million or more.

In practice, at least some members of Congress have considerably more than thirty days to decide whether they want to support a concurrent resolution. First, by informal agreement with the executive, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee receive "pre-notification" of proposed sales twenty days in advance of formal notification to Congress. Formal notification initiates the thirty-day disapproval period.

Second, members of Congress may be able to buy time by threatening to pass a resolution of disapproval before the end of thirty days. The president can prevent this by withdrawing formal notification before Congress kills the sale. The president may resubmit notification later, but that begins a new, full thirty-day period. In the indefinite interim between withdrawal and resubmission of the proposed sale, Congress has ample time to influence the president and foreign governments to accept congressionally imposed compromises on foreign arms sales.

This has already occurred: in the 1975 sale of Hawk ground-to-air missiles to Jordan, and in the 1977 sale to Iran of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft.[40] A third instance of compromise occurred in May 1978, when President Carter promised an additional twenty planes for Israel as part of his package sale of jet fighters to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel.

STOPPING PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS BY SIMPLE RESOLUTION

A one house veto of a presidential recommendation by passage of a simple resolution is authorized in the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (which appears

[38] PL 93-559, 88 *Stat.* 1814; 22 *USC* 2776.

[39] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1975* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.), p. 353.

[40] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1975* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.), pp. 358-359, and *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, vol. 35, Sept. 3, 1977, pp. 1857-1863.

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as Title X of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974).[41] In a special message to Congress, the president may propose that he defer spending specified amounts of money for certain purposes until a later time in the current fiscal year (he may not propose deferrals beyond the end of the year). But the funds must be available for expenditure if either house passes a resolution disapproving the proposed deferral. Both houses have procedures for discharging a resolution from a committee, for treating motions to consider a resolution as privileged, and for limiting debate before the final floor vote.[42]

STOPPING THE PRESIDENT AUTOMATICALLY BY INACTION

Sponsors of concurrent or simple resolutions cannot stop the president without convincing a majority of their colleagues to vote against him. Assembling a majority on any policy issue is hard enough; constructing one in opposition to the president's policy is even harder.

This problem is leapfrogged if Congress wants to stop the president from fighting an undeclared war or from permanently impounding appropriations. In both cases, the president must stop automatically by a specific deadline, unless majorities in both houses of Congress vote to approve his action. The problem of achieving a majority is faced by the president's supporters, not his opponents.

Recall that in the absence of a declaration of war, the War Powers Resolution directs the president to report to Congress within forty-eight hours after he introduces U.S. armed forces into hostilities or situations where hostilities are likely. The teeth of the Resolution are in its provision that within sixty days after the report is due, the president shall terminate American involvement in hostilities or hostile situations, unless Congress has declared war or enacted a specific authorization for the fighting, has extended by law the sixty-day deadline, or is physically unable to meet because of an armed attack against the United States.[43] Priority procedures provide that any measure supporting the president, that is, legislation authorizing the war or extending the deadline, shall be voted upon before the sixty days have elapsed. However, this is not guaranteed, for the procedures may be waived by majority vote in either house.[44]

The sixty-day deadline could be extended up to thirty additional days if the president determines that "unavoidable military necessity" requires the extra time for the safe removal of U.S. forces. The president would have to certify this need to Congress in writing.[45] (As mentioned above, Congress could force the president to disengage from hostilities at any time by passing a concurrent resolution.)

A shorter deadline is written into the Impoundment Control Act. The presi-

[41] PL 93-344, 88 *Stat.* 332; 31 *USC* 1400.
[42] Ibid., at 337 in the *Statutes* and 1407 in the *U.S. Code*.
[43] PL 93-148, 87 *Stat.* 555 at sec. 5 (b); 50 *USC* Supp. V (1975) 1545(b).
[44] Ibid., at sec. 6 in the *Statutes* and 1546 in the *U.S. Code*.
[45] Ibid., at sec. 5 in the *Statutes* and 1545 in the *U.S. Code*.

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dent must propose permanent impoundments, called "rescissions," to Congress. However, the appropriations proposed to be rescinded have to be available for expenditure unless, within forty-five days of the president's request, Congress acts affirmatively and passes a rescission bill[46] approving the president's request. If passed, the rescission measure would repeal or amend the amounts authorized in previous appropriations acts. Both houses have provisions for expediting floor action on rescission bills.

ABOLISHING PREVIOUS PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY

The National Emergencies Act was signed into law on September 14, 1976. Two years from that date, all powers and authority held by the president and any other federal officer or employee as a result of past national emergencies will have terminated.[47] In effect, on September 14, 1978, the Act will have ended four emergencies: those declared by presidents Roosevelt, in March 1933 to deal with the Depression, Truman, in December 1950 after the outbreak of the Korean War, and Nixon, in March 1970 in response to a postal strike, and in August 1971 to implement currency restrictions following an international monetary crisis.[48]

The two-year grace period was to give the executive time to seek enactment of new laws to continue programs operating under statutes triggered by past emergencies. Also, of the some 470 so-called "emergency" laws, eight grant the executive authority considered essential for normal government activities. These eight provisions are exempt from termination under the National Emergencies Act, although they were subject to congressional review and possible change within nine months after the Act became law.[49] So, while the Act strips the president of most past emergency authority, it leaves him with enough for normal operations and grants him time to try to gain more. And, of course, the president may declare new emergencies in the future.

PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: THREE SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE

A combination of the Great Depression, World War II and the Cold War, and the early years of the Vietnam War left the presidency with vastly expanded responsibilities and authority. Is the final legacy of Vietnam and of presidents Johnson and Nixon to be a weakened presidency? An ascendant Congress? More generally, in what way may the new restrictions shape the future relationship of presidents and Congress?

[46] PL 93-344, 88 *Stat.* 332; 31 *USC* 1402.

[47] PL 94-412, 90 *Stat.* 1255; 50 *USC* 1601.

[48] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1976* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.), p. 522.

[49] PL 94-412, 90 *Stat.* 1258; 50 *USC* 1651.

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While the definitive answer will be provided by future events, we can consider three scenarios, in order of their probability for the near future.

Scenario 1: A More Balanced Partnership. Assuming no major changes in the existing political environment, the next few years should see a more balanced partnership between president and Congress in the adoption of public policy. Congress will insure this by exerting many of the new restrictions as checks on the president. But while there will be some retrenchment of the president's influence, there will not be a period of congressional dominance reminiscent of the nineteenth century. The president has too many responsibilities, legal and political, for that. Rather, the president will continue to propose, but Congress will more often—and more effectively—dispose. This relationship should be institutional. That is, the growth in congressional checks will be mostly (but not completely) independent of changes in specific issues or in the partisan makeup of the White House and Capitol Hill. Several factors contribute to this conclusion.

The new restrictions make it easier for Congress to offset the president. Executive actions kept secret in the past now must be reported routinely, giving Congress substantive knowledge on which to act. Previously, Congress's ultimate weapon was the power of the purse—restricting the use of future appropriations or repealing past spending authority. Both techniques were subject to delay in the legislative process and a possible presidential veto. Now the president faces veto-proof simple and concurrent resolutions, protected against committee pigeonholes and filibusters, and automatic deadlines written into existing law.

Other things being equal, the more opportunities Congress has to impose restrictions, the more likely it will. Restrictions giving Congress the most opportunities are those permanently built into routine congressional activity. One example is the annual budgetary process, with its budget committees and timetable of deadlines for spending priorities and target ceilings. The routine workload of the Intelligence Committees includes drafting annual authorization bills and receiving annual, or more frequent, reports of executive branch intelligence activities. Finally, presidential impoundment requests, and their review by Congress, have become virtually routine.

In the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate, Congress appears to have developed a more confident self-image, a greater willingness to assert its institutional prerogatives. Consequently, Congress seems more inclined to oppose a president perceived as demeaning its dignity and downgrading its importance in the constitutional scheme of things.

With the possible exception of Lyndon Johnson, presidents since Franklin Roosevelt have not had consistently strong political bases from which they could win a serious confrontation with a determined Congress. Republican presidents Eisenhower and Nixon won huge popular pluralities in 1956 and 1972, respectively, but faced sizable Democratic majorities in Congress. Democratic presidents—Truman in 1948, Kennedy in 1960, Carter in 1976—won very close

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elections and ran well behind their congressional party in popular votes. There is no evidence that this phenomenon—presidents of both parties without coattails—will reverse itself in the immediate future.

Scenario 2: Constitutional Confrontation. Given the necessary circumstances—president and Congress at loggerheads, with neither willing to back down or compromise—there could be a confrontation if the president challenges the constitutionality of some of the restrictions.

For example, a case can be made that Congress cannot stop the president with a veto-proof concurrent resolution. Article 1, section 7 of the Constitution states that "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote" to which both houses must agree (with the exception of a resolution to adjourn) shall not take effect until after it has been signed by the president or passed over his veto "according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill." Consequently, one can argue that any resolution ending an emergency or a war, or preventing a foreign arms sale, must be sent to the president for his approval or veto. The rebuttal is that veto-proof concurrent resolutions comply with the requirements of Article 1, section 7, because they are authorized in statutes which have been signed by the president or passed over his veto. This constitutional argument has not been resolved by the Supreme Court.

A president might also refuse to continue reporting CIA activities, especially if they were compromised by leaks, by asserting executive primacy in the conduct of foreign policy and national security. Congress could retaliate by citing its legislative authority for oversight and investigation.

The Supreme Court would have to be willing to resolve such issues. If it were not, either the president would eviscerate any restrictions he chose to ignore, or Congress would enforce them by other means—not excluding impeachment.

Scenario 3: Reassertion of the Dominant Presidency. Unlikely in the near term, but not in the more distant future, is the reassertion of presidential primacy on a footing equivalent to what it was from 1932 to 1972. The present restrictions (or most of them) might remain in the statutes, but they would be unused as politically unfeasible. The conditions for this scenario would include one or more of the following: the dimming of Vietnam and Watergate in Congress's institutional memory; a desire in Congress to escape the political heat that accompanies leadership in policy making, with a consequent deferring to the president's initiatives; and some severe crisis or emergency (a prolonged energy crunch or world famine come to mind) comparable to the Depression or World War II, in which Congress and the public give the president virtual carte blanche.

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Congressional Politics and Urban Aid: A 1978 Postscript

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

The explanation often given for the modest nature of the Carter administration's urban policy announced in the spring of 1978 was that a more aggressive and expensive one would have been unsupportable in Congress. HEW Secretary Joseph Califano reportedly argued to President Carter while the administration's urban policy statement was being formulated that since most members of Congress did not come from large cities, a policy that focused on those cities would "[fly] in the face of political reality" and meet with congressional rejection.[1]

The Califano argument and, in so far as it is based on it, the Carter urban policy reflect a major fallacy: that members of Congress are compelled to vote their constituencies' characteristics—such as whether those constituencies are predominantly "large" or "central" city or suburban or rural—and that presumably only those members from large cities or central cities can support strong urban programs. In point of fact numerous political science studies over the years have shown that the party affiliation of a member of Congress has been almost always more predictive of his or her vote than the nature of that member's constituency.[2] Specifically with respect to congressional voting on

[1] *New York Times*, Jan. 25, 1978.

[2] See, for example, Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951) and the revised edition edited by Edward V. Schneier, Jr. (Balitmore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959); David B. Mayhew, *Party Loyalty Among Congressmen* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966); W. Wayne Shannon, *Party, Constituency and Congressional Voting* (Baton

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urban aid programs, I have earlier shown in these pages that from 1945 to 1975 Democratic members (and especially nonsouthern Democratic members) of Congress supported urban programs strongly, regardless of the central city, suburban, or rural character of their constituencies, and Republican members did not, again regardless of the type of constituency they were representing.[3]

As part of a larger, ongoing study of congressional voting behavior, I recently completed an analysis of urban voting in the 1977 session of the 95th Congress to see, among other things, whether the patterns found for the earlier period had changed. Thirty-five House and twenty-four Senate recorded votes were examined that had been taken on various aspects of eight urban-oriented assistance programs: public works jobs, public service jobs, countercyclical assistance, community development grants, subsidized housing, youth jobs, food stamps, and community legal services. From these were generated "urban support scores" for each representative and senator based on the percentage of his votes on which he took the "pro-urban" position.[4] Finally each representative and senator was categorized according to various constituency characteristics and to the region of the country in which his district or state was located.

Party vs. Constituency

Analysis of the 1977 urban votes shows that regardless of the central city, suburban, or rural nature of their constituencies, Democratic members of Congress continued to support urban programs strongly and Republican members continued not to do so. The following is a breakdown of the average urban support scores of House members according to party and type of constituency:[5]

Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1968); and Aage R. Clausen, *How Congressmen Decide* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973).

[3] Demetrios Caraley, "Congressional Politics and Urban Aid," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Spring 1976):19-45.

[4] The "pro-urban position" was considered to be (1) on the question of having or not having an urban program, to have the program; (2) on the question of having higher or lower funding or having longer-term or shorter-term authorization, to have the higher funding or the longer-term authorization; and (3) on the question of different allocation formulas, to have the formula that would tend more to "target" funds to so-called "hardship cities"—those larger and older cities primarily in the East and Midwest with the most serious social and economic problems—rather than to "spread" those funds among local governments more generally. The 1977 recorded votes on which the urban support scores were based are by Congressional Quarterly (CQ) number: in the House, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 35, 51, 53, 54, 60, 61, 62, 63, 148, 165, 171, 199, 201, 203, 211, 212, 218, 219, 352, 353, 355, 358, 409, 433, 434, 438, 441, 442, 577, 694; and in the Senate, 38, 43, 46, 47, 48, 126, 127, 129, 130, 132, 133, 135, 137, 163, 165, 167, 170, 171, 174, 175, 177, 512, 555, 560. See *Congressional Roll Call 1977* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1978).

[5] In the House a constituency was classified as "central city," "suburban," or "rural" according to whether a majority of its population lived in a central city of a standard metropolitan statistical area, the "outside central city" portion of such a metropoliton area, or outside such a metropolitan area. Constituencies where there was neither a central city, suburban, nor rural majority were

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House

68%

	central city	*suburban*	*rural*	*chamber*
Democrats	86% (84)	83% (85)	70% (73)	80% (291)
Republicans	40% (19)	46% (53)	40% (48)	44% (144)

As can be seen, for every kind of constituency the score for the Democrats is about twice as high as for the Republicans. Moreover, the differences within each party between the most urban (that is, the central city) and least urban (that is, the rural) constituencies was only about one-third to one-half the difference between the Democrats and Republicans from the same kind of constituency. One further way to appreciate the predominant impact of party is to note that the score for *rural* Democrats (including rural *southern* Democrats) was almost twice as high as for *urban* Republicans!

When House urban support scores for central city representatives are further broken down by size of the central city, we have the following array:

Central City Districts

78%

city size	*Democrats*	*Republicans*
50,000–99,999	85% (4)	56% (1)
100,000–249,999	81% (3)	35% (3)
250,000–499,999	81% (22)	40% (5)
500,000–999,999	82% (19)	39% (5)
1,000,000 and over	92% (36)	30% (3)

The scores show that for Republican House members size of city was, if anything, negatively correlated with urban support and that for the Democrats, those members representing cities of 1 million in population or larger had somewhat higher scores than those who represented smaller cities. The dramatic differences were thus not between representatives from different size cities but once again between parties: for cities of any population size Democrats had two to three times higher urban support scores than did Republicans. Furthermore, Democrats even from the smallest central cities of 50,000 to 99,999 had support scores almost three times as high as Republicans from the largest central cities of over 1 million.

In the Senate as in the House, a breakdown of urban support scores by party and type of constituency[6] shows the predominant impact of party:

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classified as "mixed" and excluded from further analysis with respect to the impact of constituency on urban voting.

[6] Senate constituencies could not be classified in the same way as in the House since in only one state, New York, did a majority of the population live in central cities. The urban character of statewide constituencies was therefore classified as "more urban" if the state contained a city whose population was 250,000 or larger and "less urban" if it did not. No other population cut-off for the

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Senate

68%

	more urban states (largest city 250,000 or over)	*less urban states (largest city under 250,000)*	*all states*
Democrats	76% (34)	77% (28)	77% (62)
Republicans	66% (18)	43% (20)	54% (38)

First, Democratic senators had essentially the same score regardless of the size of their state's largest city and, second, this score was higher than that of the Republican senators from either category of states. Thus, in a pattern similar to that found in the House, even Democratic senators from the "less urban" states had a higher score than Republican senators from the "more urban" states. Among the Republicans, however, senators from the "more urban" states did have an average urban support score 23 points higher than those from the "less urban" states—a very substantial point spread, as large as that between all Democratic and all Republican senators.[7]

The major political lesson from this analysis should be clear: at present it is not the number of central city or large city constituencies or the number of "more urban" states in Congress, but the number of Democratic members that is crucial to passing urban programs. Over the past four decades Congress has been seriously responsive to the needs of urban areas only in those few years of the Roosevelt and Johnson administrations (1933–37, 1965–66) when a Democratic president was serving with a Congress that had heavy Democratic majorities. The "heavy" Democratic majorities were needed so that there would be enough Democrats to constitute floor majorities for urban programs even in the face of substantial southern Democratic defections.

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size of a state's largest city was found to be statistically significant in accounting for differences in the urban support scores of senators.

The urban character of each state was also classified according to the percentage of its population living in central cities as follows: 0 to 20 percent, "low urban"; 21 to 40 percent, "midurban"; and 41 to 60 percent, "high urban"; but there was no statistically significant difference in the urban support scores of senators when their states were classified in this fashion.

[7] Those readers interested in statistics should know that an analysis of variance and a multiple classification analysis (MCA) confirmed the conclusions of what may be the more intuitively meaningful analysis in the text based on point spreads. An MCA of party and constituency produced for the House adjusted beta weights of 0.64 for party and 0.16 for constituency and for the Senate, adjusted betas of 0.41 for party and 0.19 for constituency, thus reflecting the much heavier impact of party over type of constituency in both chambers.

An analysis of variance in the House testing for the impact of the size of the central city showed that for central city Republicans, size of the city was not statistically significant in accounting for differences in urban support. For the Democrats, size of the central city just barely passed the test for statistical significance at the 0.05 level (actual significance=0.0493) in accounting for difference in urban support and produced an eta of 0.3350, thus signifying that city size accounted statistically for about 11 percent ($eta^2 = 0.1122$) in the variation among the urban support scores of central city Democrats. For a description of all these statistical tests, see Norman H. Nie et al., *Statistical Package for the Social Science*, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), chs. 17 and 22.

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The roughly two-to-one Democratic majorities of the 95th Congress were heavy enough to constitute strong potential support for important urban initiatives,[8] and these Democratic majorities were serving with a Democratic president in the White House. But in order to galvanize those potential pro-urban majorities into actual ones, strong leadership was necessary from a forceful and energetic president who was willing to dramatize the special problems of hardship cities and was not reluctant to spend money on efforts to deal with them.[9]

There is no reason to believe, incidentally, that continued high levels of support for urban programs from Democratic members of Congress regardless of the urban character of their districts or states can be taken for granted. If Democrats who do not represent central city districts or "more urban" states hear too often Califano-type arguments to the effect that they cannot afford politically to support urban programs, these nonurban or less urban Democrats may well begin to believe such arguments and make Califano's prediction a self-fulfilling one.[10]

Section vs. Party: An Emerging Snowbelt–Sunbelt Split?

The 1977 urban support scores also allowed analysis of whether a new sectional politics, splitting a purportedly bipartisan, pro-urban "snowbelt" against a bipartisan, anti-urban "sunbelt" is superimposing itself upon and overriding the traditional voting cleavages in Congress. If such a snowbelt vs. sunbelt sectional cleavage were to become dominant, combined majorities of Democrats and Republicans from the East and Midwest[11] would presumably be oppos-

[8] Some strong evidence for this proposition is that on the various pieces of the Carter administration's 1977, or implicit, urban legislative package on which this study is based, the pro-urban position prevailed on 30 of 35 votes in the House and on 21 of 24 votes in the Senate.

[9] And, indeed, on the 1978 votes for loan guarantees to New York City—which were supported energetically by the Carter administration—the margins of victory for the pro-urban position on the two crucial House votes were overwhelming ones of 291 to 109 (Democrats 236 to 25; Republicans 55 to 84) and of 247 to 155 (Democrats 203 to 59; Republicans 44 to 96). See CQ House votes 370 and 371 of 1978, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, June 10, 1978, pp. 1510–11.

The pro-urban margins in the Senate were similarly overwhelming ones of about 2 or 3 to 1 on defeating anti-urban amendments and of almost exactly 2 to 1 on final passage (final passage 53 to 27: Republicans 18 to 15; Democrats 35 to 12). See CQ Senate votes 193–197 of 1978, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, July 1, 1978, p. 1709.

[10] For a discussion of further reasons for the possible long-term vulnerability of this kind of political support from congressional Democrats, see Demetrios Caraley, "The Carter Congress and Urban Programs: First Soundings," in Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Wagner Weinberg, eds., *American Politics and Public Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), pp. 213–218; and Demetrios Caraley, *City Governments and Urban Problems* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977), chs. 6 and 20.

[11] Following the Congressional Quarterly Service, the eastern states were considered to be Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia; and the midwestern states, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.

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ing combined majorities of Democrats and Republicans from the South and West.[12] And they would be doing so more consistently than Democrats would be opposing Republicans or than Republicans and southern Democrats would be opposing northern Democrats—these being the traditional party and "conservative coalition" voting splits. Considerable discussion of the possible emergence of sectionalism took place in 1977 both on the floor of Congress and in the media, especially after a dramatic House urban vote pitted an almost completely unified snowbelt coalition of eastern and midwestern representatives against a less completely unified but still highly cohesive sunbelt coalition of westerners and southerners.[13]

A breakdown of the scores of House and Senate members according to the snowbelt or sunbelt location of their districts and states but without regard to party shows that in both chambers, the snowbelt did give higher support to urban programs than did the sunbelt:

	House	*Senate*
Chamber	68% (435)	68% (100)
All Snowbelt	74% (238)	81% (48)
All Sunbelt	61% (197)	56% (52)

This in itself, however, proves only that the snowbelt and the sunbelt differed significantly on urban voting, especially in the Senate, but not that they had become more salient as voting groups than the parties. One test of this last point is whether the difference between the average support scores of the two sectional groupings was larger than between the parties. Following are the breakdown of scores according to party:

	House	*Senate*
Democrats	80% (291)	77% (62)
Republicans	44% (144)	54% (38)

It turns out that in the House, the difference between all Democrats and all Republicans (a point spread of 36) was almost three times as large as between the snowbelt

[12] The southern states were considered to be Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia; and the western states, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington.

[13] The House vote (CQ # 199 of 1977) was on an amendment to delete from the bill extending the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 a new, alternate formula for the distribution of community development grants. The original formula enacted in 1974 was based on the size of a city's population, its amount of overcrowded housing, and its percentage of poor (this last factor counted twice). By 1977 it became widely recognized that this formula favored the newer and still-growing cities of the western and southern sunbelt at the expense of the older cities of the East and Midwest whose populations were declining and whose fiscal problems were the most acute.

The new, alternate formula was based on the amount of older, pre-1940 housing (weighted 50 percent), poverty (weighted 30 percent), and population growth lag, that is, the degree to which a city's population growth between 1960 and 1973 was less than the average population growth for all central cities of metropolitan areas (weighted 20 percent). The amendment to strike this formula, which

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and sunbelt sectional groupings (a point spread of 13). In the Senate, on the other hand, the difference between all snowbelt and all sunbelt senators was slightly *larger* than between all Democratic and all Republican senators (a point spread of 25 vs. 23).[14]

A second test of the relative impact of party and section is whether the snowbelt coalition has replaced the Democratic membership as the most pro-urban grouping in Congress and whether the sunbelt coalition has replaced the Republicans as the least pro-urban. Once again the results between the two chambers differ. In the House the Democrats had a higher urban support score than the snowbelters (80% vs. 74%) and the Republicans had a lower score than the sunbelt coalition (44% vs. 61%). In the Senate, while the snowbelt senators did have a slightly higher score than the Democrats (81% vs. 77%), the sunbelt senators did not have a lower score than the Republicans (56% vs. 54%).

A third test of the impact of party and section is to compare the average cleavage (that is, the percent voting pro-urban in one grouping minus the percent voting pro-urban in the other grouping) between the Democratic and Republican party memberships and between the snowbelt and sunbelt coalitions. As measured over 35 House and 24 Senate votes, the average cleavages were:

	House	*Senate*
Average party cleavage	38%	24%
Average sectional cleavage	15%	26%

For a third time the chambers differ, with the party cleavage being two-and-one-half times the sectional cleavage in the House, but the sectional cleavage being slightly larger than the party one in the Senate.

As measured by these three tests then, party remained clearly more important than snowbelt vs. sunbelt sectionalism in the House. In the Senate, however, this kind of sectional cleavage came out to be at least as important as the party one and some differences suggest that sectionalism might actually have been slightly more important than party but these are too small to be conclusive.

When one separates the average support scores of the party groupings within each section, the impression of sectionalism having a heavier impact in the Senate than in the House is confirmed:

	House		Senate	
	68%		*68%*	
	Democrats	*Republicans*	*Democrats*	*Republicans*
Snowbelt	88% (149)	49% (89)	87% (30)	71% (18)
Sunbelt	70% (142)	37% (55)	67% (32)	39% (20)

clearly would benefit the snowbelt, failed in a vote of 149 to 261: in the twelve eastern states the vote was 110 to 1 and in the twelve midwestern states, 108 to 7 against the motion to strike; in the twenty-six southern and western states the vote was 141 to 43 in favor of deleting the alternate formula.

[14] The conclusions of the point-spread analysis in the text is again confirmed by statistical analysis

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As can be seen, in the House the sunbelt Democrats have a higher urban support score than the snowbelt Republicans, indicating once again the predominant influence of party. In the Senate, on the other hand, sunbelt Democrats had a slightly lower score than snowbelt Republicans, thus showing a very heavy pro-urban sectional impact on the snowbelt Republicans.

A further breakdown of average urban support scores by party and region reveals the underlying building blocks for whatever snowbelt vs. sunbelt sectionalism is evolving:

	House		*Senate*	
	Democrats	*Republicans*	*Democrats*	*Republicans*
Easterners	91% (82)	60% (35)	88% (14)	81% (10)
Southerners	64% (91)	32% (30)	60% (19)	33% (7)
Midwesterners	85% (67)	42% (54)	86% (16)	59% (8)
Westerners	81% (51)	42% (25)	76% (13)	42% (13)

Three highly significant patterns stand out: (1) Both in the House and Senate, southern Democrats are significantly less pro-urban than the other, or "northern," Democrats; (2) Both in the House and Senate, eastern Republicans are significantly more pro-urban than noneastern Republicans; and (3) The southern Democrats' deviance from their party colleagues toward an anti-urban position and the eastern Republicans' deviance from their party toward a pro-urban position are very much stronger in the Senate than in the House. Specifically on this last point, while the southern Democrats in the House were only slightly closer to the Republicans than to the northern Democrats, in the Senate they were *four times closer.* Similarly, the eastern Republicans in the House had an average score about midpoint between the Democrats and the noneastern Republicans, but *in the Senate the eastern Republicans were actually somewhat more pro-urban than the Democratic senators as a whole and only slightly less pro-urban than the average of all the northern Democratic senators.* One final way of pointing up the extreme deviance of the eastern Republicans is by noting that they were 37 points more pro-urban than the average of the noneastern Republican senators—a point spread larger than any other we have identified and one that is one-and-one-half times as large as the point spread between southern and northern Democratic senators and between all Democratic senators and all Republican senators.

The total implications of these findings are that there was some reality to a snowbelt vs. sunbelt sectionalism on urban voting in 1977, though it far from overshadowed traditional party cleavages and was less powerful in the House than in the Senate. In the House at best only five of the eight party-regional elements needed for a full snowbelt vs. sunbelt realignment were in place. The

of variance and multiple classification analysis. For the House an MCA of party and section produced adjusted betas of 0.64 for party and 0.26 for section, thus showing the much heavier impact of party. For the Senate, the MCA adjusted betas were 0.41 for party but 0.52 for section, showing that unlike in the House, section had a slightly heavier impact than party.

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eastern and midwestern Democrats were, as snowbelters presumably should be, more pro-urban than the chamber as a whole, while the southern and western Republicans and the southern Democrats were, as sunbelters, more anti-urban. The eastern and especially the midwestern Republican House members were, however, still voting more as anti-urban Republicans than as pro-urban snowbelters, and the western Democrats were still voting more as pro-urban Democrats than as anti-urban members of the sunbelt. It should also be recognized that although the southern Democrats in the House were voting less pro-urban than the chamber as a whole, they were nevertheless more pro-urban than the snowbelt's eastern and midwestern Republicans, thus raising a question of whether even the southern Democrats should be considered already in place as part of a House anti-urban, sunbelt sectional coalition.

In the Senate six of the necessary eight elements for a snowbelt vs. sunbelt coalition were firmly in place in 1977, largly reflecting the fact that southern Democrats were much more deviantly anti-urban, and eastern Republicans much more deviantly pro-urban in the Senate than in the House. Thus the eastern and midwestern Democrats and the eastern Republicans were, as snowbelters presumably should be, more pro-urban than the chamber as a whole. And the southern and western Republicans and the southern Democrats were, as sunbelters, more anti-urban. The western Democrats and the midwestern Republicans were still out of place, each grouping being closer to its party than to its sectional cohorts, though even this was less so in the Senate than in the House.

One political lesson from this part of the analysis is that if snowbelt Democrats in coalition with eastern and potentially with midwestern Republicans engage too strongly in what has been called "aggressive regionalism," they may cause a serious anti-urban backlash among western Democrats.[15] Western Democrats in 1977 voted almost as pro-urban as eastern and midwestern ones. But overly aggressive regionalism by the snowbelt may cause western Democrats to start perceiving themselves not as allies, but as targets of their pro-urban Democratic colleagues from the snowbelt. And these western Democrats might then begin to vote more as sunbelters in protection of real or hypothetical, anti-urban sectional interests and less as traditionally pro-urban northern Democrats.*

[15] See the remarks of Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen during debate on the Housing and Community Development Act, *Congressional Record*, June 7, 1977, pp. S9061–S9062.

In 1977 House western Democrats, had they all voted on every occasion, would have provided 1418 pro-urban votes on the issues examined in this study while House midwestern Republicans provided only 735. Similarly, Senate western Democrats would have delivered 237 pro-urban votes, and Senate midwestern Republicans, only 113. If the price of winning over the midwestern Republicans to become part of a bipartisan, pro-urban, snowbelt coalition were to be the loss of the western Democrats from the Democratic membership's northern, pro-urban wing, the trade would be a highly imprudent one for any pro-urban politicians to want to make.

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Federal-Local Relations Under Block Grants

RICHARD P. NATHAN
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The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, establishing a new "block grant" program for community development was signed into law on August 22, 1974. The community development block grant (CDBG) took seven previously established federal assistance programs—urban renewal, model cities, water and sewer facilities, open spaces, neighborhood facilities, rehabilitation loans, and public facility loans—and combined them in a single new grant. The program was initially authorized for three years and was extended for three more years in 1977. The findings of the Brookings monitoring study of the first year of the CDBG program in sixty-one recipient jurisdictions have been presented in an earlier article.[1] This second article focusing on intergovernmental relations presents the findings for both the first and second years of the CDBG program on the relationships between the federal government and recipient jurisdictions.

The Aims and Structure of the CDBG Program

The first question to be asked—and it is not an easy one—is what kinds of in-

[1] Richard P. Nathan, Paul R. Dommel, Sarah F. Liebschutz, and Milton D. Morris, "Monitoring the Block Grant Program for Community Development," *Political Science Quarterly* 92 (Summer 1977): 219.

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tergovernmental relations were anticipated under the CDBG program? The origins of the program can be traced to the Nixon administration's New Federalism. This was a devolutionary strategy which sought, as one way of decentralizing, to create broader and less conditional federal grant-in-aid programs for state and local governments, that is, broader and less conditional than categorical (narrow purpose) grants, the mainstay of President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society program.

The two main intergovernmental fiscal instruments of the New Federalism were general revenue sharing (enacted in 1972 and extended in 1976) and the so-called special revenue sharing programs, the Nixon administration's term for what are now called block grants. A block grant is a grant in a broad functional area, distributed in part (or in full) under a formula allocation system and involving a "minimum" of federal conditions and restrictions. The aim is to enable recipient jurisdictions to (1) anticipate their allocations in advance and (2) use these funds with more flexibility and discretion than is possible under the narrower categorical grant programs, especially those allocated on a project (as opposed to formula) basis.

The implications of the block grant policy for community development were described as follows by President Ford when he signed the Housing and Community Act of 1974: "In a very real sense, this bill will help to return power from the banks of the Potomac to people in their own communities. Decisions will be made at the local level. Action will come at the local level. And responsibility for results will be placed squarely where it belongs—at the local level."[2]

The executive branch, however, was by no means the only actor in this drama. While the Nixon and Ford administrations stressed the breadth, flexibility, and formula allocation features of the CDBG program, the Congress wrote in objectives, added restrictions on the use of funds, and established application and planning procedures, including review by state and regional bodies as well as HUD. The result, in effect, was a hybrid: *a decentralization instrument with many centralization features.*

From the outset there were many who were skeptical about the decentralization impact of CDBG. Some predicted that in the first year—in the rush to implement the new program in four months—central controls would be few and limited, but that in the ensuing years they would grow. It was pointed out that, beginning in the second year, HUD was required to conduct performance monitoring reviews under CDBG. For this reason and others, both defenders and opponents of the New Federalism saw a possibility of what was called "creeping recategorization" in subsequent grant years.

Others pointed out—correctly—that the election in 1976 could produce a Democratic administration less enamored of the program's decentralization aims than its Republican predecessors. How the new administration's policies,

[2] Gerald R. Ford, "Statement on the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974," *Public Papers of the President of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 44.

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which included requirements for targeting on the poor, will affect local decision making in the CDBG program is a question that cannot be answered for several years.[3] We can, however, assess the federal role of administering the CDBG program in its first two years.

HUD Influence: An Overview

The analysis presented here of HUD's role in the CDBG decision-making process relies on two kinds of information: assessments by the field research associates of HUD influence in each jurisdiction in the first two program years, and descriptions of specific instances of HUD involvement at the local level.[4] In the first part of this article we evaluate the overall level of HUD influence; the second part examines individual cases of HUD involvement, both their content and outcome.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR HUD INFLUENCE

HUD officials interact with recipient local jurisdictions at several points in the CDBG process. These include, among others, application reviews, performance monitoring, and site visits, all of which are chiefly the responsibility of the HUD area office, though unresolved issues may be referred to the regional office or to the central office in Washington.

In contrast to the categorical programs, under which funds were not granted until HUD had reviewed specific proposals and the jurisdiction's capability to carry out its proposals, the Housing and Community Development Act specified that applications from formula entitlement and hold-harmless jurisdictions are automatically approved unless HUD raises objections within seventy-five days after submission.[5]

[3] In her statement in February 1977 before the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development on the extension of the CDBG legislation, HUD Secretary Patricia R. Harris indicated that she did not consider targeting CDBG funds to the poor "just an objective of the block grant program; it is the highest priority of the program; and we, in the Federal Government, must see to it that the thrust of the program serves that objective." On March 1, 1978 HUD issued regulations aimed at increasing the use of CDBG funds for projects and activities which principally benefit low- and moderate-income persons.

[4] The monitoring methodology relies upon a national network of experienced researchers, primarily political scientists and economists, who study an agreed-upon set of relevant policy issues in communities where they live or a nearby community with which they are familiar. The sixty-one communities under study are a representative sample which includes thirty central cities, twelve satellite cities, ten urban counties, and nine nonmetropolitan jurisdictions that received CDBG aid.

[5] There are two types of entitlement jurisdictions. Formula entitlement communities receive their CDBG allocation on the basis of the formula criteria. Formula entitlement communities include all central cities in metropolitan areas, eligible urban counties, towns, and townships, and all municipalities other than central cities that have populations of 50,000 or more. Hold-harmless entitlements guarantee communities as much funding during each of the first three years of CDBG as the annual average of what they had received under the folded-in grant programs during the five-

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Once approved, a CDBG plan is not ignored. HUD officials may raise questions at any time regarding its implementation as a result of site visits, complaints from third parties, and performance-monitoring reviews, which were conducted annually beginning in the second program year (1976). In short, the opportunities for HUD to intervene in and influence local CDBG programs are many. The important question is, how has HUD used these opportunities?

THE LEVEL OF HUD INFLUENCE

Reviewing the data for the first two program years (1975 and 1976), the sixty-one sample units which received grants in both years are classified in Table 1 according to the overall level of HUD influence. Jurisdictions are grouped in four categories: no HUD influence on the local program, minor HUD influence, major HUD influence, and cases in which HUD's influence was so strong that it can be said that HUD determined the local program. In cases where HUD's role changed from year one to year two, several factors, including the frequency of HUD involvement, the kind of issues raised by HUD, and the outcome of HUD-jurisdiction disagreements, were assessed to produce a single classification for the two years.

TABLE 1

HUD Influence in the First Two Years of CDBG

Level of influence	*Number of jurisdictions*
Local program determined by HUD	2
Major HUD influence	14
Minor HUD influence	34
No HUD influence	11

Source: Field research data.

In the majority of communities, HUD's influence was clearly limited. As shown in Table 1, cases with little or no HUD influence were nearly three times as numerous as those where HUD was a major influence or determined CDBG program content.

HUD's influence tended to be greater in smaller communities. Nine of the fourteen jurisdictions where HUD's influence was classified as major have populations under 100,000, and the two cases in which HUD determined the local program involve jurisdictions with populations under 25,000. The two cases in which HUD determined the local CDBG program are jurisdictions with no prior experience under the folded-in categorical grants and which were

year period 1968–72. Beginning with the fourth year of CDBG, the excess of hold-harmless over the formula entitlement is to be phased out by thirds. Thus, by the sixth year all formula entitlement jurisdictions will receive their actual CDBG formula amounts and all hold-harmless communities that are not formula entitlement jurisdictions will be eligible only for discretionary funds.

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awarded CDBG allocations out of discretionary funds. The combination of inexperience and discretionary funding appeared to make these communities more subject to HUD influence. By contrast, HUD exercised essentially no influence or minor influence in the seventeen largest sample communities (those with populations over 500,000).

The two exceptions to this pattern of low HUD influence in large jurisdictions are Phoenix and Houston, both classified as cases of major HUD influence. In Phoenix, discussed later, housing programs were the point of contention, while in Houston the issue was social services. According to the associate, Houston in the past had resisted federal programs: it had a model cities program but no urban renewal projects. The city's continuing commitment to model cities service programs begun under the categoricals conflicted with the negative position adopted by the HUD field office concerning the eligibility of social service programs under CDBG. These factors, in part, explain the tension between the city and HUD on CDBG, which resulted in HUD having a strong hand in shaping the city's program.

THE DECENTRALIZATION IMPACT OF CDBG

To put these findings of generally limited HUD influence in context we must ask, limited compared with what? Was HUD's role in the first two years of the CDBG program different from its role in categorical grant administration? This analysis, of necessity, is limited to the forty-four sample units that had significant previous experience under HUD programs.

The results, summarized in Table 2, show that CDBG has had a decentralization impact. For thirty-eight of the units, or 86 percent, associates reported a reduced HUD role under CDBG, and for another three units they reported no change. Furthermore, of the three jurisdictions where an increased HUD role was indicated, two—Miami and Miami Beach—simultaneously reported very low levels of HUD influence. This is a reflection of special structural arrangements between Dade County and the communities within it. Direct HUD involvement in Miami and Miami Beach had been small in the pre-CDBG period because the community development function was primarily a responsibility of

TABLE 2

The Decentralization Impact of CDBG: CDBG Compared with Categorical Grants

Change in HUD role	*Number of jurisdictions*
Substantially greater	0
Somewhat greater	3
No change	3
Somewhat smaller	21
Substantially smaller	17

Source: Field research data.

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Dade County. Under CDBG these cities became entitlement areas themselves and thus came into direct contact with HUD. In Miami, for example, which had had direct relations with HUD primarily through the model cities program, the associate observed that under the block grant HUD raised "more frequent and more varied questions of eligiblity, as well as fiscal and technical issues." According to the associate for Miami Beach, previous HUD involvement there had been "so minimal that there was an increase in the day-to-day involvement under CDBG, but overall it was low-keyed." Only Houston reported both major HUD influence under CDBG and an increase in HUD influence from the categorical to the CDBG programs. In sum, the data for these three cities do not constitute a strong exception to the predominant decentralization effect of CDBG in its first two years of operation.

Comments of the associates for some of the units reporting substantially less HUD influence stress both the extent and the range of local autonomy under CDBG. For Atlanta the associate reported,

> HUD's relationship with the city on the CDBG application was entirely different from what it had been under the model cities and urban renewal programs. HUD has taken a "hands off" position. Its only concern is in reviewing the application to make sure it is consistent with the guidelines.

The Chicago associate compared HUD's previous close supervision—"aggressively raising policy questions"—with conditions under CDBG in which "HUD is essentially divorced from dealing with substantive issues." The Los Angeles associate stressed the independence of the city under CDBG and concluded, "the current program is light years away from the categorical grant programs." Similarly, the associate for Worcester, Massachusetts, noted that "decentralization has been significant" and has "enabled the city to carry out its programs faster than was possible before CDBG." The Sioux Falls, South Dakota, associate quoted an enthusiastic local official as saying, "never in my eighteen years in the housing field has so much real decision making been possible right here at home."

CHANGES WITHIN CDBG: YEAR ONE VERSUS YEAR TWO

As suggested earlier, a number of observers have speculated that there would be a gradual "recategorization" process under CDBG. A comparison of year one with year two of the CDBG program indicates that a stronger HUD role was already apparent in the second year, as shown in Table 3.

There were two reasons to expect an increase in HUD involvement in the second year of the CDBG program. First, implementation of the program in the first year was rushed. The law, signed in August 1974, gave communities only about five months to set up an application process, hold public hearings, evaluate projects, and prepare their formal application, including a housing assistance plan. Second, performance-monitoring (PM) reviews were not con-

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TABLE 3

The Decentralization Impact of CDBG: First and Second Program Years Compared

Change in HUD role	*Number of jurisdictions*
Substantially greater	13
Somewhat greater	19
No change	22
Somewhat smaller	5
Substantially smaller	2

Source: Field research data.

ducted in the first year because programs were just starting, but during the second year of the CDBG program. First, implementation of the program in the gave HUD officials an opportunity to consider whether local activities met the objectives of the Housing and Community Development Act and could be used as the basis for decisions to reduce or withhold future grants.

Because both of these factors involve a change from a temporary situation tied to start-up of the program, to the establishment of regular administrative procedures for the CDBG program, this increase in HUD involvement perceived by some in the second year may level off in future years. On the other hand, the policies of the Carter administration and Secretary Harris, referred to earlier, could result in greater HUD involvement in the local CDBG process. This question will be a major focal point of the monitoring research, now extended through 1981.

Comments of a number of associates about HUD's second-year oversight role suggest that HUD's influence under CDBG may continue to grow. This was particularly true for communities where a "substantially greater" HUD role was found. In Jacksonville, Florida, for example, the associate observed that HUD was becoming "more and more rigid, moving toward stricter control over the community development programs in determining the focus and output of specified activities." The associate for East Lansing, Michigan, reported that HUD officials played "a greater supervisory role" in the second year, with "increased attention to the eligibility of CDBG activities and the basic philosophy of the local program." In both Charlottesville, Virginia, and Greece, New York, associates noted that HUD pressures seemed to be increasing in the planning process for the third year of the CDBG program. This expansion of the HUD role from the first to the second year was perhaps most pronounced in Minneapolis, where the city went to court to reverse HUD administrative actions.

Although these several cases suggest a recategorization tendency on the part of HUD, it is important to note also that HUD's role remained the same or decreased from year one to year two in almost half of our sample (Table 3). In Cleveland, the change was substantial.

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Capsule 1. Cleveland, Ohio
Population: 638,793
Central city
Previous experience: model cities, urban renewal

HUD-city relations in the first program year were tense, as the agency questioned a wide array of social service and public service programs in its review of Cleveland's grant application. The issues were resolved only after a ruling by the agency's general counsel and involvement of a congressman, a senator, and HUD Assistant Secretary Meeker. At the performance-monitoring stage, the agency again was critical of Cleveland's CDBG program. HUD's objections focused on social service programs, environmental reviews, and citizen participation and affirmative action procedures.

In the second-year, Cleveland's relations with HUD improved significantly. The agency raised only minor questions regarding the application, and city officials reportedly felt they had established a good working relationship with HUD. The associate noted, "Cleveland officials believe that both the responsibility for the CDBG program and the authority for implementing it are now vested in the local jurisdiction."

Similarly, contacts between Cleveland Heights and the HUD area office in Columbus were said to have decreased substantially in the second year.

There were five cases where HUD's role was found to be "somewhat smaller" in the second year. For Bangor, Maine, the associate wrote, "HUD has appeared to give the city even more of a free hand" in the second year. In Boston, city officials took the position in the second year that they should proceed essentially on their own, "on the theory that any transgression would merely result in 'a slap on the wrist' in the post-audit process." The Columbia, South Carolina, associate's second-year report stated that "decentralization is continuing at a steady pace." Essentially the same observations were made by the associates for Santa Clara and San Jose, California.

RED TAPE

Although the crucial decentralization question is who decides where and how CDBG money will be spent, increased decentralization might be expected to result in a reduction of administrative detail, processing requirements, and paperwork—in short, "red tape."[6]

With this in mind we collected data on local officials' perceptions of the amount of red tape involved in the CDBG program. The results were somewhat surprising. When officials in the forty-four jurisdictions with prior HUD categorical grant experience were asked to compare red tape under CDBG with their prior experience, only about half of those responding (twenty-one out of forty-three), including officials from a number of large cities with extensive categorical grant experience, reported a decrease in red tape. The other half

[6] For a provocative discussion of the role of red tape in government, see Herbert Kaufman, *Red Tape: Its Origins, Uses, and Abuses* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977).

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reported either no change or an increase in the amount of red tape. Clearly the block grant approach is not seen consistently as reducing red tape.

Two factors help to explain this. First, the CDBG program gave local officals responsibility for some tasks previously carried out by HUD, such as environmental impact reviews (see below). Second, despite the fact that their community had prior categorical grant experience, the local officials involved in CDBG planning and implementation may be new to the job and thus unfamiliar with the paperwork routinely involved in federal grant programs. To these newcomers, any amount of paperwork might seem burdensome.

Like overall HUD influence, red tape also seemed to be increasing in the second year. Officials in only four communities reported a decrease in red tape from year one to year two, while nearly two-thirds reported an increase. One reason for this may be the addition in the second year of a new task for local officials: preparation of performance reviews of their projects—the local jurisdictions' counterpart to HUD's performance-monitoring reports. Officials in many communities complained about the timing of these reports, which sometimes covered only a few months of the first program year. Many local officials indicated to associates that they found the reviews of little or no use to their community. According to one local official, the review was "designed by bureaucrats in bureaucratese and produced yet another document to be filed away." The various environmental impact reviews and affirmative action plans required of recipient jurisdictions also necessitated new paperwork.

A third aspect of the CDBG program frequently criticized as red tape was the housing assistance plan (HAP), required annually as part of each grant application. In the words of one associate, local officials see the HAP as a "necessary evil" that must be put up with in order to get CDBG money—"it's like eating your spinach in order to get your dessert."

These comments on performance reports and the HAP, coupled with the assessments of red tape given by local officials, make it clear that in the eyes of many local officials red tape has not decreased under the block grant program, as might have been expected. However, red tape itself does not necessarily mean reduced local decision making. Perceptions of red tape tend to focus on procedure—how the CDBG program is planned and implemented—rather than substance. Thus, the findings on red tape do not contradict the earlier conclusions about the decentralization of decision making, which concentrated on the substance of decisions. The relationships between HUD and the local communities will become clearer as we look at instances of HUD-jurisdiction interaction.

HUD Influence: An Analysis of Issues

In this section we examine specific cases in which the associates reported that HUD questioned local CDBG activities. The analysis concentrates on three aspects of HUD-jurisdiction disputes: (1) the type of issue involved and the grounds for HUD's involvement; (2) the importance of the issue to both parties;

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and (3) the outcome, that is, whether HUD or the local community prevailed. There are two basic categories, *substantive* and *procedural* issues. Substantive issues include:

1. *Strategy issues,* involving the program mix and the benefits by income group in the overall allocation of a jurisdiction's CDBG grant; and
2. *Program issues,* involving the definition and eligibility of specific program components of a jurisdiction's CDBG plan.

The second main category is procedural issues, which include:

1. *Compliance issues,* involving such legal requirements as equal opportunity, environmental protection, Davis-Bacon (prevailing wage), and citizen participation requirements; and
2. *Administrative and technical issues,* involving staffing, the planning process, the rate of implementation (an important subject, especially in the early days of CDBG), and the various data required in CDBG plans and programs.

The types of issues are listed above in what we consider their order of importance. Overall, we found that the position of the community tended to prevail on substantive issues, whereas on procedural issues HUD tended to prevail. The apparent explanation for this pattern is that recipient jurisdictions tended to be more willing to compromise on lower-level issues, particularly procedural issues where they could satisfy HUD without making basic changes in their plans. On the other hand, they were likely to resist HUD pressure on substantive issues, where they felt it was necessary to defend their decision-making prerogatives.

Another general comment is needed here. The figures on specific issues and their outcomes may obscure an important point: for each kind of issue there were significant numbers of jurisdictions that had no disagreements with HUD during the first two years of the CDBG program. Although HUD's failure to take issue with CDBG activities in these jurisdictions is not tantamount to approval, we interpret it as evidence of decentralization. In assessing the level of HUD involvement and the degree of HUD influence on various kinds of issues, we look at both cases where HUD did not raise issues and cases where HUD raised issues but did not prevail.

An important question in analyzing decentralization concerns local decision making in anticipation of HUD expectations. While it cannot be directly observed there may be instances where no HUD-local differences occurred because local officials knew HUD's position on certain programs and issues and designed their program and procedures accordingly. We will be examining this question of "potential" HUD influence in our next round of field research.

STRATEGY ISSUES

Altogether, the field associates reported that HUD raised strategy issues on sixty-four occasions in forty-three jurisdictions, which means that for eighteen jurisdictions, (approximately 30 percent of the sample) there were no

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disagreements with HUD over strategy matters in the first two years of the CDBG program. Where HUD raised strategy issues, it prevailed half of the time; recipient jurisdictions won one-third of these cases.[7] Combining the cases where no strategy issues arose with those where the jurisdictions prevailed, we find that the local community's position was accepted in over half the cases.

Among the strategy issues, three kinds predominated: housing, geographic targeting, and social services.

Housing Strategy. Neighborhood conservation programs (housing rehabilitation and related public improvements) emerged in the second year of CDBG as the single largest activity under the program. Hence, it is not surprising that many strategy issues involved housing. The focus of attention in most of these cases was the distribution of benefits. HUD's policy, particularly in central cities, was not consistent. In Cleveland, Durham, and Raleigh, the agency urged concentration on the most distressed neighborhoods; by contrast, HUD favored spreading housing rehabilitation programs in Philadelphia and in Phoenix, where the issue was a source of considerable tension.

Capsule 2. Raleigh, North Carolina
Population: 134,231
Central city
Previous experience: urban renewal

In the second year, the HUD regional office disallowed a central feature of the Raleigh CDBG plan—a proposal to make housing rehabilitation assistance available not just to those in the target areas but also to several "satellite" areas where pockets of poor housing threatened to cause neighborhood decay. According to HUD, such a plan would violate the target area approach intended in the CDBG legislation because the "satellite" areas would not be receiving any other assistance under the block grant. All but three of the pocket areas were disqualified for housing rehabilitation assistance.

Capsule 3. Phoenix, Arizona
Population: 664,721
Central city
Previous experience: urban renewal

A city with a strong coalition for housing assistance, Phoenix allocated nearly 95 percent of its first-year and 85 percent of its second-year CDBG funds to housing and urban redevelopment programs. Implementation, however, was very slow; local officials frequently cited HUD as the villain. A performance-monitoring visit in the first year generated three HUD rulings that undermined Phoenix's low-income housing policy by making most program sites ineligible for CDBG assistance. HUD ruled that racial and economic impaction in twenty-one census tracts made them ineligible for section 8 housing assistance. HUD also declared the city's Residential Restoration and Preservation Program, a major renewal effort, ineligible for section 312 rehabilitation loans

[7] The residual is cases where the outcome was a compromise that did not clearly favor either side. Throughout the chapter, compromise settlements favoring HUD are counted as HUD wins, and compromises favoring the jurisdiction are counted as jurisdiction wins.

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because of the poor housing conditions in the area. HUD's position was that the city should avoid rehabilitation in segregated areas of the city because it would increase existing minority and economic impaction. The city's view, on the other hand, was that "neighborhood development in minority neighborhoods takes priority over neighborhood integration. A housing program designed to produce the opposite effects—deconcentration—would, in effect, reduce needed assistance in abandoned and blighted inner city areas." According to the associate, local officials were critical of HUD's inconsistency of interpretation and of conflicting regulations, especially regarding impacted census tracts.

It is possible, of course, that differences in local conditions explain these variations in HUD's implementation policy, but the more likely presumption is that these cases involve a difference in policy between different offices and officials of HUD. The act itself is unclear as to the most desirable location of housing assistance activities, reflecting the basic conflict between the income group targeting and spatial deconcentration objectives contained in the law.[8]

Consequently, some city leaders, emphasizing the targeting objective, claim that the poor in deteriorated core areas should be the focus of housing assistance activities under CDBG. Others argue for the application of the law as a spatial deconcentration instrument to help the poor and minorities obtain housing in suburbs and in better-off neighborhoods within central cities. To the latter group, targeting benefits in areas of concentrated low- and moderate-income population only reinforces concentration.

Another related housing strategy issue was raised by HUD in its criticism of citywide housing rehabilitation programs in jurisdictions such as Pittsburgh and Sioux Falls, South Dakota. In pressing for a concentration on lower-income neighborhoods in both cities, the agency cited the provision of the law stipulating that housing rehabilitation must be *incidental* to other neighborhood physical improvements in order to be an eligible activity.[9] The cities responded by interpreting "physical improvements" loosely: tree planting in Pittsburgh and the replacement of street signs in Sioux Falls were used as justification for housing rehabilitation efforts throughout the city. HUD eventually accepted both plans.

Geographic Targeting Strategy. In eighteen cases HUD questioned the overall geographic distribution of CDBG activities within jurisdictions. HUD won twelve cases; jurisdictions won four. In most cases the issue concerned income group benefits; HUD consistently favored targeting funds on low- and

[8] The seven "specific objectives" contained in the law include eliminating "slums and blight," and increasing "the diversity and vitality of neighborhoods through the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities" [Sec. 101(c)(1) and (6)].

[9] In describing eligible activities, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 states that a community development program may include "clearance, demolition, removal and rehabilitation of buildings and improvements (including interim assistance and financing rehabilitation of privately owned properties when *incidental* to other activities)." Emphasis added; see Sec. 105(a)(4). In the 1977 amendments, housing rehabilitation was made a separate eligible activity.

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moderate-income groups, as opposed to allowing jurisdictions to spend funds communitywide. In the first year, for example, HUD required Atlanta, Georgia, Casa Grande, Arizona, and East Lansing, Michigan, to designate specific target areas before their CDBG applications were approved; in the second year it required Hennepin County to submit maps of census tracts to verify that projects would serve low- and moderate-income households.[10]

An especially interesting case involving overall targeting was that of Columbia, South Carolina. HUD officials expressed concern over the citywide nature of the CDBG program throughout the first year and instructed the city to develop specific target areas for the second year. As a result, substantial changes were made. The city's home burglar-proofing program, for instance, was restricted to low-income neighborhoods. HUD ruled after lengthy negotiations that a mosquito control program was permissible because mosquitoes do not fly over the entire city.

In Chicago and Denver, two big cities with much larger proportions of low- and middle-income residents, HUD was less successful. Commenting on Chicago's second-year application HUD officials stated, "Many of the proposed activities do not appear to be consistent with maximum feasible priority being given to activities which will either benefit low- or moderate-income families or the elimination of slums or blight. At the same time the Applicant has not described in the Application community development needs having a particular urgency, which these activities are designed to meet."[11] For the sixteen activities to which this statement applied—one-fifth of the city's second-year program, amounting to $9.5 million—the city responded by providing additional rationale for undertaking them; it did not otherwise modify its program. Similarly, when spreading was criticized in Denver, the city made minor modifications in its CDBG program but no major reallocation of funds. These cases illustrate our earlier point that large cities are more successful than smaller jurisdictions in resisting HUD pressure.

HUD discouraged spreading of funds in one city for efficiency reasons. In Charlottesville, HUD was critical of the city's shotgun approach, in which many small projects were dispersed throughout the city. In response, the city's third-year CDBG application designated two projects to receive over two-thirds of the total allocation.

Social Service Strategy. The CDBG program was perceived by HUD to be mainly a hardware (bricks and mortar) program and not a software (service) program. This interpretation reflects the legislative history of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. Initially the Senate adopted an amendment proposed by Edward Brooke of Massachusetts setting a 20 percent limit on

[10] HUD defines low-income and moderate-income areas as census tracts with a median income of 0–51 percent and 51–80 percent of the SMSA median income, respectively.

[11] Memorandum from Joseph E. Paige, Office of Area Counsel, to Woodrin Kee, Director, HUD Community Development and Planning, August 4, 1976, containing legal review of Chicago's second-year application.

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social services under CDBG. The House, however, dissented. The result was the inclusion of general language requiring that such services be related to projects undertaken with block grant funds.[12]

In the first year of the CDBG program it was found that this unadopted 20 percent lid influenced local policy in many cases, being used by local officials to justify decreasing or expanding social services, depending on their predilections. And in both the first and second years, this section of the law (see footnote 12) was the grounds used most often by HUD for challenging social service spending as a major CDBG strategy.

HUD, however, was not consistent in its social service policy. Some area offices strongly discouraged such spending while other HUD area offices allowed the level to exceed 20 percent. The agency was also not a consistent winner on these strategy issues: jurisdictions won half of the cases. Model cities experience was an important factor in determining the outcome of social service strategy issues. Eight of the nine jurisdictions that won on this issue had considerable experience under the model cities program, ranging from 25.3 percent of the hold-harmless (pre-1972) base in Minneapolis to 93.2 percent of the hold-harmless base in Houston. By contrast, only one jurisdiction where HUD won on a social service strategy issue—Allegheny County, Pennsylvania—had model cities experience. This suggests that those communities with model cities experience were willing to fight harder to keep their social service programs and that HUD was willing to drop its objections in communities that had commitments to social service programs begun under model cities.

According to the associate in El Monte, California, "In general, the HUD message to all the area cities was to keep social service programs out of the application unless they were part of the hold-harmless programs." Likewise, in Portland, Maine, HUD criticized social service programs with a communitywide clientele, that is, not linked to specific physical improvement activities. However, according to the associate, the agency "backed off after the intervention of one (and perhaps the other) of the state's U.S. senators." In Houston, where HUD's intervention in the city's strategy on social services involved its model cities program, the associate reported that the city appealed directly to the office of the secretary of HUD in Washington and was reported to have received assurances that it could continue these services up to 20 percent of the block grant without jeopardy to the rest of its CDBG plans. HUD officials also questioned social service spending in Cleveland. In this case, city officials took the position that the requirement that social services under CDBG be "specifically related" to physical development projects (the language at issue) was HUD area office language and not in the law.[13] The city proceeded to carry out its plans for social services despite the questions raised by the area office.

[12] Section 105(a)(8) of the law classifies services as an eligible activity if they "are not otherwise available in areas where other activities assisted under this title are being carried out in a concentrated manner."

[13] See the immediately preceding footnote, which raises doubts about so specific an interpretation.

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In contrast to the communities that won social service disputes with HUD, the losers not only tended to have little prior experience with HUD-funded social service programs but also tended to be small jurisdictions. Of the seven, four had populations of less than 100,000. In addition, two—Alma, Michigan, and Charlottesville, Virginia—were nonmetropolitan hold-harmless recipients. These units are much more vulnerable to HUD influence than are formula-entitlement jurisdictions. A third nonmetropolitan hold-harmless jurisdiciton—Carbondale, Illinois—was among the winners on social service strategy issues, but there was a significant difference between this community and the two others—one-third of Carbondale's hold-harmless base was model cities spending, while neither Alma nor Charlottesville had model cities experience.

PROGRAM ISSUES

We turn now to program issues—cases in which HUD sought to modify or delete some aspect of one of the program components of a community's CDBG plan. HUD's win-loss record was higher at this level than at the strategy level: of the 115 cases identified we counted HUD as winning 79 and losing 26 (with 18 other outcomes). However, these figures may obscure more than they reveal since on many of these issues the stakes were not high. Again, housing and social service issues predominated.

Housing Programs. A majority of the housing program issues raised by HUD centered on the housing assistance plan (HAP). According to section 104 (a)(4) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, each jurisdiction must submit as part of its CDBG application a HAP which includes: (1) a survey of the condition of the jurisdiction's existing housing stock; (2) an estimate of current housing needs and the housing needs of those lower-income persons "expected to reside" in the community over the next three years as a result of existing or planned employment opportunities; (3) realistic goals for the amount and kind of housing assistance to be provided annually. The HAP, which permits localities to determine both the type and general location of housing assistance, is to be included in the CDBG application to ensure that housing and community development activities are undertaken in a mutually supportive manner.

Nationally, the "expected to reside" clause—or ETR as it is now known—received more publicity than any other intergovernmental issue that arose in the initial implementation of the CDBG program. This occurred because of the Hartford case in which HUD was enjoined from releasing community development funds to seven suburban towns surrounding the city of Hartford, Connecticut. The federal district court for the district including Connecticut ruled that HUD had acted illegally in approving the applications of the seven suburban towns since the towns had not documented the housing needs of those "expected to reside" within their borders. Six of the towns had given zero as their ETR figure; the seventh had used a figure obtained from the local hous-

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ing authority's waiting list, which the court found inadequate. The Hartford case focused on a memorandum of May 21, 1975, in which HUD Assistant Secretary David Meeker stated that the agency would approve applications without an ETR figure as long as the jurisdiction indicated what steps it would take to provide more accurate data in the next year's application.

On August 15, 1977, on an appeal from three of the suburban towns involved, the Hartford decision was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the second circuit. The city of Hartford in turn appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court which declined to hear the case.

The Hartford case appears to have sensitized HUD officials to the ETR issue. During the first two program years, HUD questioned ETR figures in twenty-eight of the sample units and won an overwhelming majority of these cases. In many of the cases HUD successfully pressed jurisdictions to use higher ETR figures based on the agency's standardized estimation procedure rather than the figures initially provided by the local government. The field data clearly suggest that HUD tended to lean more heavily on suburban governments (urban counties and satellite cities) than on central cities. Suburban St. Louis County, for example, was pressed to raise its ETR estimate from 40 to 400 households in the first year of the program. In the second year, Evanston, Illinois, which set its first-year figure at zero on the grounds that there was no vacant land available for low-income housing, was "induced" to change its ETR figure to 910 households.

Though both HUD and the recipient jurisdictions tended to take the ETR estimates more seriously in the second year, the jurisdictions in which HUD questioned ETR figures generally did not get highly exercised about the issue in either year and were willing to substitute HUD's figures. Similarly, communities in which HUD questioned projections of subsidized housing goals based on the ETR rarely challenged the agency. The reason for local governments' acquiescence on both counts is obvious. The amount of subsidized housing available under HUD's housing programs—most notably Section 8—was bound to fall short of local needs. Since HUD could not deliver the goods, it did not matter how much was ordered. In Lubbock, Texas, for example, an official remarked that the ETR is "a fruitless exercise since only a small number in need can be assisted through HUD subsidy programs." Also, local officials knew they could use Section 8 units for the elderly and thus avoid local controversy.

HUD's position on the amount and type of assisted housing varied considerably. HUD sometimes asked localities to lower their housing assistance goals to conform with their Section 8 allocation. In other cases, HUD encouraged jurisdictions to raise their housing assistance goals. Similarly, regarding the program mix, HUD insisted on fewer *new* units (as opposed to subsidies for *existing* units or for rehabilitation) in some communities, but encouraged more new construction in others.

In addition to HAP-related issues, there were many cases in which HUD challenged the eligibility of specific local housing programs and projects.

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Rehabilitation, relocation, and code enforcement programs stand out. In Philadelphia, Chicago, and Durham, HUD challenged different aspects of rehabilitation loan and guarantee programs. All three cities were able to retain their rehabilitation loan and grant programs, though Philadelphia was forced to find private funding for certain mortgage activities. Relocation cases were generally less controversial and more easily resolved. One exception to this rule was Los Angeles County, where the agency required the county to establish a formal relocation procedure for its Neighborhood Development Program after finding in its first-year performance monitoring review that existing procedures were inadequate.

Social Service Programs. HUD questioned the eligibility of various specific social service programs, ranging from child care to senior citizen programs. At the program level as at the strategy level, localities tended to prevail more often on social service issues than on other functional issues. HUD prevailed on nine cases and the jurisdictions eight. In all, HUD raised issues in ten jurisdictions.

The communities that prevailed on social service questions tended to be large and experienced with federal grant programs: three of the four winners had populations over one million, and two—Chicago, where HUD challenged four social service programs, and Houston—had model cities experience. On the other hand, HUD tended to win in smaller jurisdictions inexperienced with HUD programs: four of the seven programs that were overturned by HUD were in jurisdictions with populations under 100,000, and only two had model cities experience.

One of the most controversial social service cases involved Houston's attempt to use CDBG money to establish neighborhood service centers which would serve as points of inquiry and information dissemination for the CDBG program at the neighborhood level. However, a second-year spot check of two centers by HUD performance monitors revealed that over half of the inquiries were concerned with general city administration, rather than specifically related to community development. This confirmed the suspicions of HUD officials that the centers would become "little city halls," though the city contests the validity of the spot check. As a result of its audit, the agency recommended the disallowance of $306,000 in the first-year CDBG funds used for the operation of the neighborhood service centers. The issue was finally settled when HUD dropped its repayment claims in exchange for reductions in Houston's CDBG expenditures for citizen participation, expenditures which HUD felt were excessive.

The requirement that social services be tied to physical development activities funded with CDBG money, cited often by HUD in its attempts to reduce overall social service spending, was also used to support HUD challenges of individual social service programs. In Cook County, Illinois, HUD enforcement of this regulation led to restructuring of two of the three programs.

Public Facilities and Improvements Programs. Construction and repair projects for streets, neighborhood centers, parks, water lines, etc. were the subject

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of HUD challenges in fourteen cases involving ten jurisdictions. Most of the cases were noncontroversial, and the agency tended to prevail.

Many of these cases involved HUD's enforcement of the "urgent needs" provision of the Housing and Community Development Act (explained below). In specifying that "maximum feasible priority" be given to activities that benefit low- or moderate-income families or aid in the prevention or elimination of slums or blight [Section 104(b)(2)], the law allows an exception for activities which the secretary of HUD determines are "designed to meet other community development needs having a particular urgency." The evidence for the Brookings sample suggests that the agency tended to interpret this provision narrowly (where it was at issue) and to prevail on these cases.

Other Program Controversies. Local communities differed with HUD on a number of other program issues, including land acquisition, police and security programs, and commercial and industrial development. One important case involved Cleveland, which sought to use $2.25 million of its $16 million first-year CDBG entitlement to avoid laying off 190 policemen. Initially, the HUD area and regional offices refused to approve Cleveland's CDBG application, contending that the crime control program did not tie the use of CDBG funds to neighborhoods in which other community development activities were scheduled to take place. An additional concern, voiced by Ohio Representative Louis B. Stokes and several community groups, was that the use of CDBG funds for crime control would allow the mayor to use funds outside of low-income neighborhoods. Besides Stokes, this issue eventually involved a U.S. senator and HUD area, regional, and national officials. After HUD's general counsel ruled that CDBG funds could be used for police so long as they were confined to the target areas, the agency reversed its position and approved Cleveland's application. This decision permitted CDBG funds to be used to pay the salaries of 190 police officers in four low-income target areas in which the city also planned to spend other CDBG dollars.

Another interesting case, involving industrial development, centered on a little-used but potentially important "loophole" in the law (similar to the "urgent needs" provision) which allows recipient jurisdictions to classify up to 10 percent of their annual program as "unspecified local option." Doing so can be a means of avoiding a HUD challenge on the eligibility of particular activities. Chicago wanted to allocate $500,000 of its second-year allotment to the city's new economic development commission for the purpose of encouraging and facilitating industrial expansion and development. HUD objected on the grounds that the project would neither benefit low- and moderate-income individuals nor aid in the prevention or elimination of slums or blight. To win approval, HUD maintained, the project had to meet the urgent needs test. In response the city simply shifted these activities to the "unspecified local option" category.

On other issues, HUD disqualified programs for rehabilitation of privately owned neighborhood centers (Cambridge), purchase of police cars (Durham),

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microfilming housing data (Evanston), repurchase of urban renewal notes (New York), and bicentennial projects (Philadelphia).

COMPLIANCE ISSUES

Compliance issues involve requirements in the law which are external to the community development function and concern implementation rather than program content. Four types of compliance issues predominated: equal opportunity, environmental impact, citizen participation, and Davis-Bacon (prevailing wage). Several generalizations apply to all four categories. (1) Of the seventy-two cases identified, jurisdictions prevailed on only six. (2) Though not hard fought, many compliance cases—especially those involving equal opportunity requirements—have been drawn-out. As of this writing several are not yet resolved; however, HUD generally has not held up funding pending resolution. (3) HUD action on compliance issues has often been initiated by complaints from third parties.

A reason for HUD's high success rate in compliance issues may be the existence in each HUD area office of a separate unit (or individual) for equal opportunity and environmental review functions. HUD's ten regional offices also have units responsible for all four of the compliance categories listed above. We also observed a general reluctance on the part of recipient governments to highlight or debate questions that arose affecting the status of minorities as beneficiaries or employees under the CDBG program. The same kind of dynamic was found to apply, although less strongly, on environmental issues. Local officials sought to dampen environmental controversies that arose under CDBG and were less prone to challenge HUD or third parties than on matters affecting strategy and program content.

Equal opportunity cases were the most numerous compliance issues. Jurisdictions won only two—in Boston and Denver.

Capsule 4. Boston, Massachusetts
Population: 636,725
Central city
Previous experience: urban renewal, model cities

In HUD's first-year performance-monitoring report, the area office's equal opportunity division cited "a recent finding by the Boston Housing Court of segregation in Boston Housing Authority (BHA) housing," and several "well-publicized incidents of harassment of public housing tenants and minority individuals in white neighborhoods".[14] On the basis of these findings the area office stated that the city should develop programs to rectify the problem of minority access to housing and public facilities. When the city omitted such specific programmatic guarantees from its second-year CDBG program, the HUD area office recommended rejection of Boston's application. HUD

[14] The court deals with tenant-landlord disputes and makes judicial rulings on housing issues.

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headquarters in Washington overrode this recommendation and approved the city's $32.4 million application, but it required assurances from the city that all CDBG money used for BHA activities would be in compliance with court desegregation orders and that projects funded from CDBG or Section 8 sources would meet all civil rights requirements. HUD also indicated its intention to begin monitoring the city on a quarterly basis for equal opportunity compliance.

In New York City an issue was raised by the Pratt Conference Coalition, a citywide organization of 150 community groups which alleged that two second-year CDBG activities (the Fordham Plaza and the Housing Rehabilitation Finance Program) would not adquately benefit blacks and Hispanics. After reviewing the charges HUD ruled that the two projects did benefit low- and moderate-income people and that a representative proportion of blacks and other minorities would benefit from them.[15] The Pratt Conference Coalition also raised objections to environmental review and citizen participation procedures in New York. In these cases, too, HUD sided with the city.

Another aspect of equal oportunity is the development of a local affirmative action plan covering facilities, services, employment, and other benefits provided under CDBG. Local officials tended to respond to these issues in a low-key manner. Typical of the local response was Marlborough, Massachusetts, where an affirmative action plan was drawn up after HUD commented on its absence. According to the associate, the plan then "languished in the desk drawer of the mayor for several months." Eventually the plan was adopted by the city council and forwarded to state and HUD officials.

Environmental review cases usually focused, not on the substance of the environmental impact decisions, but on some aspect of the review process, which requires recipient units to "assume all of the responsibilities for environmental review, decisionmaking, and action" [Section 104 (h)(1)]. In an unusually controversial case, HUD froze CDBG funds for Plainview, Texas, until the city had completed separate environmental reviews for several projects the city's community development consultant had indicated would have a significant environmental impact. The only jurisdiction to prevail on an environmental review issue was in Charlottesville, where the issue was impact statements for ramps in curbs to improve access for the handicapped. HUD withdrew its request when the city officials pointed out that each statement would cost more than the ramp itself and threatened to take the issue to court.

Citizen participation cases generally focused on expanding and formalizing the citizen participation structure in the local jurisdictions. For example, HUD officials informed the suburban town of Greece, New York, that it must diversify the membership on its citizen advisory committee; Cleveland officials were told to develop a formal citizen participation mechanism that would include women and minorities; and Sioux City, Iowa, was told to broaden its citizen

[15] Cases resulting from third-party complaints to HUD are intergovernmental in their resolution though not in origin. Where such cases were decided against the complaining party we counted them as "other outcomes" rather than as jurisdiction wins.

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participation process beyond the neighborhood groups that had been active in the pre-CDBG categorical programs.

In several jurisdictions HUD officials were critical of the lack of a formal citizen participation plan. Local officials in Columbia, Cleveland, Philadelphia, and Rochester were instructed to submit a written citizen participation plan. The case of Columbia, South Carolina, is one example where HUD pressure resulted in a significant expansion of citizen participation.

Capsule 5. Columbia, South Carolina
Population: 111,616
Central city
Previous experience: urban renewal

In its first-year PM report, HUD criticized Columbia's citizen participation mechanism at several points. There was no record of public hearings and no formal citizen participation plan. A survey questionnaire had been sent out in one of the city's water bill mailings, but this failed to reach many low- and moderate-income apartment renters who do not receive their own water bills. In the second year, Columbia restructured its citizen participation plan to include nine neighborhood "brainstorming" sessions, the results of which were summarized and passed on to city officials and to a newly formed citizen advisory council. A total of five public hearings were then held—two by the city and three by the advisory committee—before the CDBG application was submitted to HUD.

HUD was not always successful in dealing with local jurisdictions on citizen participation issues. Hennepin County, Minnesota, met HUD's objections to the lack of a regularized citizen participation process by requiring each participating municipality to hold two public hearings and to submit the record of these hearings with the county rather than impose a countywide citizen participation process which HUD officials had pressed for.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL ISSUES

Like compliance issues, administrative and technical issues tended to be noncontroversial and were usually settled in HUD's favor. In one instance of a jurisdiction prevailing, the Washington HUD office overruled area office complaints about ineffecient administration of the CDBG program in St. Louis, stating that the city's performance was "comparable to other jurisdictions." Administrative issues centered on such matters as financial recordkeeping systems (Minneapolis and Pulaski County, Illinois), accounting and contracting procedures (East Lansing), maintenance of records (Charlottesville), and letter-of-credit procedures (Alma, Michigan).

The most frequent administrative issue was the rate of spending, a topic of concern in Washington, where frequent complaints were heard about the CDBG program's "slow" progress. In Charlottesville HUD threatened to cut off funds if spending did not accelerate. Jurisdictions usually responded to criticism of their slow spending by indicating that they would take steps to speed up program implementation.

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Concluding Comments

We found that local governments tended to prevail more frequently on substantive—strategy and program—issues, whereas HUD was more assertive and successful on procedural and compliance questions. In terms of jurisdictional types, large central cities were more successful than other types of jurisdictions. Central cities prevailed on about half of the cases of substantive issues, while other types of jurisdictions prevailed on an average only about one-fourth of the time. On procedural and compliance issues the pattern is less clear.

Prior categorical grant experience was an important factor in disputes between HUD and recipient jurisdictions. Communities with moderate and high levels of previous HUD grant experience were successful about half of the time on substantive issues, while those with little or no experience prevailed only 20 percent of the time. On procedural issues, the more experienced jurisdictions also did better than those with less experience, but the difference in success rates was smaller.

Overall, the CDBG program has resulted in the decentralization of decision-making authority from the federal to the local level, compared with the older-style HUD categorical aid programs. The general view of local officials at the end of two years was that they had more control over community development under the block grant than they did under the categorical programs. At the same time, there was a growing belief at the end of the second year that decentralization was being reduced.

It is difficult to speculate about the future of decentralization under this block grant for several reasons. One important consideration is the nature of federal involvement. We found in the first two years a general tendency for federal officials to insert themselves more in the local CDBG decision-making process as the block grant program matured. The necessity for speedy decision making in the first year of the program gave way in the second year to a slower and more deliberative HUD-locality relationship. Also, in the second year HUD became more involved in the CDBG process locally through performance monitoring and program evaluations, procedures that were not operative in the first year of the new program. Perhaps the most important factor that will influence decentralization under CDBG is the role of the Carter administration, a subject that will be highlighted in the extension phase of the Brookings monitoring of this block grant program.*

*This article is based on chapter 3 of a forthcoming report, *Decentralizing Community Development*, to be published by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The full report describes the second year findings of the Brookings monitoring study of the community development block grant program. The authors wish to thank Sarah F. Liebschutz, Margaret T. Wrightson, Michael J. Rich, and Arthur A. Morton for assistance in the development of material presented in this article. Liebschutz and Wrightson are co-authors of the full report; Rich and Morton are research assistants in the Brookings Monitoring Studies Group. The material presented in this article is the responsibility of the authors and does not represent the analysis or views of the officers, trustees, or other staff members of the Brookings Institution.

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U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing Africa

HENRY BIENEN

Africa has had greater salience in United States foreign policy concerns under the Carter administration. This administration has moved on a number of fronts to alter directions in United States-Africa policy. Fences were mended with Nigeria; the United States extended former Secretary of State Kissinger's activity on Rhodesia and Namibia and went well beyond Kissinger's policies in tilting away from South Africa. The Carter administration has taken a harder line against internal apartheid policies in South Africa, announced U.S. support for majority rule in South Africa, and in October 1977, supported a U.N. resolution embargoing arms to South Africa.

Elsewhere in Africa, specifically in Zaire in the spring of 1977 and more recently in the Horn of Africa, the Carter administration has tried to formulate African policies without always deriving those policies from the exigencies of Soviet-United States competition.* These new directions are useful. New policy directions toward Africa should and must take account of general North-South issues which involve international finance and trade, nuclear proliferation, environment, and resources. These new directions can and should take account of African continental or regional organizations like the Organization of African Unity and the Economic Commission of West African States. The collective interests those organizations represent should be well understood. The thrust of

* A second invasion of Zaire from Angola (launched after this article had gone to press), coming on top of massive Cuban involvement in Ethiopia, led to a shift in U.S. policy in 1978. Once again, concern over the Soviet Union seemed to dominate the thoughts of some, but not all, high-level policy makers.

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the argument that follows, however, is that political and economic differentiation is proceeding apace in Africa. Conflict and transition in southern Africa have speeded up these processes but they have obscured them too because Black African states can agree to shared interest in the end of white dominated regimes.

It is now necessary to be as clear as possible about United States concerns in various parts of Africa and to define those concerns in bilateral terms as well as continental ones. New approaches toward Africa must take account of the growing differentiation between states and must be especially sensitive to domestic political and economic evolutions within African countries.

The United States has stopped saying that it has no "interests" in Africa. This is not true, and no one believed it in any case. Paying more attention to the way that the United States will behave toward individual countries in the context of division within Africa is no panacea. Coherent policies will not spring forth magically from a "bilateral relations" emphasis any more than they did from continental generalizations. There will always be contradictions in U.S. policies in Africa from cross pressures and from the fact that hierarchies of interest are not always clear. There will be unforeseen events as well. But if policy is not going to be always ad hoc, reactive, and crisis oriented, as it was in Angola in 1975, it is time to establish priorities and alignments more in tune with the realities of Africa's present and future.

The Evolving African Interstate System

The African interstate system which existed from 1960 until the mid-1970s is undergoing rapid change. This system was characterized by the establishment and maintenance of certain norms which, while sometimes honored in the breach, nonetheless governed the behavior of most states most of the time. These norms involved commitment to the territorial integrity of states; the stability of borders between states; noninterference in the internal affairs of African states; the right to self-determination within the territorial framework of colonial entities, and settlement of disputes peacefully and through the auspices of African mediators or the Organization of African Unity rather than by recourse to the United Nations or to non-African powers.

These norms did not apply to the relations of African states to the white regimes of southern Africa. And, from 1960 there were important deviations from these rules of interstate behavior. The Somali Republic never accepted the territorial boundaries it inherited at independence. Secessionist attempts were mounted in Katanga, and Biafra was recognized as an independent entity by Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, and the Ivory Coast. Elements within a number of African states did call on former colonial powers to intervene militarily in their affairs.

What then is new in Africa which justifies saying that interstate relations are changing? First, African countries have become increasingly differentiated.

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There have always been differences between independent African states in size of population and territory, in wealth, levels of education, resources, military capabilities. But it has taken some time for these differences to become cumulative.

Nigeria, always the largest of African nations, had armed forces of only 10,000 in 1966. It now has around 250,000 men under arms. Its oil revenues are allowing rapid industrialization and literacy programs. It has clearly emerged as a continental power with heavy weight on issues such as African economic ties with non-African countries, South Africa, inter-African cooperation. Its nationals in large numbers staff African and non-African international organizations. Smaller states, which were internationally prominent and made a splash in pan-African affairs through the activities of dynamic leaders like Nkrumah in Ghana or Guinea's Sekou Touré, are now understood as much more marginal than Nigeria in inter-African and international affairs. Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania have prominence as confrontation states facing Rhodesia and South Africa, and Tanzania has tried striking social, agricultural, and political experiments in Africa and is active in international forums. But Tanzania, too, is constrained as a foreign policy actor in Africa and internationally by its weakness and poverty.

It is still the case that some relatively small states with little prospect for rapid industrial growth can occupy international attention through their capacity for regional disruption or through the chaos which may be evident domestically or both. Such is the case with Uganda. There is also a category of states that from time to time occupies world attention because of natural disaster as in the Sahel drought stricken countries. But policy making toward Africa ought not be dominated by the awful or bizarre, or by traditional ties, or by affinity for or aversion to individual leaders.

What of the larger countries whose size and resources and economic potentialities allow them to aspire to regional power status in Africa? The Black African states which are large in geography and/or population tend to have an economic future but they have also had severe ethnic, regional, linguistic, and religious tensions. This describes Nigeria, Zaire, Sudan, Angola, Ethiopia. These are all states which can aspire, as could a black South Africa, to power status in Africa. With the exception of Nigeria, these countries have not been able to translate size and resources into regional or continental, much less international, power. They have been unable to create strong national institutions or even coherent military forces, again save Nigeria. Small states in Africa have not been immune from internal cleavage but actual attempts at secessions are more likely within large states since the seceding unit has resources of its own and can think of itself in national terms as did Biafra, the southern Sudan, Katanga, and Eritrea. We cannot say with confidence that Zaire, the Sudan, and Ethiopia will be able to create or recreate the national grids and institutions necessary for them to fight off secession and develop their resources as nation-states with their present boundaries. Nor can one say with certainty that Nigeria

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has "solved" its ethnic-linguistic-regional-religious splits although it has centralized authority, moved away from a fragile federation of four regions to a nineteen-state system, and increased the national government's ability to tax and to implement development projects. Problems of national integration are not solved once and for all as current events in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, and Canada show us.

Judgments about the prospects for continued territorial integrity and internal stability of large African states are now complicated by the increased possibilities for outside interference in the affairs of individual countries. Such intervention has occurred on a large scale in Ethiopia, Angola, and Zaire; sometimes neighbors have intervened; sometimes distant countries have intervened. Internal stability in certain African states is now increasingly hostage to foreign policy relations just as relations between African states have been affected by ethnic groups spilling over boundaries and by refugees who sought sanctuary in neighboring countries.

Though it is difficult to predict with certainty which states are going to be successful in holding themselves together in the short and longer runs, it is necessary to try to understand how the inevitable process of economic and military differentation will manifest itself in Africa. The process of translating resources into power will be jagged, but it is a process that is taking place. Economic performance has been variable among states. Either because of resource endowments or relatively good management or economic policy, some states have done much better than others in the past decade. Nigeria and Gabon fall into the first category. Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Cameroun fall into the second. Ghana, Zaire, Guinea, and Uganda showed economic promise at the time of independence but their growth rates have been disappointing.

No intelligent bilateral relations with African countries can be elaborated without sensitivity to domestic political and economic evolutions. This may be a truism that holds for relations with all states, but it has special force when the countries in question are changing rapidly and becoming distinct from one another, and have no long-standing and extensive relations with the United States.

This leads me to a second feature of current international relations in Africa which is worth underlining. Numerous states are now evolving conceptions of their own national interests. There were ideological differences between states from the time of independence but these have become clearer, more embedded in different institutional arrangements if not in social structures. Trade relations, investment policies, and foreign ties did not exist for all African states at independence. Trade, aid, investment, and foreign contacts were closely held by metropolitan powers. It has taken time for most states to proliferate their sources of imports and their export markets, and to elaborate new relationships with bilateral and multilateral donors. These national interests of African states are evolving at a time when North-South relations are altering and when important new actors like India, Japan, Cuba, China, Brazil, Iran, and Arab oil states have formed economic and military relationships with Africa.

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African states with varied resources, goals, and development strategies will not be able easily to harmonize their African and international policies. Two somewhat contradictory trends are occurring at the same time. On the one hand, there have been major bilateral and multilateral cooperative ventures such as the Tanzanian-Zambian railway and the Economic Commission of West African States. African states have also negotiated as a bloc with the European Economic Community and signed the Lomé Convention in 1975.[1] They generally have been cohesive during North-South negotiations in numerous arenas. On the other hand, the Organization of African Unity has been split and paralyzed by conflicts in Angola and in the Horn of Africa. Support for the MPLA regime in Angola by a clear majority of African states only came after the South African invasion of Angola. The OAU has been unable even to take up the conflict between the Somali Republic and Ethiopia for fear of further fracturing the organization. Regional conflicts in Africa have been increasing in scope and intensity. In part this is because African nations now have the material and logistical wherewithal to translate their disagreements into armed conflict. Armies can now sustain warfare for a longer time and over a wider area. Moreover, African countries with territorial demands on other countries or with political conflicts with their neighbors appear more willing to take advantage of internal strife and act militarily against those neighbors. The Somali Republic escalated its conflict with Ethiopia when the latter was under severe pressure from secessionist movements in Eritrea and when Ethiopia's borders with the Sudan and its internal politics were highly unstable. Angola supported the intervention of dissident forces in Zaire.

There is another reason military conflict between African states is likely to increase and the boundaries set by colonial mapmakers likely to change. A growing number of states have acquired an interest in Africa and have been willing to act as intervenors on their own or as proxies for larger powers. As non-African states expand their trade, investment, and political ties with Africa, the possibility of outside political and economic intervention in Africa rises. Japan is now a major trading partner with African countries. Brazil and India have growing economic relations with Africa and Brazil has been involved in the politics of Portuguese decolonization. Cuban and Soviet military intervention in the Angolan civil war and in the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia has been decisive. No former colonial power maintains anywhere near the number of troops in Africa that Cuba today maintains in Angola and Ethiopia.

The recent conflicts in Zaire and in the Horn of Africa illustrate the importance of new actors. The government of Zaire announced in early April 1977 that Moroccan troops would come to Zaire to support the central government and that Chinese military equipment would arrive too. Subsequently, Egypt also gave military support to Zaire. Morocco, Egypt, and China, as well as the

[1] Whereas the earlier Yaoundé agreements between African countries and the EEC included only some African states, the Lomé Convention included virtually all Black African states south of the Sahara.

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United States and France, which provided transport for Moroccan troops, have been concerned with Soviet activity and influence in Africa. The Saudis may well have provided funds for the Moroccan operation. President Sadat feared future interventions in the Sudan and seeks to build an alignment of specific Arab and African states. France seeks to protect traditional economic and political interests in West and Central Africa so it too aided Zaire. China wishes to counter Soviet influence in Angola, thus it decided to assist Zaire. Morocco fears Libya's and the Soviet Union's intervention in Saharan and neighboring states.

Some of the same forces and alignments that operated in the 1960s were still at play in Zaire in 1977. But new forces are engaged too. Arab countries are more active. Egypt, which looked to the Middle East as its arena of major interest, now looks to Africa too. The Soviet Union is much more influential. And African countries, especially Nigeria, try to bring their influence to bear on events in other African states.

We can see these forces at work in the Horn of Africa. Arab countries are very interested in the outcome of internal conflict in Ethiopia, especially in the movement for secession of Eritrea and the Ogaden. The Saudis and the Sudanese successfully attempted to move Somalia away from alliance with the Soviet Union.

The Implications for U.S. Policy

If African states are becoming more differentiated, if regional conflicts are increasing in scope and intensity, and if important new actors have entered the scene, what are the implications for U.S. policy toward Africa? Let me begin by making some generalizations about that policy before drawing implications for the future.[2]

The United States divided Africa into Black Africa and white-dominated Africa. Until collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique and the subsequent crises, United States policy makers did not clearly perceive the link between policies toward southern Africa and their effects on Black Africa.

The United States tended to avoid defining priorities toward and interests in individual Black African countries. Policy makers said that the United States had "historic" ties to Liberia and Ethiopia. The United States had more investments in certain countries than in others, for example in Liberia, Guinea, and Zaire (from 1970 on) and more recently in Nigeria and Angola. On the whole, Africa was assigned a low priority compared with other continents and little discrimination was made between various states. Because the United States had no developed policies toward individual countries and because the U.S. role in

[2] In 1977 the Council on Foreign Relations held survey discussion group sessions on U.S. policy toward Africa. These groups produced various papers on U.S.-African relations. I have benefited from reading the papers.

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Africa was perceived in Washington to be subsidiary to that of European countries, U.S. economic and technical assistance programs were not closely meshed with bilateral foreign policies. The importance of countries could not be deduced from bilateral USAID figures for Africa. Ambassador Edward Korry's report to President Johnson in August 1966 on United States aid to Africa, taken in conjunction with the 1966 Foreign Assistance Act amendments which limited the number of countries able to receive bilateral aid, worked toward shifting AID programs in Africa to a multilateral and regional framework and to concentrating aid. It also shifted aid to those countries with supposedly the best prospects for development success on a national scale. In Black Africa these were specified as Ghana, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Zaire, and Liberia. This list was not especially prescient and perhaps was not governed by economic concerns. From 1969 to 1973 Ethiopia was the largest recipient of U.S. aid. Subsequently, more was given to poorer African countries. In 1976 Tanzania was the largest recipient of U.S. aid in Black Africa; Ethiopia and Mali were close together in second and third positions.[3]

U.S. policy toward individual countries was often formulated in response to internal disruption within a country or to Soviet activity. These were usually thought to be linked. Thus the Africa outside of southern Africa which came to the attention of executive office policy makers and to the attention of the Congress were "crises" in the Congo in the early 1960s, Angola in 1975, Zaire in early 1977, and currently in the Horn of Africa. U.S. policy was reactive, focused on Soviet activities, and tended to be formulated in an already developed crisis situation, because the United States had not elaborated individualized country policies in Africa. This tendency was itself a reflection of the low priority given to Africa. Africa was seen to be a sphere of Western European influence. Then, even after Western European influence waned, the United States faced many countries which it knew little about and where, it was felt, the United States had few interests. Assumptions were made that African countries were not and could not become consequential. Perhaps race had something to do with such assumptions. Perhaps the failure to develop a large pool of people with expertise on individual countries may also be relevant. How many Nigerian, Ethiopian, Sudanese, Angolan, Zairian experts are there in the State and Defense departments who can advise policy makers and who can press for sensitivity to the interests of "their" African countries? Only some State Department country desk officers have had field experience in the countries for which they have responsibilities. It is difficult enough to develop long-range polices toward countries whose politics are so fluid; it is harder yet when the pool of reliable area experts is shallow.

[3] See *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants* for various years, published by the Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division. For an official statement of USAID policy in Africa see "Africa: U.S. Development Aid," Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, Department of State Publication 8754, African Series, 56, March 1974.

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Even where low- and mid-level African area experts exist, they have often been ignored by higher officials who become involved in African policy making. U.S. policy toward Angola reflected primarily Secretary Kissinger's concern with Soviet activities and the effects of decolonization on political change in Portugal. He seldom consulted State Department experts on Angola or took their advice. Despite reviews of United States and Soviet relations with Angola, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that U.S. policy toward Angola did not grow out of a policy analysis which anticipated various events.[4] It is true that Soviet and Cuban intervention was not easy to foresee. Still, with a better understanding of Angola, the fragility of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FLNA) and its inability to maintain a firm regional base without a great deal of assistance might have been recognized. Not enough sustained interest in and knowledge of Angola had preceded intense crisis activity.

U.S. African Policy and Soviet Activity

There is evidence that in Zaire and in the Somali-Ethiopian conflict the Carter administration has been much more sensitive to factors internal to the politics of the countries involved and less concerned to formulate policies toward African countries as a reaction to Soviet moves and as part of global Soviet-American relations. When troops from Katanga based in Angola entered Zaire's Shaba Province in March 1977, despite requests from Zaire the Carter administration avoided any major direct commitment to the Mobutu regime. The United States did airlift "nonlethal" equipment to Zaire and this provoked critics of any U.S. intervention in Black Africa to argue that the United States was starting down a well-worn and discredited path reminiscent of interventions in Angola in 1975 and the Congo in the 1960s. For some, the United States has no interests in Africa that justify direct intervention in military conflicts. These conflicts are perceived as essentially regional and ethnic. General Mobutu, on the other hand, criticized the United States for too little commitment and too weak a response.

The Carter administration tried to understand events in Zaire on their own terms and at the same time to gather support for a policy of keeping the Soviet Union out of Zaire's conflict. These events gave further evidence that African states do not even publicly state their commitment any longer to precluding the intervention of outside powers in African conflicts. Angola and Zaire made it clear that short-run political criteria determine whether African nations support specific non-African interventions; these criteria override the formerly stated concerns for nonintervention. Nigeria, as the largest and most powerful Black African country, still has an interest in maintaining a position against in-

[4] See Department of State, News Release, February 6, 1976, Bureau of Public Affairs and Office of Media Services. Statement by Assistant Secretary of State William E. Schaufele, Jr., before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

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tervention by non-Africans and has stated this interest during fighting in Zaire and Ethiopia.[5]

Although the territorial integrity of Zaire was maintained through French, Egyptian, and Moroccan intervention, and the United States kept a low profile, in some quarters the invasion was perceived as a direct consequence of a U.S. failure of will in Angola and Rhodesia. It has been argued that Angola provided a model for Soviet intervention by proxy which would be used in Rhodesia and South West Africa, and it has been asserted that Cubans had become entrenched in Congo-Brazzaville, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Tanzania, and that the Cuban-Soviet axis in Africa is part of a Soviet design to deny the United States and Western European states access to raw materials, to potentially hinder communications and the delivery of oil and minerals to Europe through dominating the Cape routes around South Africa. The ultimate Soviet aim is said to be aid to guerrilla attacks on South Africa itself.[6]

Throughout March 1977, major United States newspapers, when reporting Fidel Castro's visit to Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, and Mozambique, used a style of reporting on Soviet activity that was reminiscent of writing on Africa in the Kennedy and early Johnson administrations, when U.S. policy in Africa, and especially Congo policy, was essentially a reflection of the United States-Soviet struggle for influence in the Third World.[7] The significant difference between the 1960s and the present is that there is wide agreement that the Soviet Union's influence has grown since the 1960s.

I am not going to review here the useful literature which deals with the history of Soviet-African relations and with Soviet motives in pursuit of long- and short-term goals.[8] Rather, I am going to state some aspects of Soviet-African relations which are highly significant for U.S.-African policies.

Although the Soviet Union lost bases and naval facilities in Somalia in late

[5] Nigeria, through Foreign Minister Garba, announced its desire to keep outside powers from intervening in Zaire and in Africa generally. See "Nigeria Appeals on Arms," *New York Times*, March 24, 1977, p. 3. On the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict, General Obasanjo, the Nigerian Head of State, urged that the dispute be settled by Africa and called attention to Nigeria's role as a mediator. On the other hand, Ambassador Leslie Harriman stated that Cubans were welcome in Africa as long as they did not subvert independent Black African states. He insisted on Ethiopia's right to call in Cubans, and he upheld Zaire's right to call in Egyptians and Moroccans. For General Obasanjo's and Ambassador Harriman's statements see, *Washington Post*, April 4, 1978, p. 16.

[6] Robert Moss, "Paying the Price for Angola," *Sunday Telegraph*, February 20, 1977. This article was reprinted as a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times*, March 15, 1977, p. 2.

[7] See Michael T. Kaufman, "Russia and Cuba Reported Trying to End Role of U.S. and China," *New York Times*, March 13, 1977, p. 3. Graham Hovey, "U.S. Uneasily Watching Soviet Strategy in East Africa," *New York Times*, March 23, 1977, p. 3. Joseph C. Harsch, "Communist Push in Africa Tests Carter," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 25, 1977, p. 1, 8.

[8] See Robert Legvold, *Soviet Policy in West Africa* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970); Legvold, "The USSR's Strategic Stake in Africa" forthcoming in Jennifer Whitaker, ed., *Africa and the United States Vital Interests* (New York: New York University Press); the January-February 1978 issue of *Problems of Communism*; Warren Weinstein, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Aid to Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

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1977, it retains certain rights to facilities in Guinea and Libya and has a military presence through its sales and assistance programs in Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Angola, and Nigeria. Cuban and/or Soviet military advisers are present in other African countries as well.

Soviet economic assistance to Africa, however, has not been large (excluding Egypt and Algeria) and it has been declining.[9] Even where sizable economic credits were made they were not always drawn upon, as in Ethioopia in the 1960s. For 1974 and 1975, the latest figures I have seen, aid from China, Eastern Europe, the United States, and Western Europe was much larger than aid from the Soviet Union. Even where Soviet military assistance programs have been large, as in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, economic aid has not been substantial. In 1975 U.S. trade with Africa totaled more than $10 billion; the United Kingdom's trade with Africa came to more than $6 billion; Japan's exceeded $3.5 billion, and the EEC's trade with Africa amounted to more than $35 billion. (These figures exclude trade with South Africa.) The Soviet Union's trade was just over $1 billion and China's trade was well under $1 billion.[10] Nor does the Soviet Union seem willing to permit expansion of domestic consumption of key African export commodities. While the Soviet Union no doubt wants future access to Africa's rare metals and other minerals, it is not now a large purchaser of African minerals. The Soviet Union has scarce hard currency and a much weaker technical capacity than the West and Japan for sophisticated off-shore oil or mineral extraction operations.

While Western Europe was and is Africa's largest trade partner, trade with the United States increased dramatically after 1973. In 1975 U.S. exports to Africa were about $3.5 billion, of which the Republic of South Africa accounted for around one-third. U.S. imports from Africa were about $8 billion of which close to half was accounted for by imports of Nigerian oil. In 1974 the United States bought close to 15 percent of its total crude petroleum imports from Black Africa. Nigeria provided about 80 percent of the oil from Black Africa; the rest came from Angola's Cabinda area and from Gabon. By 1977 Nigerian exports to the United States exceeded $6 billion. After Saudi Arabia, Nigeria was the largest foreign oil supplier to the United States.

Two things are apparent from trade data. Black Africa is a more important trading partner for Western Europe and the United States than is South Africa, a fact to which we will return shortly. And, rising Soviet political influence in

[9] For China and the Soviet Union see *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974;* Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, Report No: 298, January, 1976; United States Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1976,* ER 77-10298, Washington, August 1977. For the United States see Agency for International Development, *Fiscal Year 1976 Operational Budget,* p. 5, Table 3, Washington D.C., 1977.

[10] For a breakdown of Africa's trade with the world from 1960 to 1969 see Frederick Arkhurst, ed., *U.S. Policy Toward Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 239-240. From 1970 on see International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade, 1969-1975,* Washington, D.C., 1977; also see *United Nations Trade Statistics, 1974,* Statistical Papers, Seven D, Volume 24.

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Africa is not based on increasing trade any more than it is based on increasing economic assistance. Soviet military assistance programs in Africa are another matter. Of the 6,900 Soviet military technicians said to be in developing countries from 1974 to 1975, 1,000 were stationed in Somalia, 600 in Algeria, 300 in Uganda, 170 in Angola, and 110 in Guinea.[11] From 1955 through 1974 Soviet military aid to Africa (excluding Egypt) has been estimated at $682 million out of a total of $12 billion in Soviet military aid to developing countries.[12] Soviet arms deliveries to Africa (excluding Egypt) from 1964 to 1973 have been valued at $621 million out of a total of more than $7 billion worth sent to noncommunist developing countries.[13] In 1975 Secretary of State Kissinger reckoned Soviet military aid to Angola at $200 million.[14] This was considerably more than total U.S. military assistance to all Black African countries in 1975.

The Soviet Union provided large-scale military support to Ethiopia in 1977, including tanks and jet aircraft, at a cost of $1 billion. The Soviet Union was for a time the major arms supplier to both Somalia and Ethiopia. The decision to support Ethiopia in the current struggle between the two countries led to expulsion from Somalia and loss of the Soviet position on the northeast Indian Ocean littoral. In the highly fluid situation in the Horn of Africa, the Soviet Union appeared first to suffer a defeat with its expulsion from Somalia. However, with Ethiopa's victory in the Ogaden, the Soviet Union became critical to a larger and more important country and to an Ethiopian military highly dependent on Soviet support domestically as well as vis-à-vis Somalia.

The United States tried to keep a low profile and to maintain lines of communication to both Somalia and Ethiopia. It has refused to provide offensive weapons to Somalia and has dragged its feet on all weapons deliveries until Somalia should have renounced military force in the Ogaden and in Kenya's Northern Frontier. The United States resisted Saudi, Iranian, and Egyptian pressures to counter Soviet military assistance. This was a wise posture for a number of reasons. Somalia has hardly been friendly to the United States. It has signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union and provided it with important base facilities. It was in conflict with Kenya, with whom the United States has close relationships. Most African states opposed Somali military intervention in the Ogaden. Moreover, it is not in the long-run interest of the United States to be a party to the attempt to carve up Ethiopia. Whatever the merits of Somalia's claims to parts of the Ogaden, it has been a military aggressor and had pushed past areas populated by Somali peoples. The wisest position for the

[11] These figures are gathered from *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974*, op. cit., p. 44, and from Walter F. Hahn and Alvin J. Cottrell, *Soviet Shadow Over Africa* (Coral Gables: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1976), p. 58.

[12] *Communist States and Developing Countries*, op. cit., Table 8.

[13] Ibid., Table 9.

[14] See Secretary of State Kissinger's statement in Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, January 29, 1976, p. 11. See Hahn and Cottrell, op. cit., p. 58.

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United States is to help mediate the dispute and to avoid any large military sales or assistance programs.

It is good that serious account has been taken of counterclaims in the Horn of Africa and of the ramifications throughout Africa of the current struggle. Ethiopia's instability and unfriendliness had to be weighed against the repercussions of Somalia's gains and the effect of those gains on Kenya, which would have been a likely next target for Somali expansionism. The conflict was not and should not have been reduced to a Soviet-United States struggle for influence. Indeed, in an attempt to anticipate events and to see them in African contexts, the Carter administration had ordered a new study of the Horn prior to large-scale warfare breaking out.[15]

It is not enough, of course, to argue that the United States must pay attention to the influence of struggles in the Horn on neighboring countries and on relationships with Arab states. As soon as one tries to formulate a U.S. response to the specific conflict, one comes up against the problem of defining U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean and in Africa more generally. The process of defining interests vis-à-vis individual countries in conflict must take place within wider contexts and concerns. But unless the specifics or local conflicts are understood, policies will be built on sand as they were in Angola in 1975.

U.S. Interests in Africa

Can we say anything about U.S. interests in Africa? Secretary of State Vance has outlined his ideas of our national interests in Africa. He noted the African roots of many American citizens and tied the search for justice and peace in southern Africa to effects on American society; he noted the number of African states in multilateral bodies. He pointed to the substantial share of imports from Africa of certain commodities, especially crude oil. He noted the sixfold increase of U.S. direct investment over the past fifteen years, along with a twelvefold increase in trade, and the rise of Nigeria as a trading partner twice the size of South Africa. Secretary Vance then went on to list six broad points.

> That the United States should not have negative, reactive policies opposing Cuban or Soviet involvements but should develop affirmative policies;
>
> the United States should try to foster a strong and peaceful Africa through long-run assistance policies;
>
> the United States should encourage African nationalism rather than impose American solutions;
>
> U.S. policies must reflect national values, that is, human rights commitments, racial justice;
>
> cultural and economic ties are even more enduring than political ones;

[15] Secretary of State Vance alluded to this study in his press conference of May 4, 1977. See the Secretary of State, Press Conference, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, May 4, 1977, p. 6.

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the United States will discuss all issues openly with African nations.[16]

One could not really object to these statements although not all African nationalisms can be supported as some conflict with each other. But these broad views do not define interests.

When U.S. interests in Africa are conventionally discussed in global terms, two points mentioned by Secretary Vance are frequently noted: African size of representation in the United Nations and other multilateral bodies and access to raw materials, especially access to minerals produced in southern Africa and Zaire and to Nigerian oil. Secretary Vance, however, did not mention any strategic considerations, particularly command of sea lanes of communication for oil shipment from the Persian Gulf to Europe and from Nigeria to Brazil and the United States, and sea-based nuclear weapons positioning.

A great deal of the recent debate over U.S. policy toward Rhodesia and South Africa has concerned sea lanes, projections of military control of African air and sea space, and access to scarce resources. The Republic of South Africa produces important minerals and commands the sea route around the Cape. South Africa also has major naval facilities at Simonstown, while the United States has only limited access to ports from Cairo to Capetown, and can only count on Mombasa in Kenya as a "friendly port." Thus policy toward South Africa is central to those who see these as the key issues. Some who have emphasized the importance of open sea lanes around Africa and in the Indian Ocean in order to demonstrate the critical importance of retaining a friendly (white? noncommunist? anti-Soviet?) regime in the Republic of South Africa have doubtless been concerned to preserve the status quo in that republic as well as being concerned with U.S. interests. How heavily should policy makers weigh sea routes, strategic positioning, and access to resources as African policy issues?

Recently, U.S. access to ports and bases on the African littoral has decreased while there has been an increasing United States dependence on Persian Gulf and Nigerian oil. Those who draw arrows to indicate the flow of oil around the Cape have no trouble demonstrating the growth of flows. At the same time, Soviet naval deployments and bases increased around the Persian Gulf and on African shores of the Indian and Atlantic oceans up to the loss of Berbera in Somalia in November 1977. What should we conclude from this? Does the Soviet Union have a threatening "grand design?" If so, does it call for a corresponding American "grand design" with Africa in a major position?

The United States has not heretofore stressed the strategic importance of Africa either for the positioning of land-based or sea-based weapons. Nuclear submarines may lie off the South African or East African coasts but what happens on the continent is irrelevant to submarines. The United States has used security assistance only minimally and selectively in Africa. It has given up

[16] Secretary of State Vance's address to the annual convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) at St. Louis, July 1, 1977, published as press release 316 of the Department of State and in The Department of State's *Bulletin*, Volume LXXVII, no. 1990, August 1977.

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military bases or electronic listening posts in North Africa and Ethiopia without serious loss to military capability. Almost all recent discussion of future U.S. military postures in Africa have had to do with cooperation or non-cooperation with South Africa and the limitation of Soviet bases on the East and West African littorals. There is no intent to construct new American military positions in Africa. Discussions concerning the Indian Ocean have centered on the development of island bases, especially Diego Garcia, and the amount and kinds of weapons to be sold to Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Africa has not loomed large in U.S. strategic considerations that relate to military postures nor should it.[17]

The tied questions of access to resources and control of sea lanes are another matter. A sophisticated argument that tries to account for the increased Soviet military presence in Africa and in the Indian Ocean and Atlantic need not necessarily postulate that the Soviets will actually interrupt the flow of oil around the Cape or from Nigeria to the United States, or deny the West other resources, although presumably they would in wartime. Conceivably, the Soviet Union might interfere with oil flows in conditions of extreme tension and conflict short of war. Rather, so this argument goes, the relationship between security of oil supplies and military power is complex. The threat of force against oil might be a more important and decisive military measure than actual intervention.[18] However, even if threats of force are the crucial advantage, are they more likely to be directed at oil production at its source than against oil shipments on the high seas?

It is not a simple matter to sort out the relationship between shifts in overall strategic power and a Great Power's regional influence. Hahn and Cottrell argue that the general strategic level reversal for the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union has allowed the Soviets to intervene more aggressively in Africa. According to them, regional changes in balance of power work back to affect strategic balances negatively for the United States. Thus their conclusion is that regional defense of interests is necessary to preserve global positions.[19]

If military power changes regionally against a country, it may be true that an

[17] For review of strategic considerations in the Indian Ocean and East African littoral see, among others, Dale R. Tahtinen with the assistance of John Lenczowski, *Arms in the Indian Ocean* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977); Mordechai Abir, *Oil, Power, and Politics: Conflict in Arabia, The Red Sea and the Gulf* (London: Frank Cass, 1974); and Michael McGwire, "Soviet Interest and Capabilities in the South Atlantic Region: 1977–1990." Paper prepared for the study group on U.S. Interests in the South Atlantic, Institute for Foreign Policy Study Analysis, Cambridge, Mass., 1977. Also, David J. Kelley, "African Oceans," *Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest* (April 1977).

[18] For discussions which stress the importance of sea routes see Hahn and Cottrell, op. cit., pp. 48–52; Geoffrey Kemp, "The Diffusion of Power and the Security of Oil," and the banquet address by Geoffrey Kemp to the Senior Conference on Arms Transfers held at West Point, United States Military Academy, June 10–12, 1976, both published in The Final Report of the Conference, pp. 75–89 and 23–42.

[19] Hahn and Cottrell, op. cit., p. 89.

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adversary may be in a better position to make the "last safe move." Low- or medium-level military intervention may suffice to get one's way as the Soviet Union did in Angola. That is, we could conceive of the United States wanting to maintain a particular government in an African country through military assistance and being unable to do so as regional balances altered. Would failure to maintain a particular government in Zaire, Nigeria, or South Africa alter global strategic balances? Even for these three African countries most important in terms of resources, size, and potential power, changes in government are likely to be consequential for the United States only within an African regional, not a global strategic context. And the consequences have to do, above all, with access to African resources.

We can only speculate about Soviet motives for the Angolan intervention and the more general rise in Soviet activity in Africa and its seas. We assume that various groups within the Soviet Union—naval spokesmen, American specialists, African experts, interventionists, minimalists, risk averters, etc.—put forward different arguments and bargain with each other over African policies. Some may want to support socialisms that they envision; some will argue to project Soviet power, as a Great Power, wherever it is feasible to do so with low risk. Angola may well have been considered a low risk since the MPLA's opponents were weak; Zaire was not a formidable opponent and the United States in the post-Vietnam period could be expected to be in a noninterventionist phase. The Soviet Union may well feel that it has had weak positions in Africa. With its expulsion from Egypt, central and southern Africa are natural areas in which to project its power. In the short run, Soviet ability to deny the West African resources is not great and it is unlikely that the Angolan intervention had that goal foremost among policy outcomes. It is more likely that the Soviet Union wants access to resources in central and southern Africa in the future, and wants to protect its sea routes, commerical concerns, and longer run strategic interests.

For the Soviet Union the gains in Angola were real. Soviet and Cuban power was projected to new places. Both countries are actors that must be taken into account more carefully by African leaders. But this is precisely what happened in Zaire in 1977 where the Soviet Union was not able and did not try to affect the outcome between conflicting groups and between Angola and Zaire.

Only Nigeria and South Africa are currently important to United States trade and resource needs. And Nigeria's oil reserves, though sizable, are not nearly as extensive as Saudi Arabia's. If guaranteed access to oil is essential, Nigeria is not likely to be the place to intervene. And as for the international price of oil, the attitudes of "friendly" oil-producing states (such as Norway, Iran, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Mexico) toward oil exports and prices have to do with their needs for international currency for imports and development, their desire to conserve reserves for future domestic consumption, their estimation of the profitability of investment, and their analyses of what higher oil prices mean for the industrial countries. U.S. military capability has not had

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a direct effect on the price of oil in the international market, although the Saudi regime's ultimate reliance on U.S. support for control of its oil resources may play a role in the many factors weighed by the Saudis in determining the price of oil. As for supply, it was, after all, not the Soviet Union which interrupted oil flows in 1973, although Soviet commentators have continuously called attention to the West's need for resources from developing countries. (These same Soviet commentators have also insisted that recent changes in the balance of class forces in the world have altered the dependence of developing countries on the West. Specifically, Soviet commentators argue that the Soviet Union's armed forces have a duty to aid national liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere and that the changed balance of power has made counterrevolution more difficult to achieve.)[20]

The United States was inept and ineffective during the Angolan conflict. But it has since mended its ties with Nigeria, has fostered discussions on a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia, and has altered its South African policy in ways designed to ease relations with Black African states on other issues. The Soviet Union has become more active than China in Africa, more influential in Mozambique and with Zimbabwe liberation movements, and in Ethiopia. However, the Soviet Union must have enough experience in Africa to know by now that political gains on the continent can be ephemeral, especially when tied to factions that may be narrowly based.

The nature of Soviet activities in Africa and the nature of African politics make it likely that the Soviet Union can continue to project its power. There will be opportunities to affect factional conflict by infusion of limited resources at low risk. Moreover, even apart from southern Africa, the gamut of North-South issues that need to be negotiated and the strained relations that will often arise from those negotiations provide a context in which the Soviet Union will be looked on sympathetically by at least some countries unhappy with the West. But the Soviet Union has not itself been very forthcoming on North-South issues and remains irrelevant to the resolution of major trade, finance, and development issues.

The United States and African Resources

It is difficult to envision the United States or Western Europe being cut off from African resources by Soviet interventions or by domestic political changes within Africa including a change in South Africa's racial majority. I do not want to detail the specific shares of minerals and commodities produced in Africa.[21] Suf-

[20] See the statement by Marshall A. A. Grechko, "The Leading Role of the CPSU in Building the Army of a Developed Socialist Society," *Voprosy Istorii, KPSS*, No. 5, May 1974, cited in Hahn and Cottrell, op. cit., p. 22, and Fleet Admiral S. G. Gorshkov's *Morskaia Moshch' Gosudarstva* (Moscow: Voeizdat, 1976) cited in ibid., p. 88.

[21] This has been done in, among other places: Hahn and Cottrell, op. cit., pp. 26–38; various papers prepared by the Council on Foreign Relations Survey Discussion Group on U.S. Policy

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fice it to say that South Africa especially has large shares of certain mineral reserves which exist outside the Soviet Union and China. Also, the United States imports from South Africa significant shares of its total consumption in certain minerals of specialized use: corundum, industrial diamonds, chromite, platinum. South Africa also provides nearly one-fifth of U.S. uranium imports.

Other Black African countries that contribute significant shares to United States consumption of fuel and nonfuel minerals are: Nigeria for oil; Zaire, which provides more than two-thirds of cobalt consumed in the United States; and Gabon, which provides for about one-fourth of U.S manganese consumption. Algeria may become a significant exporter of natural gas to the United States.

Outside of South Africa, the other African countries that hold large known shares of mineral reserves in noncommunist countries are Zaire for cobalt, industrial diamonds, and tantalum; Morocco for phosphates; Guinea for bauxite; Niger and Gabon for uranium; Zambia for copper. Nigeria's share of known oil reserves is not large although Nigeria is a significant current producer of oil and a major exporter to the United States. Zambia and Zaire together produce about one-fifth of the noncommunist world's exported copper. Of course, simply citing current shares of production for a country or even its share of known reserves is not decisive in deciding a country's importance in minerals. South Africa does produce a significant amount of manganese. However, Australian reserves are very large. A country might have half of the known reserves of a mineral but the other 50 percent may be sufficient for world production. Cost of production of alternatives and new processes must be considered. Artificial carborundum can be produced by chemical processes, at somewhat higher cost than present southern African production. New processes have reduced the importance of germanium and new processes allow for substituting nickel for chromium, one mineral in which Rhodesia and South Africa have very large shares once the Soviet Union is excluded.

However, let us agree that South Africa is an important source of minerals. Still, there are a number of problems with the argument that maintenance of a white regime in South Africa is of primary importance to the United States and Western Europe. United States trade with Black Africa is larger than trade with Rhodesia and South Africa. The United Kingdom imports three times more from Black Africa than from South Africa. U.S. direct investments in South Africa at the end of 1975 were about $1.6 billion, about 40 percent of investment in Africa, or larger than the equivalent investments in Norway, Sweden, or Argentina, but less than the $3.3 billion in direct investments in the rest of Africa (excluding Libya and Egypt), and around 1 percent of U.S. total foreign investment. There has been a sharp decline in new American and European investment in South Africa following the upheavals in Soweto in 1976. Return

Toward Africa, 1977; William Foltz, "United States Policy Towards Southern Africa; Economic and Strategic Constraints" *Political Science Quarterly* 92 (Spring 1977): 47–64.

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on capital for overseas firms and reinvestment of profits has been declining too. Investments in Nigeria, although then less than one-third of those in South Africa, doubled between 1973 and 1975, and a decision by U.S. firms to invest in a Nigerian natural gas industry would considerably increase investments there, although Nigeria has also been transfering equity from foreign firms to the government. The United Kingdom is in a different position on investments. Its net assets at book value were £198.7 million in Nigeria in 1974 and £1003.7 million in South Africa (including South West Africa) in the same year. British direct investments in South Africa are close to 10 percent of British direct foreign investment. Additionally, British investments in Rhodesia were £113 million in 1974. British investments might well suffer from political change in southern Africa. They may also suffer from future instability in southern Africa.

If political change can and frequently does alter the relationships of foreign investors to a host government, as has already been the case in Africa, for example in Nigeria, Libya, and Tanzania, political change is less likely to affect access to raw materials. Price of those materials can only be drastically altered if supply/demand conditions permit. I have suggested that even friendly nations have not lowered oil prices below what the market will bear or a cartel can deliver. This has been true for regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Iran which are heavily dependent on U.S. military cover and technical assistance. There may be short-run special cases. The Saudis may be telling the truth when they say that their decision was a political one when they pushed for a 5 percent OPEC price rise in 1976 instead of the 10 percent rise which Iran and others wanted. But it is also true that Saudi Arabia did not need new oil revenues as did Iran, Nigeria, and Indonesia. Only when a regime is the complete client of another state and the maintenance of an elite's power rests on outside power solely can one envision significant pricing policies in favor of the dominant state. Even in that extreme situation, the client regime has some leverage; someone worse from the perspective of the dominant state may come to power.

It has been hard for developing countries to organize cartels to restrict supply. OPEC has not proved, as yet, to be the first of many effective cartels. Also, it is one thing to restrict total supplies to raise prices and another thing to selectively embargo would-be importers. Very strong political motives must be working in conjunction with market forces for embargoes to occur and then they are extremely difficult if not impossible to enforce.

The Soviet Union well might like to benefit politically and economically from the formation of new cartels as it benefits from OPEC. But could the Soviet Union compel major African producers to withhold their supplies from markets or could it compel countries to sell to it below world market prices? It is difficult to envision the Soviet Union having a relationship with countries like Zaire, Nigeria, or a black South Africa, similar to U.S. relationships with Central American republics in an earlier day or similar to past British relationships with client states in the Persian Gulf. Angola continues to sell oil to Gulf Oil. Of all the major oil producing states, Iraq has had the closest relations with the Soviet

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Union, yet Iraq, for its own purposes, did not adhere to the 1973 Arab oil embargo.

This leads me to the view that the destruction of the white regime in South Africa, and its hypothetical replacement with a regime no friendlier to the United States than, for example, Mozambique's, would not mean, willy-nilly, the loss of access to South Africa's minerals. Threats to reliability of supply of minerals from South Africa, Rhodesia, Zambia, Zaire, and Angola are more likely to come from internal political instability or military conflict and racial warfare than from deliberate embargoing of supplies. Fighting in Shaba Province threatened to disrupt mineral production in Zaire. Conceivably, fighting between states in southern Africa or internal sabotage could disrupt supplies and open up avenues for Soviet interventions as well. Internal labor unrest in South Africa might have this effect also. Political instability in South Africa and a climate of extreme hostility between South Africa and its neighbors already have had a depressing effect on investment in South Africa. And increasingly, U.S. companies face difficult trade-offs between investing in South Africa and dealing with the opposition such investment generates in the United States. The United States may not accede to African demands for economic embargoes to South Africa. But these demands do not make easier negotiations on a wide gamut of North-South economic issues.

Thus, the issue does not get correctly posed when it is said that the United States and its allies face in South Africa "excruciating policy choices between complex ideological issues, on the one hand, and compelling strategic and economic stakes, on the other."[22] This statement implies that a decision made to support the end of white minority rule in South Africa could be taken only for moral or ideological reasons, but would be counter to basic economic and strategic interests. Support of basic United States economic interests does not lead to the conclusion that the present South African regime or a white dominated regime should be maintained. It does not follow, as supporters of the regime in South Africa would have it, that it is necessary to counter the Soviet Union or China or the growth of socialist states in order to preserve access to raw materials. It does not follow that support for South Africa would be the way to maintain influence in southern Africa and guarantee access to raw materials in southern Africa any more than it follows that overall U.S. trade and investment policies in Africa and other non-Western areas benefit from support of South Africa.

I am not trying to establish here U.S. policy toward South Africa. I am trying to put the matter of U.S. interests in South Africa in the context of U.S. concerns in Africa as a whole and to debunk the arguments that are usually made in support of maintaining the South African regime. The United States also has a presumed interest in peaceful settlements of disputes. Any U.S. policies toward South Africa must also take into account the effects of policies on peacefully ar-

[22] Hahn and Cottrell, op cit., p. 91.

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rived at outcomes. And, of course, the United States has a stated interest in human rights and opposition to racism which should guide U.S. South African policies. These interests are not necessarily antithetical to long-run economic and strategic concerns.

New Policies toward Black Africa

The United States will continue to be preoccupied with southern Africa. Dangers to peace in Africa are posed by racial conflict in Rhodesia and South Africa. There are continuous pressures domestically and from non-Western countries for the United States to oppose minority rule in southern Africa. While the United States still has relatively significant economic and strategic interests in southern Africa, U.S. emphasis in trade has already shifted to Black Africa. American concern for the settlement of disputes in southern Africa in part comes about because continued racial conflict threatens the United States' ability to progress on race relations and threatens U.S. interests in the rest of Africa. The Carter administration has recognized that U.S. southern African policy is consequential for U.S. positions elsewhere and for our ability to influence events in Black Africa.

If, tomorrow, black governments came to power in Rhodesia and South Africa, the latter, but not the former, would be a country of major interest for the United States in Africa. But, racial conflict aside, South Africa would not dominate U.S. interest to the exclusion of other African interests. It would be (as it is) the dominant military and economic power in southern Africa as Nigeria is in West Africa. Potentially Zaire has this position in Central Africa but its financial, economic, and political weakness currently prevent it from having a regional power status. In East Africa no country has the potential to be dominant by virtue of size, resources, military prowess, or economic productivity. The most populous East African country is Ethiopia but neither its economy nor its economic potential cast it in the role of dominant regional power. And, whatever the short-run outcome of secessionist movements, Ethiopia will confront long-run problems of national unity. These problems will be exacerbated by the willingness and ability of actors external to Africa as well as Ethiopia's neighbors to intervene in its territory.

None of these countries, including Nigeria, is likely to be able to emerge as a country able to dominate affairs within Africa. Nigeria is often called the "Giant of Africa." True, its army is almost five times the size of any other Black African army except for the rapidly expanding Ethiopian army. Its population is almost one-fifth of all Africa's. Its gross national product will soon surpass South Africa's. As a major oil exporter it has revenues available beyond those of any other African country by far save South Africa, and as an OPEC member it is involved in a wide range of international discussions. But Nigeria, for all this, is a regional, not a continental power. Its level of industrialization is well below that of Brazil. It has nothing like the nucleus of advanced technology, scientific

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establishments, trained manpower of India. Its military power is well below that of Iran. It is more like Indonesia in size relative to its neighbors and in that its productivity levels remain low as do its levels of industrialization. It has an extremely weak agricultural base. Nor does Nigeria have vast reserves of oil nor large known reserves of other major fuel or nonfuel minerals. And Nigeria, like Indonesia, has severe problems in creating adminstrative and political grids for centralizing authority and carrying out development plans. Thus the "Nigerian Giant" should be put in perspective. It already carries a heavy weight in African councils and in international forums as an African spokesman. It is a regional West African power. But it cannot and will not be able to dictate to African countries removed from its borders. Nor does its geographic position or its territorial size give it the role of Brazil in South America, which touches almost all its continental neighbors. Nigeria's geographic position is less central than Zaire's. Nigeria, however, is the United States' most important African trade partner.

Nigerian influence was critical for African support of the MPLA in Angola after South Africa militarily intervened there and the United States ignored Nigerian views in its Angolan policy. Recently, Nigerian-American relations have improved, and increasingly the United States has consulted Nigeria on major policy initiatives in Africa and especially in southern Africa. But on the one hand U.S. African policy, while taking account of Nigerian interests, cannot be reduced to having a policy toward Nigeria any more than it should, on the other hand, be reduced to having a single overarching policy for Africa as a whole.

It will be tempting to focus on regional powers in Africa and elsewhere: India in South Asia; Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf; Brazil in South America; Indonesia in Southeast Asia. Because Africa has so many states and their politics and interrelations will be confusing and pose difficult choices, it will be especially tempting to concentrate expertise and interest on Nigeria, South Africa, and Zaire. Also, a concentration on regional powers may recommend itself as a policy congenial to those who want stability in international relations. Power can be devolved to regional policemen. The "haves" in the developing world may themselves want marginal changes in North-South relations.[23] While the United States should recognize discrepancies in power and influence between African states, it is not likely that regional powers will be able to resolve inter-African disputes. Moreover, the interests of regional powers in Africa may or may not be consistent with those of the United States in the realm of human rights or economic concerns. The United States may want to sometimes engage in balance of power politics in Africa. Above all, the United States should not get locked into seeing its security needs, economic interests, and concerns for basic needs and human rights always through the eyes of regional powers.

[23] See Roger Hansen, "Major U.S. Options on North-South Relations: A Letter to President Carter," in John W. Sewell *et al.*, *The United States and World Development: Agenda 1977* (New York: Praeger, 1977), esp. pp. 39–44.

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The United States has general concerns in Africa. But Africa has become too differentiated and relations between African states have become too complex for the United States to have a single "African policy." Policies aimed at different states must be put within continental and global contexts. The United States must now fashion appropriately complex and flexible polices for relations with individual African states. To do this, we must come to grips with the varieties of interests that the United States has in Africa, and we must develop more expertise on individual countries. Sending a secretary of state or a UN ambassador on tour is not a substitute for acquiring basic and necessary knowledge about the economic and political structure of a nation within our foreign policy-making institutions.

I have not tried to outline specific policies for different African states or even for various categories of states. States can be categorized by their relative wealth, resources, concern for human rights and needs, leadership, ability to innovate, geographic location, ideology, friendliness to the United States, dependence on the United States, past ties. We could proliferate categories relevant to foreign policy making. Undoubtedly, states will be congenial to U.S. interests and concerns on some dimensions and often in opposition on others. Moreover, countries will move in and out of various classifications. New resources will be discovered. Leaders will change or their postures may alter. There will be a constant dynamic between evolving bilateral relations and U.S. regional, continental, and global interests. If the United States defines its economic and noneconomic interests as clearly as possible it will be better able to deal with a changing Africa within both African frameworks of interest and the United States' own frameworks.*

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Newsmen and Campaigners: Organization Men Make the News

LEON V. SIGAL

The self-absorption of journalists and the paranoia of politicians combine to exaggerate the influence of the news media on elections. It is difficult to demonstrate empirically their impact on electoral outcomes. Yet, if the importance of the press at election time is commonly blown out of proportion, its importance in the preprimary and early primary stages merits closer scrutiny. The 1976 presidential race is a case in point.

The impact of the news media lies in their role as the Great Mentioner—paying attention to some candidates and not to others, conferring name recognition on the few, thereby boosting their standing in the polls and increasing their future news coverage. This is particularly important in a closely bunched field of relative unknowns, although it is less so in a race between two well-known candidates. By contrast, the content of news about the candidates is a product of the interaction between newsmen and campaigners. The news media play less of an independent part in creating issues, sketching imagery, and coloring perceptions of the candidates than in getting attention for their candidacies. Newsmen do not write the score or play an instrument; they amplify the sounds of some of the music makers.

Why is this so? Newsmaking during campaigns is a product of interaction between two organizations—one composed of newsmen, the other of campaigners. Organizational routines and organizational interests are necessary for explaining outcomes.

Typically, newsmen do not report what happens during a campaign, but rather what someone says has happened. This standard operating procedure of newsgathering, newsmen call "legwork." Legwork does not proceed at

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random. A reporter, whatever his assignment, has a set of contacts, potential sources of information, often cultivated over the years, with whom he checks on a regular basis.

The reporter's social location basically determines his network of sources. A columnist in Washington has a different vantage point from that of one of the boys on the bus: his sources will differ and so will his news. Few reporters are free to roam, choosing their sources at will. Only columnists and a handful of political correspondents can do so; the rest are confined to beats. A beat is little more than the formal routinizing of periodic checks with a network of contacts.

In election years, news organizations designate which campaigns will be beats deserving full-time coverage. Since only a handful of active candidates will get that designation, the decision is critical for candidates' chances of getting attention, as well as for shaping news content.

Once on the beat, reporters can select which pieces of information among the many to pass along, but campaigners can regulate the flow of information to them, passing much of it out through routine channels, such as press brefings, press releases and speeches. The two most authoritative sources on the beat, the candidate and his campaign manager, are those to whom access is most severely restricted because of the competing demands on their time—"the struggle for the candidate's body," George McGovern has called it. Reporters who do not gain access must supplement their reliance on routine channels by cultivating alternative sources, mostly among national and local campaign staffs.

Why do campaigners talk to *national* reporters? Primaries and caucuses, after all, are *local* happenings and the largest audiences for news read regional newspapers or tune in to local broadcasts. The sheer numbers of concurrent primaries and caucuses and their geographic dispersion may make it efficient to pass along information through routine channels to the television networks, but why grant exclusive interviews to a correspondent from *The New York Times?*

Part of the answer lies in the select nature of the four target audiences campaigners have:

—*Rival campaigners.* Challenges, threats, and promises can be exchanged in private, but transmitting such messages through the news media conveys a degree of commitment which more private communication does not.

—*Members of their own staff,* both national and local, and especially the candidate himself. Campaign organizations tend to combine decentralization at the bottom with inaccessibility at the top; sometimes the most effective way of reaching those at the top with dissatisfaction over stands taken, money allocated, or trips planned is through the press. The Robert Strums prevent a campaign from completely controlling its public face.

—*Political elites around the country,* in particular, financial contributors and officeholders. Using the press to reach the political elite with particular

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messages—leaked poll results, stands on esoteric issues, a shortage of money—is a long-standing practice, but more recently there may have been a narrowing in the gap between information circulating among political elites and information in the public domain. The decline of party organizations and concurrent rise of issue-oriented activists as campaign workers and the need to raise money from large numbers of people, not just a few fat cats, have disrupted informal communication networks of elites between regions and has broadened the composition of the elite, leading to increased use of news media to circulate information.

—*Other national and local newsmen.* Disclosures to the elite press not only may be reproduced in other media, but also will be read by other newsmen and influence what they disseminate. Those with access often get exclusives; those without it often follow the lead of those who have it. Reinforcing this tendency is endemic uncertainty about what news is and what it means. As Theodore White has said in his account of the 1960 campaign:

> The talk of the corps of correspondents who follow the candidates is not simply gossip; gossip is only its surface form. It is consensus—it is the tired, emotional measuring of judgments among men whom the weeks on the road have made into a brotherhood that only they understand. And the judgment of the brotherhood influences and colors, beyond any individual resistance to prejudice or individual devotion to fact, all of what they write. For by now they write. For by now they have come to trust only each other.

Tacit agreement among reporters on the beat can provide a modicum of certitude to cope with an uncertain environment.

Another part of the answer to why campaigners talk to national reporters lies in the oligopolistic competition of the news industry. The three television networks and two wire services are the principal wholesalers. Two newsweeklies and four newspapers—*The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The Washington Post,* and the *Los Angeles Times,* along with their associated news services—are retailers in exclusive markets, catering to the nation's political elite. While other news organizations, such as the *Des Moines Register,* may in turn affect what these firms disseminate, the Big Eleven dominate the national political news market. And among the Big Eleven there is opinion leadership. A presidential candidate has described the reporters covering him as so many blackbirds perched on a telephone line. First, one flies off, then another, and finally the rest of the flock. So it was in Iowa: first the *Des Moines Register,* then Johnny Apple of the *Times,* then *The Washington Post, Time* magazine, and the networks foretold Carter's strong showing in the precinct caucuses.

To account for patterns of campaign coverage, it is useful to conceive of newsmen and campaigners not simply as individuals with personal predilections and propensities, hopes and fears, but as organization men, whose positions in their organizations regulate their behavior. The social location of newsmen,

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their sources of information, and the tactical motives for its disclosure are critical to understanding what the news media say. What makes the news is thus the interaction of news and campaign organizations.

These points can be illustrated by looking at a recurring pattern in press coverage of campaigns: early emphasis on a "brokered convention" scenario followed by the surprise emergence of a relatively unknown front-runner.

First, it helps to distinguish two standard campaign strategies: the Washingtonian's and the outsider's.[1]

The Washingtonian runs in few, if any primaries, counting on name recognition and his ties to party and public officials to amass some delegates. The scenario that he emphasizes in talking to the press is the "brokered convention," meaning that no clearcut front-runner emerges from the primaries and that most, if not all, of the primary entrants are winnowed out, leaving the Washingtonian as the sole eligible candidate based on his primary name recognition and his standing in the polls. Alternatively, he stresses the power of incumbency.

The outsider, by contrast, must demonstrate his electability by winning primaries and amassing enough delegates to put him within striking distance of the nomination.

Prior to the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary, political coverage is left to columnists and a few political correspondents, most of whom are based in Washington. "Washington," Henry James once wrote, "talks about herself and almost nothing else." Not surprisingly, the dominant scenario at this point is "the brokered convention" purveyed by campaigners pursuing the Washington strategy; the man to beat will be either a prominent Washingtonian or the governor of New York, California, or Illinois which include New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago. The turning point in campaign coverage comes when the Big Eleven designate their beats and assign reporters to cover a few of the candidates full time. After that, some outsiders get attention.

But which outsiders? Resources are always scarce in news organizations. It costs too much money and manpower to cover all the candidates. The choice of which candidates to cover is thus critical for their prospects of gaining attention. Senior editors make that choice, but they are influenced by what they read in the elite press. A sometime candidate for president, the vice president-elect once expressed the frustrations of the outsider. "What's really important," says Walter Mondale, "is that the goddamn news media won't pay you much attention until you've become big. You have to spend years on the road until you get percentage points in the polls. The national media won't give you a break until then, and their eyes turn glassy when you talk to them about it." Attention-getting is a vicious circle: them that's got is them that gets.

[1] Political standing in the Washington community, not mere job-holding there, is at the core of the distinction: Johnson in 1960 was a Washingtonian, Kennedy was not; Muskie in 1972 was a Washingtonian, McGovern was not.

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But there is a way to break that circle: early victories. Any outsider who wins early and often can violate the expectations established by the Washingtonians. The extraordinary play that the news media give to the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primaries, moreover, accentuates the importance of winning there and gives an advantage to a victorious outsider. Jimmy Who becomes a Somebody—and a front-runner. Meanwhile, also-rans lose more than primaries and delegates; they lose the reporters who were covering them. Their campaigns cease to be beats for most national news organizations. A subtle thing begins to happen, too, to the reporters who are left behind with a losing campaign. Being with a winner may boost a reporter's own career: they sometimes can convert access to presidential candidates into access to presidents. Assignment to the White House beat after the election would be a step up for most reporters covering the campaign. Losing candidates thwart such ambitions, and sour coverage is sometimes the consequence. In the game of campaign coverage, nothing fails like failure. Newsmen, says Joseph Kraft, "deflate rapidly what they first inflate."

The conventions of journalism may yield another advantage to the outsider strategy. The nuances of various candidates' stands on the issues, their past performance in office, and the character that they display in private dealings with their staffs are harder to treat within the canons of objective journalism than the question of winning and losing. For some newsmen as for Vince Lombardi, winning isn't everything; it's the only thing. Indeed the news media's preoccupation with victory is so intense that newsmen race to be the first to project the winner; sometimes, as Mo Udall learned in Wisconsin, the last shall be first. But winning is precisely the basis of the outsider's strategy. So long as news coverage treats the primaries like the Kentucky Derby and downplays other aspects of a candidacy, the outsider gets attention—and a boost in the polls.

Of course, there's a trick to winning: it is not always necessary to finish first. One strategy is to enter the candidate in every primary. The hope is that early victories will make him a front-runner and help him to finish first in enough of the remaining primaries or acquire enough delegates to sustain his position vis-à-vis the rest of the field. Another strategy is to be an active candidate in a few primaries, ones carefully chosen to position the candidate favorably against his active rivals. Regardless of strategies, one tactic remains constant: to get newsmen to accept the standard of winning that the campaigners stipulate, whether that is finishing no worse than second, getting 40 percent, or beating the other liberals. As Roger Mudd put it on the eve of Iowa's precinct caucuses, "The English that is applied to these results is going to be applied by the media and the politicians themselves. It's not exactly the precise figures that will be important; it's whether the media and the politicians agree that this man won and this man lost." A consensual process is at work, in which it is not the newsmen alone who exercise opinion leadership, but newsmen and campaigners together.

Critical to "the English that is applied to the results," however, are the

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expectations that newsmen had beforehand. Whether it is the boys in the back of the bus or Russell Baker's Expector-General who formulate these preconceptions, they are the measure of the man who runs. Again, though, the newsmen do not act on their own; campaigners try to shape expectations. Confronting multiple audiences—potential financial backers and politicians, their own and rival campaign staffs—campaigners try at once to overstate their prospects in order to rally support, and to understate their prospects in order to claim victory. Thus, Reagan's campaign manager in New Hampshire, Hugh Gregg, announced a target of 40 percent against Ford in that state; but one week before the primary, aides leaked a poll showing Reagan ahead of Ford by 8 percentage points. Reagan's campaigners had set themselves up. Two days before the primary David Broder wrote:

> Presidential primaries—particularly the early ones—are games of expectation, where the candidates are judged not just by the absolute numbers of votes but by the standards of anticipated performance they, their supporters and their opponents have set. . . . But the Republican side has the virtue of marvelous simplicity. Whether it's Gerald Ford or Ronald Reagan, the winner will be the winner, and the loser, the loser.

The results were somewhat predictable: Whereas in 1968 Eugene McCarthy "defeated" an incumbent president with 42 percent of the vote in New Hampshire and in 1972 George McGovern "tarnished" Edmund Muskie's "image as a winner" with 37 percent, Ronald Reagan "lost" in 1976 with 49 percent.

The trouble with such expectations is that newsmen and campaigners can talk each other into believing them. But the "games of expectation" that they play may leave the electorate on the sidelines. Not all voters believe everything they see in the news. "I hate to think of what ten days of headlines about a Reagan victory in New Hampshire could do to that race [in Florida]," a Ford strategist told David Broder before the first primary. And after President Ford's five straight "victories" in the early primaries, Roger Mudd was telling CBS viewers that "if Reagan remains in the race he may wind up third in a two-man field." A week later Reagan won the North Carolina primary.

The conventional wisdom holds that primaries and caucuses seldom pick the parties' standard bearers, but instead constitute a winnowing out process—eliminating candidates rather than creating nominees. Yet the interaction of newsmen's and campaigners' organizations in circumstances set by new legislation has changed presidential campaigns over the past two decades, favoring the outsider's strategy over the Washingtonian's. No longer is winnowing out an apt metaphor for the process; outsiders increasingly are "winnowed in."

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Herbert Croly, Progressive Ideology, and the FTC Act

DOUGLAS WALTER JAENICKE

The proper interpretation of the national government's early twentieth-century intervention in the economy, especially in the form of regulatory agencies, is the subject of a continuing debate between two schools of thought. The first school, exemplified in the writing of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., views government economic intervention as a democratic and progressive response to the threatening power of big business. His description of President Woodrow Wilson (1913–1920) captures the essence of Schlesinger's interpretation of early twentieth-century government economic intervention.

> As the election of 1916 approached, Wilson completed his acceptance of the main lines of the Progressive program of 1912. He now stood clearly for strong government, for administrative regulation, for some intervention on behalf of the farmer and the worker—in short, for affirmative federal action aimed to produce equality of opportunity. In a basic respect, Roosevelt seemed to have been right: the people's government had to be stronger than business if popular rule were to be effective.[1]

Schlesinger interprets the national government's intervention in the economy as being impelled by and embodying concern for the little man who sought an equal opportunity to succeed.

Recent scholarship by revisionist historians, most notably Gabriel Kolko, has challenged this democratic interpretation of early government intervention in the economy.[2] Instead, Kolko has argued that from 1900 to 1916 big business

[1] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Crisis of the Old Order* (Boston, 1957), pp. 34–35.

[2] Both Kolko and James Weinstein self-consciously pit their interpretations against the Schlesinger-type of argument. See Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism* (Chicago, 1963),

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pushed for and obtained a policy of government economic intervention in order to protect the large firms from the competitive threat of smaller ones. After studying the origins, intents, and consequences of federal regulatory legislation from 1900 to 1916, Kolko concluded that the economic regulatory legislation Schlesinger had praised as being democratic not only had been supported by but also had benefited big business. According to Kolko, ostensibly progressive and democratic legislation neither restored equal opportunity and business competition nor protected farmers and workers but, rather, intentionally aided and abetted the economic self-interest of big business; consequently, the era of 1900–1916 was nothing more than *The Triumph of Conservatism.*

Kolko argued that big business sought escape from the uncertainty and risk of economic competition. To attain this, big business first attempted to stabilize the relations among firms through voluntary agreements. However, these agreements failed since an individual firm would benefit from violating an agreement if the others complied.[3] Business then turned to mergers, but these also failed to stabilize industry since the resulting large corporations were inefficient and hence vulnerable to economic competition. Consequently, big business turned to the coercive power of the government to order the economy; big business needed and pushed for economic intervention by the national government—this government intervention would be dominated by big business—in order to stabilize economic relations and thereby institutionalize the dominant position of the large corporations.[4]

In accordance with their respective general interpretations, Kolko and Schlesinger offer mutually exclusive explanations of the original Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act of 1914. Where Schlesinger sees a democratic creation, Kolko perceives a victory for big business. While agreeing with Kolko that Schlesinger's explanation of the original act as a "democratic victory" is incorrect, this article contends that the basis of *conscious*[5] support for the act cannot be understood purely in terms of big business's self-interest.

While avoiding Schlesinger's mistake, this article offers an alternative interpretation of the FTC Act which challenges, but does not exclude, Kolko's. Kolko's account of the origins and intentions behind the 1914 FTC Act neglects to confront that stream of progressive thought, exemplified in Herbert Croly's *The Promise of American Life* (1909), which sought both government encouragement and government control of economic consolidation for reasons of "individual excellence" and "national purpose."[6] This omission on Kolko's part

pp. 7–8, and *Railroads and Regulation, 1877–1916* (New York, 1965), p. 2, and James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900–1918* (Boston, 1968), pp. xi–xii.

[3] For a formal explanation of this phenomenon, see Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971).

[4] Kolko, *Triumph*, esp. "Introduction" and chaps. 1, 2.

[5] Wanting to argue that people who fully understood the implications of the act could still support it for idealistic (disinterested) reasons, I emphasize "conscious."

[6] It is neither the purpose nor the need of this discussion to defend and explain *fully* what Croly meant by "public excellence" and "national purpose." The terms are solely to show that Croly

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is due to his linking all conscious support for large economic units to support for the economic self-interest of big business. However, Croly defended the existence and regulation of large corporations, monopolies, and trusts from a perspective entirely distinct from economic interest; for Croly the national government's economic intervention was intended neither to further equal opportunity nor to serve big business's self-interest, but rather to provide and protect positions of concentrated power and responsibility for a few excellent individuals.

In 1914 Herbert Croly publicly endorsed the FTC Act.[7] This article will show how and why Croly could consciously support the act, not in terms of equal opportunity (business competition) or big business's self-interest, but rather for idealistic, disinterested reasons,[8] first by briefly sketching Croly's thought and then by demonstrating the harmony between the 1914 act and Croly's ideas.

Croly's Progressive Vision: Excellence and the Large Corporation

A number of factors justify using Croly as a representative of a distinctive stream of progressive thought. Students of the progressive era see Croly as exemplifying one style of progressivism.[9] Furthermore, many contemporaneous intellectuals recognized the distinctiveness of Croly's thought and agreed with him on fundamental points.[10] In addition, Croly's influence and recognition extended beyond intellectual circles to a broader audience. Theodore Roosevelt called Croly's *Promise* the "most powerful and illuminating study of our national condition which has appeared for many years." Croly had cited Roosevelt as the model reformer and his policy as the model progressive program.[11] Finally, Croly along with Walter Lippmann and Walter Weyl edited the *New Republic*, which along with its audience constituted indirect evidence of a wider reception for Croly's thinking. Thus, Croly's was not a lone voice.

Perceiving a positive role for the large corporations in the modern world, Croly arrived at a progressive vision that tried to avoid both the Scylla of big business's self-interest and the Charybdis of equal opportunity. His driving vi-

valued the large corporations for reasons other than big business's self-interest. Due to space constraints this article sketches what Croly meant by "excellence" but not "national purpose."

[7] Herbert Croly, "Restraint of Trade," *New Republic*, I (November 21, 1914), 9–10.

[8] "Idealistic" is used to emphasize that Croly's *ideas* would lead him to endorse the act.

[9] See Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York, 1955), and Charles Forcey, *The Crossroads of Liberalism* (New York, 1961).

[10] See Walter Lippmann, *Drift and Mastery* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961, first published 1914). *Drift and Mastery* proposed the substitution of national purpose and individual excellence (taken together he termed them "mastery") made possible by economic concentration for the traditional American values of equal liberties, equal opportunity, business competition, and the profit motive.

[11] Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Introduction," Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American Life* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), p. xxiii. For Croly's praise of Theodore Roosevelt, see chap. 6, sec. 6, 7.

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sion was the achievement of an economic and political structure that would enable excellent individuals to distinguish themselves. According to Croly, excellent individuals disciplined themselves by accepting the authority of their work, not the requirements of the market. Economic competition vitiated any such vocationalism since under conditions of competition individuals could not dedicate themselves exclusively to the excellence of their work but rather pursued economic gain. Furthermore, economic competition only allowed for quantitative differences among individuals—more or less economic success; but, Croly contended: "A genuine individual must at least possess some special *quality* which distinguishes him from other people . . ." (italics added).[12] Accordingly, he favored economic consolidation which promised to liberate all individuals from the economic scramble so that they could dedicate themselves to the demands and nature of their work.

Economic consolidation also provided the extraordinary individual with the decision-making responsibility and power congruent with exceptional ability. Public excellence required the concentration and institutionalization of power and decision-making responsibility through extensive subordination and hierarchy. Consequently, Croly embraced the large corporations and trusts which institutionalized positions of great power. Severely circumscribing the ambit of economic market competition, the large corporations could provide pinnacles of power and responsibility where exceptional individuals could effectively govern the economy. This concentration, institutionalization, and wielding of power would lift the excellent individual high above the mass and make him visible far and wide.[13]

In the 1890s the American economy witnessed the emergence and growth of truly national economic *institutions*—trusts, monopolies, and large corporations—which in effect constituted new structures of economic governance, since they concentrated economic decision making. Preempting the decision making of individual factories, these new national economic institutions extended the power of a few corporate positions first to individual factories, and later to the economy. Corporate headquarters now assumed the task of governing the corporation's factories which were dispersed across the country, thereby abrogating the previous practice of each factory deciding economic matters autonomously.[14]

[12] Croly, *Promise* (New York, 1965), p. 410. Hereafter, page references are to this edition of Croly's *Promise*. Expressing this same disdain for quantitative differences, Roosevelt designated the Jacksonian era the "millennium of minnows." Quoted in Marvin Meyers, *The Jacksonian Persuasion* (Stanford, Calif., 1957), n. 1, pp. 16–17.

[13] For Croly's discussion of the need for concentrated decision-making responsibility, see his *Promise*, pp. 200–201, 325, 330, 332, 336, 338. For examples of his discussion of economic concentration providing positions for exceptional individuals, see ibid., pp. 368, 432. For Croly's discussion of individual excellence and distinction, see ibid., chaps. 1, 3, 7, 13 and chap. 4, sec 3, "Lincoln as More Than an American."

[14] The day-to-day operations—the efficient running of the factory—were still left to the factory managers, but corporate directors and trustees assumed responsibility for decisions concerning ex-

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Transcending governance of the large corporation's own factories and the trust's own corporations, directors of the large corporations and trusts could also conrol other firms through a variety of techniques. Oligopolistic price leadership testified to the ability of a large corporation (or group of corporations) to govern other firms in the same sector. In a similar manner dominant corporations could coerce their competitors to accept a fixed percentage of the sector's total business volume.[15] Finally, vertical integration allowed a corporation that controlled the supply of raw materials and hence their price to govern its competitors.[16]

In addition to valuing the large corporations because they established positions of extraordinary power and responsibility, Croly also favored these new institutions because they were amenable to an ongoing government regulatory role.[17] To Croly, regulation of these governing corporations meant the creation of additional positions of visibility and authority; government regulation promised mastery rather than drift, excellence rather than mediocrity. Unlike the owner of a family firm who constituted the backbone of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and on moral grounds defended the integrity of his business from government encroachment, the corporate director was liberated from such a moral imperative. Keeping this fact always before Croly, the National Civic Federation (NCF)—the national organization of the large corporations and finance capital—from 1900 to 1920 urged government intervention in the economy in order to secure and protect the governing role of its members, a role which was being attacked by equal opportunity advocates, especially NAM.[18]

Croly further argued that the existence of these dominant economic institutions was an irrevocable fact which paradoxically was the natural outcome of economic competition. Croly's analysis hinges on a psychological insight:

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pansion, sources of raw materials, markets, prices, etc. At that time, a typical example of this phenomenon was the Standard Oil Trust whose nine trustees successfully governed the more than thirty participating corporations. See Ida M. Tarbell, *The History of the Standard Oil Company*, Vol. II (Gloucester, Mass., 1963; first published 1904).

[15] Standard Oil resorted to this tactic when the practice of driving its competitors into bankruptcy became too costly. Ibid., pp. 11–23.

[16] Controlling the supply of iron ore, United States Steel pursued this course. Croly, *Promise*, p. 114.

[17] It is important to distinguish regulation which accepts economic concentration (here labeled "ongoing") from regulation which sought to destroy and level large economic units. Obviously, Croly favored the former type of regulation.

[18] Kolko fails to differentiate the NCF and NAM. The NCF, which was the organization of the large corporations and finance capital, sought government regulation of the monopolies, trusts, and large corporations while NAM favored government intervention to destroy them. The NCF had developed a new ideology of social responsibility whereas NAM still adhered to business competition and equal opportunity. See James Weinstein, *Corporate Ideal*, and Gordon M. Jenson, "The National Civic Federation: American Business in an Age of Social Change and Social Reform," Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1956, pp. 54–65. Kolko's lumping together NCF and NAM leads him to make mistakes. See footnote 26.

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Those businessmen engaged in competition, especially those who head corporations, seek to protect and consolidate their precarious advantages.[19] Any attempt to outlaw practices that result in economic consolidation would prove futile as well as pernicious since the real businessmen—who arose with the corporation—would be compelled either to develop new practices which had not yet been declared illegal or to break the law.

The demise of economic competition was due not only to the psychological desire explicated above but also to the coinciding of the economic interests of the large corporations. This coincidence of private interests encouraged cooperation among the large economic units which then furthered economic consolidation.[20]

Valuing the large corporations and also perceiving them as inevitable, Croly urged government discrimination in their behalf. The government's charting an antilargeness course would endanger Croly's vision as well as contravene historical necessity; therefore, Croly urged that government policy accept and encourage the large units while also controlling them.

Government control was exigent since economic consolidation could easily become mired in economic self-interest, bereft of excellence and national purpose; government control was needed in order to make consolidation serve public ends. For example, since consolidation abolished the natural selection of the meritorious through the market structure (that is, equal opportunity could not survive within a hierarchical society structured by large corporations), economic consolidation meant that individuals could rest upon and be content with their past laurels while still occupying the positions of power and that unworthy individuals could inherit governing positions. Consequently, Croly demanded artificial selection implemented by government to replace the moribund natural selection of the market.

However, this artificial selection did not seek to restore equal opportunity, though it was to select the best. Basically accepting the social Darwinist dictum that the best usually produce the best, Croly's solution made no pretense of ensuring equal starts and fair races. Neither accepting nor favoring a restoration of equal opportunity, Croly recognized its deleterious consequences. After crossing the many hurdles and passing through the many gates, the successful com-

[19] Croly, *Promise*, p. 111. Acknowledging this psychological motivation, Woodrow Wilson wrote that the "naturalness" of the trusts and monopolies lay in the natural desire of businessmen to escape the ambiguity and risk of competition. Wilson, *The New Freedom* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961, first published 1913), p. 102. Wilson, however, did not agree with Croly's conclusion that the psychological impetus precluded legislating against economic consolidation. Similarly, in *History of the Standard Oil Company*, Tarbell recounted Rockefeller's desire for business security; this desire to protect his success compelled him to utilize every means to establish a monopoly which was the only possible safeguard for his success.

[20] Croly cited the Northern Railroad's sale of its iron ore holdings to U. S. Steel, but not to small producers, as an example of this. Croly, *Promise*, p. 114. Such cooperation permeated other economic sectors; Rockefeller had utilized cooperation with the railroads to aggrandize Standard Oil. See Tarbell, *History of the Standard Oil Company*.

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petitor was so exhausted and enervated that he could not fully exploit and enjoy the position of power and responsibility which he had eventually won.[21] Purposeful government discrimination was to affect the direction and character of the entire nation both by ensuring that the meritorious secured positions of honor and power congruent with their talents and by favoring those institutions that provided such positions.[22]

Progressive Aspects of the Act: A Policy Analysis

D.H. Lawrence warned: "Art-speech is the only truth. An artist is a damned liar, but his art, if it be art, will tell you the truth of his day. . . . Never trust the artist. Trust the tale."[23] Concerning politics, we are wise to obey an analogous dictum, for politics deals with the world of appearance as well as the underlying reality. The intellectual debate surrounding the FTC Act confronts us with three conflicting interpretations. If we continue to focus on the political process, we will be unable to resolve the issue since each author can point to political activity which supports his conclusion. For example, the legislative debate amply supports Schlesinger's thesis that the advocates of equal opportunity fought for enactment; however, Kolko has marshaled evidence that big business was also actively engaged in writing and supporting the act but for self-interested reasons. Consequently, a resolution of the debate demands that we get outside the political process perspective and analyze the actual policy. Only the final act can reveal which group's vision—that of Schlesinger's advocates of equal opportunity, of Kolko's big business, or of Croly—was more nearly embodied in the final law. The very recognition that a plurality of groups pursuing different ends sought a trade commission act compels a policy analysis.

Five major points about the 1914 FTC Act will help explain Croly's idealistic endorsement of it: (1) the "strange wording" of the public interest clause; (2) the provision of cease and desist orders; (3) the provision of consent decree power as related to cease and desist orders though in a different statute; (4) the particular and peculiar stress on information and the degree of punishment for misinformation; and (5) the FTC as a new official governing institution. Each of these points will be argued in turn as a case of Croly's outlook so that each will become a datum tending to confirm Croly's idealistic support for the act. The first three points demonstrate that the legislation would encourage economic consolidation and also provide for control of this process. Developing this latter argument, the fourth and fifth points contend that the FTC Act was written in such a manner that the FTC could be a governing agency. From this entire analysis will emerge a portrait of the FTC which challenges Gabriel Kolko's conclusion that conscious support for the FTC was simply the product of big business's self-interest.

[21] Croly, *Promise*, pp. 409–421.
[22] For the preceding paragraphs' discussion of discrimination, see ibid., chap. 7, sec. 2, 3.
[23] D. H. Lawrence, *Studies in Classic American Literature* (New York, 1961), p. 2.

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From the perspective of early twentieth-century political economy, the FTC Act (1914) was not originally conceived as consumer protection legislation. (The transformation of the FTC into an ostensible consumer protection agency only occurred in the 1930s with the adoption of the Wheeler-Lea Act which outlawed deceptive advertising.) Declaring unfair methods of competition illegal, the original FTC Act was viewed as dealing with incipient monopolies, for the political economy of that day argued that unfair methods provided one means by which corporations developed into either monopolies or dominant corporations.[24] In addition, the creation of an agency that would proceed against incipient monopolies responded to the then widespread criticism that the Sherman Antitrust Act empowered the government to act only *after* the monopoly actually existed; the pernicious deficiency of the Sherman Act was that the government could only react to a fait accompli. Given this understanding of unfair competition as producing monopoly and the criticism of extant antitrust legislation, one understands the original FTC Act as enabling the government to proceed against incipient monopolies.

STRANGE WORDING

Taken at face value, the original FTC Act enacted an absolute standard, which represented an apparent victory for equal opportunity: "Unfair methods of competition in [interstate] commerce are hereby declared illegal" (Sec. 5).[25] However, the act moved immediately to withdraw the absolute by giving the FTC discretion to apply the standard according to the public interest. The statute actually recognized that some outright cases of unfair competition would be permissible by the strange provision that:

> Whenever the commission shall have reason to believe that any such person, partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition in [interstate] commerce, *and if it shall appear to the commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public,* it shall issue and serve . . . a complaint. (Sec. 5, italics added.)

At the very least the FTC would not proceed against an unfair practice when that practice benefited the public interest, that is, the FTC was to be guided by the bane of equal opportunity—the rule of reason.[26] In the case of the FTC Act,

[24] At that time the best-known example of this phenomenon was the Standard Oil Trust which Rockefeller had built into a near monopoly using rebates, drawbacks, other forms of railroad subsidization of Standard Oil, price cutting to kill competition, and similar unfair practices. See Tarbell, *History of the Standard Oil Company.*

[25] 38 Stat. 719. All references to the FTC statute are from 38 Stat. 717–724; therefore I will no longer footnote quotations from this act.

[26] In 1911, the Supreme Court had enunciated its rule of reason decision—a decision warmly applauded by Croly. Arguing that the antitrust laws did not outlaw monopolies and restraints of trade per se, this decision ruled that only unreasonable restraints of trade, i.e., those that injured the public interest, were illegal whereas reasonable restraints were legal. 221 U.S. 1; 31 S.Ct. 502; 54 L.

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rather than distinguishing between reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade, the FTC was to take the public interest as its standard and to evaluate unfair practices and its own proceedings accordingly. To state, as did Herbert Croly,[27] that the italicized phrase parallels the reasonable/unreasonable distinction is only partially correct. The statement is correct in that unfair competition per se will not necessarily be prosecuted since a standard of public interest will be employed. However, if the intent were merely to parallel the reasonable/unreasonable distinction, a different phrase would and could have been used: "and if such unfair method of competition injures the public interest. . . ."

Unlike the final version, the substitute language (above) would compel the FTC to prosecute any unfair practice that injured the public interest. But, according to the statute's strange wording, the FTC is directed to proceed only if the *proceeding* is judged to be in the public interest; a proceeding is not justified by the simple fact that the unfair practice injured the public interest. Consequently, the statutory phrase grants the FTC greater discretion in selecting cases with which to become involved than does the substitute wording. Beyond the obvious meaning that the FTC can refuse to prosecute when it judges that an unfair practice benefits the public interest, the strange wording also allows the FTC to refrain from prosecuting a *harmful* unfair practice on the reasoning that (1) the FTC should concern itself with serious violations and not squander its resources on petty violations or (2) though the unfair practice injures the public interest, to correct the abuse would damage that interest even more (for example, the stock market might fall and cause a panic).

This interpretation of the strange wording of the implementation phrase enables the FTC to narrow its jurisdiction—just such a narrowing had been fought for and sought by Senator Newlands. Originally planning to limit the FTC's jurisdiction to large corporations whose capital assets exceeded $5 million, Newlands later abandoned this threshold when he recognized that large corporations often used smaller corporations as weapons against competitors. Consequently, Newlands argued that the FTC's jurisdiction should encompass all corporations.[28] Upon the adoption of Cummins's amendment which extended the FTC's jurisdiction to individuals and partnerships as well as to corporations, Newlands immediately encouraged and supported the Pomerene amendment which sought to return the FTC to a jurisdiction including only corpora-

Ed. 619. *Standard Oil of New Jersey* v. *U.S.* (1911). NAM's opposition to the 1908 Hepburn bill which proposed statutory recognition for the reasonable-unreasonable distinction evidenced equal opportunity's opposition to this distinction; for the equal opportunity votary, this distinction is spurious because *all* trusts make a mockery of equal opportunity. Weinstein, *Corporate Ideal*, pp. 78–80. Kolko missed this reason for NAM's opposition and instead attributed it solely to the bill's recognition of labor unions. This is an instance where Kolko's lumping all business together causes him to err. Kolko, *Triumph*, p. 135.

[27] Croly, "Restraint of Trade," pp. 9–10.

[28] *Congressional Record*, Sixty-third Congress (1914), p. 11,602.

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tions.[29] Although Newlands's two attempts to restrict the FTC's jurisdiction to corporations failed, the strange wording of the statute grants the FTC general discretionary power so that the FTC could avoid entanglement in petty violations—which was Newlands's intent.

Interpreting the strange wording in much the same manner as point 1 above, the Supreme Court in *FTC* v. *Klesner* (1929)[30] decided that the public interest was not served by the FTC's prosecution of Klesner even though Klesner had engaged in unfair competition, since Klesner's violation was minor. The court ruled that the FTC was to issue a cease and desist order only if the injury to the public interest was "specific and substantial." In addition,

> this requirement ["if it shall appear to the commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public"] is not satisfied by proof that there has been misapprehension and confusion on the part of the purchaser, or even that they have been deceived.

In spite of the Klesner ruling, the FTC has allowed itself to be entrapped by petty violations to the detriment of both the public interest and the FTC's governing role.

The discretion granted the FTC concerning its jurisdiction was increased by the fact that the strange wording liberated the agency from being bound by prior precedents. The wording of Section 5 is purely situational and particularistic since a proceeding against an unfair method might be in the public interest at one point in time but not at another. The difference between an FTC that possesses discretion in deciding when to proceed and one that is guided and bound by precedents is analogous to the difference between equity decisions that are and are not rule-bound.[31]

This liberation of the FTC from precedents coincided with Croly's avowed antipathy to lawyers. Croly argued that lawyers were unfit to govern for two reasons: (1) Their self-interest in litigation precluded them from being advocates of reform and change. (Note the contemporary opposition of lawyers to no-fault insurance.) (2) More importantly, even if they could transcend their self-interest, their "mental outlook" and "prejudices" disqualified them.[32] By this Croly meant that lawyers placed too great a faith in precedents and failed to grasp that precedents often need to be rejected. Applied to the FTC, Croly's point is that if the FTC became bound by precedents it would to that extent become less of a governing institution since the FTC commissioners would become the administrators of previous decisions rather than the creators and enforcers of policy that responded to changing circumstances; consequently, Cro-

[29] A brief discussion of this legislative history is given in the text in the section "Jurisdiction and Implementation," and in footnote 40.

[30] 280 U.S. 19; 50 S.Ct. 1; 74 L. Ed. 1929.

[31] For the transformation of equity law, see F. W. Maitland, *The Constitutional History of England*, H. A. L. Fisher, ed. (Cambridge, England, 1965), pp. 221–226, 466–471; and Walter Wheeler Cook, "Equity," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 5 (New York, 1932), pp. 582–588.

[32] Croly, *Promise*, pp. 131–137.

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ly favored granting wide discretion to the FTC to prevent it from becoming simply an administrative body.

The analysis of the strange wording of the public interest clause has revealed two Crolyesque aspects: (1) a statutory parallel to the reasonable/unreasonable distinction, and (2) the provision of the FTC with the discretion that is necessary for governing. Other reformers, such as La Follette, who sought the abolition of all unfair practices, were to that extent distinguishable from Croly. Croly opposed government action against all unfair competition on the grounds that such an indiscriminate policy would impede necessary economic consolidation.

However, the strange use of "public interest" is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for realizing the role envisioned for the FTC by Croly. Note must also be taken of the type of sanction provided by the act—the cease and desist order.

CEASE AND DESIST ORDERS

Croly advocated experimentation as an essential feature of his reform program since no one could anticipate the consequences of various trade practices.[33] Precisely this uncertainty concerning consequences commended to Croly the choice of the cease and desist order enforced through the courts as the appropriate sanction for trade regulation. An absolute prohibition on unfair competition coupled with severe penalties such as heavy fines and imprisonment would almost certainly provide a powerful disincentive to experimentation. In contrast, the court-enforced cease and desist order, coupled with the public interest provision, would be ideally suited for a positive FTC role in the economy—positive in Croly's view. Cease and desist orders possess a unique ability to provide effective enforcement while removing most of the risk from a firm engaging in practices that might later be defined as illegal unfair competition. Under a cease and desist order, the offending corporation bears the minimal cost (consistent with effective enforcement) of giving up an unfair practice and returning to the status quo ante, but does not have to assume the *additional* costs of fines and imprisonment. More importantly, although the firm must return to the status quo ante, the public interest clause (the hope of having the FTC decide that a new unfair practice is in the public interest) and the relatively small costs imposed by the cease and desist order usually would not dissuade the firm from experimenting with *other* unfair methods.[34]

However, if the corporation refuses to obey the order, the FTC may appeal to the courts for enforcement. If the corporation continues to refuse obedience

[33] Ibid., pp. 315–332.

[34] In the congressional debates, critics of cease and desist orders argued that these orders were too weak and hence would be ineffective; instead they proposed legislating fines and imprisonment. The response to these critics was that the ambiguity of "unfair methods of competition" prevented legislating a stiffer sanction. They did not want to imprison a person who had unknowingly and unintentionally engaged in an unfair competitive practice. *Congressional Record*, Sixty-third Congress (1914), pp. 11,533, 11,539.

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after the courts have upheld the order, the corporation is then subjected to contempt of court penalties. The real threat of contempt of court serves as a strong inducement for the corporation to comply with the initial court decision.

Of course, there are sanctions that impose smaller costs on a corporation than does a cease and desist order, but these sanctions would not guarantee the effective enforcement needed by the FTC as a governing institution. For example, fines can impose smaller costs than a cease and desist order since a corporation might willingly assume the costs of even a large fine (thereby treating it as a licensing fee) in order to continue a lucrative unfair practice.[35] However, a court-enforced cease and desist order allows for an orchestration of sanctions to ensure eventual compliance. It begins with the order to return to the status quo ante and can proceed to appropriate levels of punishment imposed by the courts if the offense persists. Courts are jealous of their authority and tend to impose stiff penalties whenever their authority has gone unheeded.

Under the guise of antitrust legislation the FTC Act embodied Croly's vision within the constraints imposed by democratic public opinion. The use of cease and desist orders, enforced through the courts, sought to occupy a narrow space between two extremes: (1) a government policy that destroys and/or prevents the emergence of large corporations, and (2) a government policy that only favors large corporations without controlling them. Though public opinion proscribed the outright statutory legalization of some monopolies and government regulation of them,[36] the FTC statute could still encourage the growth of large corporations while maintaining government supervision of their behavior. Through selective use of its power, the FTC could permit as well as prevent economic consolidation (which stopped short of becoming monopolistic) *without risking a direct confrontation with the hostile advocates of equal opportunity*. As the next section shows, Croly even witnessed an attempt to escape the limits imposed by the public antipathy to *all* monopolies.

CONSENT DECREES

Not fortuitously, three weeks after the passage of the FTC Act, a device similar to the cease and desist order was incorporated into the antitrust laws. The Clayton Act, an amendment to the Sherman Act, provided for government-business consent decrees which encourage experimentation with restraints of trade. To understand the significance of the consent decree provision, one must first comprehend the historical background. Croly praised the 1911 rule of reason (see note 26) which provided the opportunity for the existence of legally

[35] Large fines can be ineffective in preventing some business practices. Arguing that large corporations can simply treat fines as the licensing fee for an illegal practice, the Justice Department recently announced that it will request that courts impose eighteen-month prison sentences for convicted price fixers. "Justice Department Seeks Prison for Price Fixers" (AP news story), *The Ithaca Journal*, February 25, 1977.

[36] Croly recognized only too well the hostility of equal opportunity to his vision. For example, see Croly, *Promise*, pp. 6, 25, 175.

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recognized monopolies other than municipal utilities. Yet Croly's joy was short-lived, for the triple damages provision of the Sherman Antitrust Act discouraged corporations from experimenting with various restraints of trade. Although the "rule of reason" had made some restraints legal, a corporation could not predict with certainty the legality of its particular restraint of trade and therefore its liability to civil suits seeking triple damages. In fact, the government possessed no statutory means of abolishing a monopolistic practice other than criminal prosecution,[37] and this meant exposing the convicted violator to later civil triple damage suits.[38]

The consent decree arms the government with a formal means of abolishing an unreasonable restraint of trade without exposing the violating corporation to the rigors of triple damages. Unlike conviction in a criminal case, the consent decree neither constitutes an estoppel to pleading innocent nor can be submitted as evidence in a civil case; nevertheless it carries the force of law with respect to future actions. As long as the triple damages provision of the antitrust laws hovered threateningly over their heads, corporations were leery of the opportunity created by the reasonable/unreasonable ruling. Yet once the consent decree removed that threat, they were free to act. The consent decree effectively removed the danger from experimenting with restraints of trade imposed by triple damages, and thereby encouraged further economic consolidation.[39] However, a consent decree can also induce corporations to accept the stipulations of the government in order to avoid being subject to criminal prosecution and the possibility of easily won triple damages. Thus consent decrees can serve both as an incentive to experimentation as well as an inducement to compliance with the dictates of the government.

INFORMATION AND PUNISHMENT FOR MISINFORMATION

As argued previously, Croly did not expect encouragement of corporate bigness to render government subservient to big business. Rather, he sought an independent government role unhampered by either the lack of information or false in-

[37] The *failure* of government-business gentlemen's agreements, which had no statutory foundation, to regulate restraints of trade during Theodore Roosevelt's administration is documented in Kolko, *Triumph*, chaps. 3–5.

[38] Under the antitrust acts, firms which have been injured by a monopolistic practice can sue for triple damages, which the plaintiff can win by proving (1) the defendant's violation of the law and (2) injury to itself as a result of the monopolistic practice. After a successfully prosecuted government case, the plaintiff can submit the court's decision as prima facie evidence of the defendant's violation of the law, thereby fulfilling the former condition and needing only to prove injury to itself. Conviction in the government case constitutes an estoppel forbidding the convicted corporation to deny in a civil suit that it had violated the law. Without the decision in the criminal case, the injured firm must prove not only injury to itself but also the guilt of the defendant. Objectively, the latter requirement is nearly impossible to fulfill since the injured firm might have been driven bankrupt by the monopolistic practice, the litigation costs might be too great for it to bear, etc.

[39] For an analysis of the consent decree which agrees with my analysis, see William D. Rogers, "Is It Trust-Busting or Window-Dressing?" *The Reporter*, November 1, 1956, pp. 21–23.

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formation. Making this independent government role possible, the FTC Act empowered the commission to gather the information necessary to make complex political-economic decisions. Thus although punishment was relatively modest for violations of the substantive provision of the act, punishment was in fact quite severe for refusal to provide the FTC with the information it needed in order to judge unfair competitive practices. Quite simply, without the requisite information the FTC cannot rationally decide when to prosecute an unfair practice; and with false information, the FTC could easily reach a wrong decision.

In regard to acquisition of information, the FTC Act significantly improved upon the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) Act and its 1893 amendment. The relevant section of the FTC statute reads:

> Sec. 10. That any person who shall neglect or refuse to attend and testify, or to answer any lawful inquiry, or to produce documentary evidence, if in his power to do so, in obedience to the subpoena or lawful requirement of the commission, shall be guilty of an offense and upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction *shall be punished by a fine of not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.* (Italics added.)

Furthermore, individuals who falsify, alter, or fail to keep business records or refuse to furnish them to the FTC

> shall be subject . . . to a *fine of not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000, or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both such fine and imprisonment.* (Sec. 10, italics added.)

These sanctions, especially the possibility of immediate imprisonment, contrast vividly with the use of a cease and desist order to stop unfair competitive practices.

THE FTC AS A GOVERNING AGENCY

The first three sections explained in detail the FTC Act's encouragement of economic consolidation. In addition, the discretion granted the FTC by the strange wording, the enforcement of cease and desist orders through the courts, and the severe penalties for misinformation indicate that the FTC could become a new governing agency which would control the process of consolidation. Not only did Croly's program entail the transformation of corporations into governing institutions within the economy through the encouragement of economic consolidation; it also sought new official government agencies which would possess the power, responsibility, independence, and discretion necessary for controlling the process of economic consolidation effected by unfair competitive practices. Table 1 schematizes the battles that were fought in order to strengthen or weaken the FTC as a new governing agency,[40] and the following explains the

[40] Acting as chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee, Senator Newlands submitted and defended the original Senate bill which he offered as a substitute for the House bill. After some debate, Cummins's amendment of Section 5 was adopted by the Senate. In response to Cummins's

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TABLE 1

Metamorphosis of the FTC Bill

	Original Senate Bill	*Cummins's Amendment (adopted)*	*Pomerene's Amendment (defeated)*	*1914 FTC Act (conference committee bill)*
Jurisdiction	Corporations	Individuals, partnerships, and corporations	Corporations	Individuals, partnerships, and corporations
Implementation	Automatic; no public interest clause; no discretion until commission appeals to courts for enforcement	Same	Same	Strange wording
Sanction	Restraining and prohibiting	Cease and desist	Restraining and prohibiting	Cease and desist
Role of courts	Procedural review	Review of questions of law and fact	Review of questions of law	Review of questions of law with limited review of questions of fact

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significance of these battles with regard to the FTC as a governing agency.

Jurisdiction and Implementation.[41] Granting the commission the broadest jurisdiction—over individuals, partnerships, and corporations—Cummins's amendment paradoxically would have substantially weakened it as a governing agency since, as Alan Stone convincingly demonstrated,[42] such an extensive jurisdiction without effective statutory means of limiting it necessarily debilitates a regulatory agency. Without this knowledge, common sense would have argued that such extensive jurisdiction actually enhances the commission's capacity to govern. Although the statute contained this same broad jurisdiction, the strange wording of Section 5 also contained the potential to liberate the FTC from the insidious consequences inherent in this grant, that is, the agency's entrapment in petty affairs at the expense of its regulation of large corporations. Since Pomerene's amendment directly responded to Cummins's amendment, especially in regard to the FTC's jurisdiction, one can reasonably conclude that the strange wording was purposefully devised in order to liberate the FTC from the enervation inherent in the broad jurisdiction.

Allowing the FTC to exercise discretion regarding the initiation of proceedings against unfair practices, the final version is superior to both the original and Pomerene bills. Without this discretionary provision, according to which the FTC could refuse to proceed against an unfair practice when such proceeding was not in the public interest, the FTC could not have effectively regulated the economy because it would have been unable to concentrate upon serious cases. Furthermore, the statute's grant of such broad discretion to the FTC is quite reasonable since even today savants are unable to generalize about what consequences flow from measurable economic features.[43]

Sanctions. All four versions employed basically the same sanction although two versions utilized "restraining and prohibiting" while the other two authorized "cease and desist" orders. The former phrase has the same consequence as the latter since both sanctions impose the minimal punishment consistent with effective regulation. The contrast of cease and desist orders to fines and imprisonment is also true for orders that restrain and prohibit. Furthermore, either of these sanctions would have to and can only be enforced by an appeal to the courts which secure obedience through the threat of contempt of court sanc-

success, the Interstate Commerce Committee at the behest of Newlands and after consultation with the Judiciary Committee authorized Senator Pomerene to draft another amendment to Section 5 in order to challenge Cummins's amendment; despite Newlands's support for Pomerene's amendment, it was defeated on the floor. Since the Senate and House versions differed, the bills were sent to conference committee. Except for a few minor modifications, the conference committee's bill became the FTC Act.

[41] Keeping in mind the strange wording section is particularly helpful here.

[42] Alan Stone, "The FTC and Advertising Regulation," *Public Policy* XXI (Spring 1973), 203–234. The FTC is de facto, though not de jure, without a means of limiting this broad jurisdiction because the FTC does not assert its statutory prerogative to exercise discretion.

[43] For example, see the selections in Walter Adams, ed., *The Structure of American Industry*, 4th ed. (New York, 1971).

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tions. Finally, the language of "cease and desist" allows the FTC to issue mandatory (corrective) orders, just as the phrase "restraining and prohibiting" permitted the courts to issue mandatory injunctions. Therefore, in terms of sanctions,[44] no significant difference exists between the four versions.

Role of the Courts. Arguing that judges lacked the expertise to decide the complex political-economic issues involved in unfair competition and restraints of trade, Croly had constantly criticized the courts as inadequate forums for deciding these issues. After the passage of the FTC Act, Croly hoped that the commissioners would be further empowered to determine the reasonableness or unreasonableness of particular restraints of trade in monopoly cases.[45] Thus Croly sought to transfer authority *away from the courts* to new governing institutions.

The independence of the FTC from the courts was a function of the extent of judicial review over the FTC's cease and desist orders. Restricting the courts to procedural review, such as determining whether constitutional rights had been violated, the original Senate bill had confined the courts to the narrowest review powers—Newlands correctly characterized it as allowing only that minimal review which the courts would assume of their own accord without statutory recognition[46]—and consequently conferred the greatest autonomy on the FTC.

In contrast to the original bill, Cummins's amendment provided: "Jurisdiction is hereby conferred, upon said court to hear and determine any such suit and enforce obedience thereto according to the law and rules applicable to suits in equity."[47] In effect, this amendment sanctioned judicial review of questions of

[44] Although the two phrases have somewhat different consequences, the following analysis demonstrates the differences to be relatively unimportant. "Restraining and prohibiting" is the language of injunctions. By 1914, the precedent had been firmly established that courts could issue mandatory, as well as prohibitory, injunctions. A prohibitory injunction orders a person to cease or not to begin an activity, whereas a mandatory injunction compels positive performance of an act. Mandatory injunctions originated when the courts would restrain and prohibit a person from allowing a condition to continue. For an excellent discussion of the differences between prohibitory and mandatory injunctions and of the development of mandatory injunctions from prohibitory language, see Zachariah Chafee, Jr., "Injunction," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. 8 (New York, 1932), pp. 53–57.

Mandatory orders can emerge from a parallel employment of cease and desist (prohibitory) orders. In regard to mandatory orders, the advantage in using "restraining and prohibiting" rather than "cease and desist" is that by 1914 the precedent had been established that the injunctive language encompassed mandatory as well as prohibitory injunctions, whereas no such precedent had been established for "cease and desist." Another difference is that the language of "restraining and prohibiting" can prevent injury before it occurs while "cease and desist" cannot. As revealed by an analysis of the language, a cease and desist order cannot logically be used to prevent an unexecuted but planned action. By the nature of the words, "cease and desist" can only forbid current, not future, activity. Since the FTC must appeal to the courts for enforcement of its orders (whether they be couched in the language of injunctions or cease and desist), future-seeing orders are of little, if any, value to it.

[45] Croly, "Restraint of Trade," pp. 9–10.

[46] *Congressional Record,* Sixty-third Congress (1914). See p. 13,060 for Newlands's comment and p. 10,377 for the original Senate bill.

[47] Ibid., p. 12,817.

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law and fact as was the practice at that time for appellate courts when deciding equity suits.[48] Consequently, this amendment abolished the FTC's autonomy and jeopardized its governing role. The threat posed by Cummins's amendment and the failure of Pomerene's amendment (Table 1) compelled the conference committee to incorporate judicial review of questions of law and a restricted review of questions of fact in the final version. Restricting judicial review primarily to questions of law, the statute provides that the courts can broach questions of fact only upon submission of new evidence, but such submission can occur only if "there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the proceeding before the commission" (Sec. 5). Thus in regard to the FTC's independence from the judiciary, the statute represented ground between the original and Cummins's version, but lay closer to the Cummins version.

The language of the bills contradicts Newlands's assertion that Pomerene's amendment provided broader judicial review than did that of Cummins.[49] Newlands's disingenuous comment underscores the importance of reading the bills carefully.

Rule Making. Table 2 introduces the concluding evidence establishing the FTC as a governing institution. The House proposed only an advisory and information-gathering agency with *procedural* (not legislative) rule-making powers whereas the Senate version offered an agency that would prosecute violations of the law without the aid of any (either procedural or legislative) rule-making powers. Rule-making and enforcement powers only coincided in the statute, thereby enabling the FTC to assume a governing role not provided by either the Senate or House versions.

The original act vested the FTC with legislative as well as procedural rule-making power: ". . . The commission shall also have power . . . from time to time to classify corporations and to make rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this act" (Sec. 6g). Using such legislative power, the FTC can declare certain methods of competition unfair and submit its declaration in a court proceeding as prima facie evidence of the unfairness of the practice. This legislative rule-making power enables the FTC simply to refer the courts to its declaration that a given practice is unfair rather than having to prove such in each case it prosecutes. Prior to 1972 when the FTC first asserted this power, it had to prove not only that the defendant had engaged in the practice but also that the practice was unfair. (See the conclusion for a discussion of

[48] Henry L. McClintock, *Handbook of Equity* (St. Paul, Minn., 1936), p. 23. It is not clear why Cummins proposed this amendment and why a majority of the Senate passed it. Croly favored narrow review powers for the courts; similarly, equal opportunity reformers also sought restricted judicial review since the courts had historically castrated antitrust and other legislation aimed at restoring equal opportunity. Furthermore, according to Kolko, "business" also favored narrow judicial review. See *Triumph*, p. 266. Perhaps Kolko's failure to distinguish the NCF from the NAM hides the group that sought the broad judicial review proposed by Cummins and accepted by the Senate. Or perhaps wanting to be cautious in their innovation, the politicians favored broad judicial review.

[49] *Congressional Record*, Sixty-third Congress (1914), p. 13,066.

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TABLE 2

Rule-Making Powers Conferred by the Various Bills

	Original House Bill	*All Senate Versions*	*Final (1914) Act (conference committee bill)*
Commission possesses any rule-making authority	Yes (procedural)	No	Yes (legislative and procedural)
Commission enforces standards	No	Yes	Yes

the FTC's renunciation of this power.) In 1972 an appellate court upheld the FTC's legislative rule-making power. Oil refiners had challenged this power when the FTC declared that failure to post the octane ratings of gasoline was an unfair competitive practice. Confirmed in its legislative capacity by the court decision, the FTC had only to prove that refiners had failed to post octane ratings, not that the failure to post was as an unfair practice.[50]

Eliminating the case-by-case determination of unfair methods, the FTC's authority to make legislative rules enhances its capacity to govern since this authority facilitates and expedites the FTC's prosecution of violations. Yet this rule making does not narrowly constrict the activity of the commission since the strange wording still allows the commission to decline prosecution of instances of unfair competition. From Croly's perspective the legislative rule-making authority together with the strange wording gave the FTC the best of all possible worlds.

The FTC Act: Triumph of Excellence or Interest?

A careful analysis has revealed that a thinker like Croly could support the FTC Act for idealistic reasons. (By establishing the existence of idealistic support for a trade commission which would further economic consolidation, this article calls for, but does not attempt, a *re*-evaluation of the prime movers behind the legislation. Especially, those legislative leaders and actors whom Kolko ties to big business need to be *re*-examined in light of this new perspective.) In appearance the act granted the advocates of equal opportunity what they desired—antitrust legislation directed at incipient monopolies. However, the act would actually encourage the development of large corporations while imposing government regulation. Even so, why has the preceding interpretation which demonstrated the congruence between Croly's idealism and the act rarely, if ever, revealed itself in the FTC's practice? If the literature on the FTC

[50] 482 Fed. 2d 672 (1972). *National Petroleum Refiners' Association* v. *FTC.*

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agrees on one point, it is that the FTC has seldom governed and served a larger public interest.

From the standpoint of consumer protection (which was not Croly's standpoint), Alan Stone argues that the FTC's inefficacy can be traced to its statute. Concentrating on deceptive advertising, Stone accounts for the FTC's failure to protect consumers by pointing to (1) the FTC's broad jurisdiction over persons (individuals, partnerships, and corporations) and subject matter (all deceptive advertising) and (2) its cease and desist orders. This broad jurisdiction makes the agency dependent upon business for information concerning violations; therefore the FTC becomes primarily and perniciously involved with cases that possess importance for business, but not for consumers. Furthermore, as has been demonstrated above, cease and desist orders can (and do) not prevent deceptive advertising; when a firm is ordered to cease one deceptive practice, it simply initiates another.[51]

Convincing as it is, Stone's analysis cannot be applied to the original statute with its Crolyesque meaning. If the defining perspective is both the encouragement and regulation of governing corporations which attain economic leadership through unfair competition, the vices cited by Stone—the FTC's dependence upon business and the cease and desist sanction—are transformed into virtues. In this Crolyesque context, there is no better source of information than the injured businesses and no better sanction than the cease and desist order. More importantly, Stone's analysis cannot account for the FTC's *self-renunciation* of its three most powerful weapons: (1) the discretionary power conveyed by the strange wording of Section 5; (2) the legislative rule-making power granted by Section 6g; and (3) the power to issue corrective (mandatory) orders. It is doubtful that Stone could ever trace this self-denial to the original statute as no necessary causal link exists between the statute and this remarkable *self-restraint*. Yet it is a historic fact that for many years the FTC denied or refused to exercise these very powers which could transform it into a governing institution. Only recently has the FTC asserted its legislative rule-making power and its power to issue corrective orders. More importantly, as evidenced by the FTC's behavior and Stone's article (Stone himself is an ex-FTC lawyer), the FTC still *refuses* to invoke the strange wording in order to narrow its jurisdiction.

Accounting for the FTC's failure to assume the governing role envisioned for it by Croly, the FTC adopted interpretations of (1) the strange wording of Section 5, (2) Section 6g, and (3) "cease and desist" which are different from the ones offered here. Reasoning that a proceeding is in the public interest whenever an unfair practice injures the public interest, the FTC throughout its history interpreted Section 5 not as has been done here but as directing the FTC to proceed against any injurious unfair method of competition.[52] Acting on this interpretation, the FTC becomes embroiled in petty affairs which obstruct its regula-

[51] Stone, "Advertising Regulation."

[52] One need only read the *Federal Trade Commission Decisions* to see the FTC's interpretation of the public interest clause. For example, see 35 FTC 335; 49 FTC 1190; 31 FTC 1076; 32 FTC 20.

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tion of the large corporations. The FTC fails to acknowledge that although an unfair practice causes some public injury, a FTC proceeding still may be detrimental to the larger public interest. Although this article's interpretation of the strange wording of Section 5 may be more convincing than that of the FTC, the act undoubtedly permits both.

Until the 1970s, the FTC denied its possession of legislative rule-making authority. Since Section 6g only states that the FTC could "make rules" without specifying what kind of rules, the agency in interpreting this section referred to both the House and Senate bills which did not delegate *legislative* rule-making power to the agency; consequently the FTC *chose* to interpret this section as conferring only *procedural* rule-making powers. But the first time (1972) the FTC decided to assert its legislative rule-making power, the courts upheld the FTC's action. Again, the original act permitted both interpretations.

Further underscoring the fact that a straight line has not linked the final act with the FTC's actual behavior, the agency issued its first corrective (mandatory) order in October 1975.[53] A corrective order compels positive performance of an act whereas a prohibitory order merely commands cessation of an activity.[54] Prior to 1975, the FTC had chosen to interpret Section 5 to mean that the FTC could only stop unfair practices, not issue corrective orders.[55] However, the agency has come to realize that Section 5 and "cease and desist" do not logically preclude corrective orders but actually permit them. The FTC's current suit against the six largest cigarette manufacturers asks that they be made not only to stop their illegal practice (that is, the firms will now have to display the standard caution) but also to pay for *corrective* advertising;[56] such corrective advertising will warn of the hazards of smoking, thereby compensating for the harmful consequences of their prior failure to display the standard caution (Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health).[57] In effect, the FTC has ordered them not only to cease and desist from a practice but also to correct the harmful conditions created by their previous illegal activity. A corrective order compels a corporation to correct the injurious state of affairs created by its unfair practice; such a correction attempts to prevent the corporation from reaping the benefits

[53] "U.S. Files Six Suits on Cigarette Ads," *The New York Times*, October 18, 1975, pp. 1, 43.

[54] Footnote 44 discusses the difference between prohibitory and mandatory injunctions and the development of mandatory injunctions from prohibitory language.

[55] Hence there are at least two meanings of "return to the status quo ante": (1) the return to the status quo ante can simply mean the absence of the unfair competitive practice, or (2) it can mean that corrective orders seek to reestablish to some degree the economic relations that existed prior to the implementation of the unfair competitive practice.

[56] Corrective orders should not be confused with affirmative disclosure orders. Affirmative disclosure requires that an offending firm disclose the fact that its product is of foreign origin, that oil is *re*refined, etc., but does not require in addition that the firm inform the public of its previous deceptive practice. For the FTC's decisions regarding affirmative disclosure, see 263 Fed 2d 818; 265 Fed 2d 246; 262 Fed 2d 741.

[57] "U.S. Files Six Suits on Cigarette Ads," pp. 1, 43.

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of a harmful state of affairs which persists after the cessation of the actual unfair practice.

The FTC Act actually delineates an *exclusive range* of possible consequences rather than just one consequence. Consequently, the malaise of the FTC's regulatory role cannot simply be attributed to its organic statute, and therefore our faith must not simply repose in good laws. The act drew a circle around the administrators' activity but within this circle they or their superiors were (and still are) free to choose. As demonstrated previously, a cease and desist order combined with the public interest clause will encourage experimentation with unfair competitive practices and hence cannot possibly inhibit economic consolidation. Democratic appearances notwithstanding, the FTC Act did not seek to protect business competition and restore equal opportunity. But whether the FTC would become an agency that would control economic consolidation or instead become the tool of the large corporations was *not determined* by the act in and of itself.[58] The FTC Act presented (and still presents) the commission with a range of alternatives: (1) to use the strange wording to narrow the commission's jurisdiction or to proceed against petty violations; (2) to issue corrective orders or to refrain from so doing; and (3) to make legislative rules or to deny itself this power. The alternatives that the FTC chose were contingent on factors external to the act—the FTC's personnel, internal organization, and political environment; but these external factors operate only within the limits imposed by the act.

Therefore, the most basic cause for the failure of the FTC to realize Croly's vision in American practice was the fact that Croly's ideal easily merged with the self-interest of the large corporations. Whereas equal opportunity and economic consolidation are polar opposites, it is a mere step from Croly's vision to the National Civic Federation's self-interest. The ground shared by Croly and the NCF (Kolko's "big business") was that both favored economic consolidation supported by the government. They differed only with regard to the extent of the government's power over the large corporations. When the crucial interpretations of the ambiguous sections were being made, Croly and like-minded

[58] The fact that two different consequences can easily flow from the use of consent decrees further underscores that a statute permits an exclusive range of consequences. (1) From Croly's perspective, consent decrees would serve a twofold purpose: to encourage experimentation with restraints of trade and also to retain government control of the resultant economic consolidation. (2) However, as they have been utilized, consent decrees mark the government as the handmaiden of the large corporations. This discrepancy is attributable to the fact that it is within the discretion of the administrators to determine the requirements of a consent decree and consequently the strength or weakness of a decree. Underscoring the existence and importance of this type of administrative discretion, complaints by competitors that a proposed decree was too weak have at times prodded the government to impose tougher conditions. Recently, the complaints of the competitors of Xerox compelled the FTC to demand a stronger consent decree than was first offered by Xerox. (John Omicinski, "FTC Okays Xerox Agreement," *Ithaca Journal*, July 31, 1975, Gannett News Service, p. 24.)

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others possessed no political power since their vision never commanded widespread popular appeal; however, the large corporations knew which interpretations favored them and mobilized to secure their choice. The final and unanswered question, then, is the most fundamental: Was Croly's vision a true alternative or does its easy transformation into serving the interests of large corporations deny it that status?*

* The author wishes to thank Diane Brannon, Eldon Eisenach, Theodore Lowi, Stephen Skowronek, and Bill Tetreault for their generous, invaluable help in the preparation of this article.

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Book Reviews

A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service *by Martin Weil. New York, W. W. Norton, 1978. 313 pp. $12.95.*

This entertaining, provocative, and important study of the U.S. career foreign service will undoubtedly be challenged by scholars and diplomats for its occasional exaggerations but it does contribute a serious and often overlooked input to foreign policy decision making. It is also a useful companion volume to John C. Donovan's *The Cold Warriors* (D. C. Heath, 1978).

Weil argues that a powerful inner circle of the foreign service career officers had disproportionate influence in the formulation of foreign policy between the Wilson and Truman administrations. He attributed their success (inter alia) to their long tenure (twenty to forty years), compared with elected officials, to their skill in bureaucratic in-fighting, to their domination of the cables, both incoming and outgoing, and to the inexperience of elected and politically appointed policy makers.

The value system of this career elite was derived from its wealthy, eastern, private school, and ivy league college background. "Educated in European history and languages, accustomed to foreign travel, bored with the prospect of tending the fortunes others had created, and impregnated with the doctrine of Christian service, some of them sought a career serving their country abroad" (p. 18). They identified with the foreign aristocracy, they feared communism, they held more benign feelings about the Nazis, and they were antisemitic. Parenthetically, this reviewer believes that Weil has overstated the extent of their antisemitism which may well have been incidental to and not an important contributory cause of their hostility to the sometimes Jewish-led communists in Russia and Poland. When others were admitted to this inner circle—like George Kennan and the Roman Catholic Robert Murphy from the Middle West—the price for admission was the adoption of the elite value system.

The main thrust of this volume, however, is the in-depth studies of the struggle between the careerists and the political officers over the management of policy: the New Deal period of the 1930s, the war years, and the immediate postwar years of the early Truman administration. Franklin Roosevelt's first term was preoccupied with domestic prob-

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lems. This left an indifferent (except for tariffs) and largely innocent Secretary of State Cordell Hull at the mercy of the foreign service elite who were located in the Division of European Affairs. Despite the discrepancy between Hull's rural Tennessee background and the polished gentility of the foreign service seaboard Brahmins, there were certain points in common: both disliked New Deal "radicalism." After his landslide re-election in 1936, Roosevelt recognized the awakening of the public to foreign affairs, but the more active foreign policy of the New Deal, for example, opposition to Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler's Nazism and sympathy for the Soviet efforts to contain Hitler, was undermined by the career elite.

During the war years, Roosevelt's distaste for the career diplomats was so great that he established his own foreign ministry to handle wartime diplomacy. But the careerists led by Robert Murphy with the assistance of Roosevelt's military advisor, Admiral William Leahy, won the day for a pro-Vichy, Darlan policy in North Africa. And the president's tenuous control of the State Department was further weakened when Hull demanded the resignation of the president's man, Undersecretary Sumner Welles. Welles's successor, Edward Stettinius, though nominally loyal to the New Dealers, proved so inept that the careerists were enabled to further enhance their authority.

In the final chapters, the Europeanists consolidate their grip on foreign policy and make a significant contribution to the inauguration of the cold war. They initiated the "Declaration of Liberated Europe" at Yalta and used it as an instrument for dramatizing Russian "bad faith" to the American public. They placed their men in the key embassies in Eastern Europe to generate cables on Russian violation of the Yalta Declaration. Thus monopolizing the interpretation of postwar European developments, they were soon convincing an inexperienced President Truman and equally inexperienced and arrogant Secretary of State Byrnes to scuttle Roosevelt's policy of cooperation for one of confrontation. Even their former archenemy, now Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, seeing the new name of the game, embraced them. As an ardent anglophile, he also realized the only way he would get congressional approval for a $3.5 billion loan for the United Kingdom would be to package it as "containing Communism."

This is a lively and anecdotal account based on an impressive bibliography of archives and manuscript collections, including the Columbia Oral History Collection, interviews, and published and unpublished materials. It may not be the last word, but it is an important supplemental one.

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Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy *by Roger Morris. New York, Harper & Row, 1977. 312 pp. $10.95.*

Contrary to the subtitle, Roger Morris's book is not primarily important for its emphasis on the content of American foreign policy between 1969 and 1976. Since he served on the National Security Council staff under Kissinger until he resigned over the Cambodian invasion of 1970, Morris does provide insights into the plans which dealt with détente,

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Vietnam, Biafra, Chile, China, Pakistan, and Cyprus. The longest and most rewarding sections of the book, however, describe those policies (especially toward Southern Rhodesia, Vietnam, and Biafra) which Morris closely followed from the inside during 1969–1970. He distinguishes between the daring and intelligence of the administration's approaches to China and Russia, and the prejudice and ready willingness to expend human lives which proved so disastrous in Vietnam, Biafra, Chile, and other areas south of the equator.

But Morris's primary concern is not the substance of policy but how Kissinger and Richard Nixon shaped policy, and how they seized power from a 1960s "Establishment" group that proved to be intellectually bankrupt. Sharing their dislike (hatred may not be too strong a word) for the old cold war elite, Morris lovingly describes how the National Security Advisor and "my drunken friend," as Kissinger described the president (p. 147), cut out the bureaucracy which both men despised; circumvented the State Department which they mocked (those "fags", as Nixon called foreign service officers); neutralized the Pentagon; and lied to or wire-tapped other troublesome officials. The only character who emerges as impervious to such manipulation, and perhaps the most fascinating of all the players, is General Alexander Haig. But then Haig, as a young officer, had lived with Douglas MacArthur's vanity and megalomania. Nixon and Kissinger might be crazy, Haig observed, but given his earlier experiences they were "no crazier than most" (p. 144).

By the end of the book Morris has problems. He admires Kissinger when the latter is compared with "the weakness and mediocrity of the government and presidents" he inherited (p. 294). And the final pages are a personal heartfelt plea that the former secretary of state return to power—but this time leave behind his public dissembling, private lying, and "inhumane" actions (p. 298). Morris seems to blame part of these problems on columnists (Hugh Sidey and Joseph Kraft appear especially foolish), and senators who were gulled by Kissinger or looked the other way when he acted outrageously. Such men, the author argues, should have kept Kissinger more honest. The distinction, however, is misleading. The substance of Kissinger's policies cannot be separated from the tactics. When one allows horrors in Pakistan for the sake of forwarding relations with China, for example, the media must be manipulated to hide one's complicity. As the young Harvard professor wrote two decades earlier in *World Restored*, domestic support is the acid test of foreign policy, but the public and bureaucracy are usually too slow to stay in step with the giant strides of the prophet-statesman who feels the future in his bones. Morris finally turns to Kissinger for salvation after writing 300 pages on the "irrelevant" and "inhumane" (p. 298) nature of his foreign policy. One closes the book wondering whether the former secretary really offers any hope for the future or, given Morris's bitter analyses of the alternatives found in the Johnson and Carter administrations, there is any hope for salvation at all.

WALTER LAFEBER
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Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976 *by William B. Quandt. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978. 313 pp. Cloth, $14.95; paper, $4.95.*

Strong presidential leadership is vital, William Quandt contends, if the United States is to play a constructive role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Professor Quandt, who has served as Office Director for Middle Eastern Affairs on the National Security Council staff since January 1977, believes that the role of the president and his closest advisers is especially crucial during crises, when domestic and bureaucratic constraints are less confining. In analyzing American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1967 to 1976, he therefore devotes special attention to the psychology of presidential decision making.

Quandt comments that "too often in the past, it has taken a major crisis to engage the attention of the president; and too often, the policies set in times of crisis have persisted well beyond their usefulness" (p. 288). Presidents accorded secondary priority to the Middle East during the Vietnam era, and when Arab-Israeli wars erupted in 1967 and 1973, their prime concern was the possibility of superpower confrontation. Prior to the June 1967 war, President Johnson was reluctant to "unleash" the Israelis because "the normally pro-Israeli Congress was in a hesitant frame of mind" (p. 70). American policy during the October 1973 war was not affected by President Nixon's distraction with Watergate, because Secretary of State Kissinger acted effectively as "an extension of the president" (p. 204). Kissinger's later "step-by-step" diplomacy may, however, have been deprived of a coherent sense of purpose because of Nixon's weakening authority and the ineffectual leadership of President Ford.

Decade of Decisions offers a penetrating commentary on American foreign policy making, and Quandt's presentation is lucid and well documented. Some of the author's most revealing insights must be extracted from lengthy descriptive passages, however, because of the detailed, chronological recounting of key episodes. Professor Quandt asserts that because of diverse concerns in the Middle East—Soviet-American rivalry, a commitment to Israel, and oil—the United States "cannot hope to find a single policy that maximizes all three sets of interests" (p. 14). Vacillation is especially intense in noncrisis periods, and the traditional bureaucratic rivalry between the State Department and the White House generated much inconsistency in policy between 1967 and 1973. Ultimately, however, "Nixon and Kissinger succeeded in undermining State Department initiatives and in gaining virtually complete control over policy toward the Middle East" (p. 128).

In Quandt's view, Henry Kissinger "will undoubtedly be regarded as one of the most powerful and most successful of American statesmen in the postwar era" (p. 285). Kissinger skillfully engineered a ceasefire accord in 1973 at "the moment when all parties could still emerge from the conflict with their vital interests and self-esteem intact" (p. 187), taking pride in "the best-run crisis ever" (p. 191). The disengagement accords that he negotiated between Israel and its Egyptian and Syrian neighbors, although modest in scope, "strained their political systems almost to the breaking point" (p. 250), and Quandt argues that more comprehensive agreements simply could not have been achieved at the time.

The October War marked a turning point in American policy, although it would be simplistic and inaccurate to assert that the United States shifted from a pro-Israel to a pro-

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Arab policy. Quandt seems to share Kissinger's judgment that whereas several Arab states preferred an activist American diplomatic role after the 1967 war, "Israel was primarily interested in wasting time" so as to divert pressures for territorial concessions (p. 161). Once a coordinated American-Israeli strategy helped resolve the Jordan crisis of 1970, however, Nixon and Kissinger lavished military assistance on Israel, which they now regarded as a strategic asset. The October War revealed that Israel's military strength alone would not assure stability, and Egypt emerged as the linchpin of a new American policy in the Arab world. In fact, as early as 1968, Secretary of State Rusk informed Egypt that the United States favored full Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai as part of a peace agreement, and this position has "consistently been part of the American official consensus" (p. 67). As American confidence in Egypt grew, Kissinger relied heavily upon President Sadat for advice on how to deal with other Arab leaders.

Despite his admiration for Kissinger, Quandt points out that the secretary never could decide how to deal with the Soviet presence in the Middle East, wavering between exaggerating and minimizing Russian influence. He was also insensitive to regional developments, underestimating the role of the Syrians and of oil, and retaining a "blind spot" toward the Palestinian issue. Most telling, perhaps, is Quandt's suggestion that Kissinger was a brilliant tactician, but lacked a vision of the ultimate goal of his diplomacy. Will a coherent and realizable vision emerge from the administration in which the author now participates? Although the Carter team has accorded high priority to the Middle East and has pursued unconventional approaches, one wonders whether the familiar pattern of vacillation or more decisive leadership is in store.

NAOMI JOY WILLIAMS
Columbia University

The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective *by Walter LaFeber. New York, Oxford University Press, 1978. 248 pp. $10.95.*

On occasion historians write books about the past that quietly enter a current public debate to inform, and perhaps to influence it. Such a book was C. Vann Woodward's *Strange Career of Jim Crow*, first published in 1955 when the civil rights movement began to challenge segregation and to stir discussion. Walter LaFeber's *The Panama Canal* is another timely work, bringing essential information to its readers, tackling tough, popular questions head-on, and demonstrating that contemporary problems have profound origins which help to explain their intensity, if not their intractability. LaFeber has written a crisp study which surveys American-Panamanian relations from the mid-nineteenth century to the signing of the 1977 treaties.

Panama fell victim to the U.S. expansionist drive of the nineteenth century. Growing commercial stakes and military intervention drew the Colombian province into the American imperial net by the turn of the century. In 1903, eager for an isthmian canal, American officials gave the signal to that self-interested Frenchman, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, to launch a rebellion for independence from Colombia. Tapping long-standing Panamanian nationalism (a persistent theme in the book) and exploiting the effective lobbying

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efforts of William Cromwell in Washington, Bunau-Varilla and his cohorts gained success and hurriedly signed a treaty with the United States which ensured American control of a canal zone ("as if it were the sovereign of the territory") and payment of $40 million to the French company that Bunau-Varilla represented.

Right away the United States began to use all of Panama for American purposes (ports for the American military, for example). Practicing what LaFeber calls "informal colonialism" (p. 58), the United States kept a white oligarchy in political power. President Coolidge spoke of Panama as one of "our outlying possessions" (p. 76) and the United States used a number of methods, not unlike those used in the rest of Latin America, to wield authority: political interference; treaty provisions which permitted the imposition of domestic order; landing of troops; frequent lectures and threats; restrictions on Panamanian foreign policy; control of radio communications; and economic domination (in 1930 the United States took 94 percent of Panama's exports and sold Panama about two-thirds of its imports). Critics of the oligarchy and the American presence grew in number: a mestizo middle class, students, and the military. Still, in 1941 American officials helped topple Arnulfo Arias from office and during the war grabbed 100 military sites in the tiny country. All the while, "Zonians" haughtily showed contempt for Panamanian sovereignty. Through the 1940s and 1950s continued American insults to Panamanian dignity, anti-American riots, and economic crises produced a stormy setting for Canal operations. The Alliance for Progress in the early 1960s tried to prevent Castroism in Panama, but in 1964 bloody riots swept the country over the issue of flying the Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone. President Johnson began negotiations.

In 1968, General Omar Torrijos seized power. He promised land reform and he pressured the United States to negotiate its withdrawal. In the early 1970s, fearing a hostile Latin American bloc and seeking economic cooperation, Washington agreed to consider relinquishing control over the Canal. As a tug-of-war developed in the American government ("Zonians" and the Pentagon against the State Department), Torrijos enticed American officials by turning for outside capital to the United States and by taming leftists. Plagued by unemployment, inflation, and corruption, Torrijos needed Canal revenues to revive his sagging economy and to meet his promises. LeFeber argues that the leverage thus shifted to the United States by 1977. Hence the treaties provided that the United States would not give up the Canal until the year 2000, something that annoyed Panamanian nationalists. As LaFeber points out in discussing some of the key questions of the 1978 debate, the United States never owned the Canal Zone, the Canal itself was no longer of vital importance to the national interest, and the Canal was indefensible against sabotage.

This is a fast-paced book. At times the reader wished for a pause for elaboration or further analysis of, for example, Johnson's reasons for shifting to negotiations. On some questions, LaFeber is restricted by scarcity of documents. Once he enters the history of the 1950s and beyond he must rely largely on public sources. Without the privilege of extensive leaks like those which permitted Tad Szulc to detail Kissinger's Vietnam negotiations *(Foreign Policy,* 1974) or Edward Sheehan to expose Kissinger's Middle East deliberations *(The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger,* 1976), LaFeber had to offer an outsider's brief account of the final talks which led to the 1977 treaties. LaFeber's study is a fine and welcome addition to the thin but expanding literature on inter-American relations. One can

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only guess (and hope) that it played its part in persuading Americans that facts and sensitivity to the real and deeply felt nationalistic sentiments of other peoples, rather than myths and stubborn imperialistic arrogance, should govern relations with the independent-minded states of the Western Hemisphere.

THOMAS G. PATERSON
University of Connecticut

The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955–1972 *by Ernest J. Yanarella. Lexington, Ky., University of Kentucky Press, 1977. 236 pp. $17.25.*

Ernest Yanarella is an author with a mission. His goal is to help foster a native tradition of critical peace research by ". . . exposing the ideational and institutional foundations of research and development (R and D) in offensive and defensive weapons technology" (p. 5). His focus of analysis is the controversy that swirled around development and deployment of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system for the United States from the mid-1950s to the early '70s.

For Yanarella, the effort to develop an ABM typifies the worst aspects of America's role in the strategic arms race. In particular, the author attempts to uncover the "technological imperative" driving the United States toward ever more sophisticated military hardware; an increasingly rational weapons development process ". . . evolving in complete detachment from human control and intervention . . ." (p. 100). The result is a provocative, if not entirely successful, attempt to prove what many believe to be almost conventional wisdom.

The book's major strengths reside in descriptions of the political and technological phenomena that affected the course of BMD events. Of particular importance was the army's search to find a strategic mission after the Unification Act of 1947 divided most of the important missions between the air force and the navy. As a result, the army turned its R and D efforts to rockets and missiles. The author, following Armacost's definitive work, convincingly shows how BMD became even more attractive to the army after its defeat in the Thor-Jupiter controversy. With the air force given sole responsibility over the IRBM program, the army devoted more and more resources to Nike-Zeus and its new-found ABM mission. The persistence of BMD research over the years can in large part be explained by the army's continued desire to grab a piece of the strategic action through its control over ABM.

The central character in the BMD controversy was Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and the author's judgements concerning McNamara's role are themselves likely to generate considerable debate. Yanarella strives to show that McNamara was predisposed to favor offensive over defensive systems, and that this strategic bias led to his resistance to the deployment of the Nike-Zeus and other BMD variants. From the author's viewpoint, McNamara doomed the ABM by refusing to accept anything other than a "technically perfect system" (p. 78). My understanding of McNamara's reasoning on the ABM issue is a bit different. McNamara saw two basic ways of protecting the U.S. home-

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land. One was to deter attack with proved offensive systems that he knew affected the strategic calculations of potential adversaries. The second approach was to attempt to defend against attack with an extraordinarily expensive and unproved BMD system whose long-term ability to cope with basic technical problems and increasingly sophisticated offensive systems was at best dubious. Rather than being driven by some ill-defined pro-offensive dogma, it is much more likely that McNamara's resistance to a full-blown ABM derived from a straightforward calculation that the American people would be only marginally safer after the expenditure of tens of billions of dollars.

The author also makes an interesting but unpersuasive argument that McNamara's influence on defense decision making and strategic planning has been greatly exaggerated. The author's contention that the dominant trends had been established by the end of the 1950s is undercut by his own description of the massive organizational overhaul carried out by McNamara during his first months in office, his introduction of the unique Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), and the shift from a countervalue to a counterforce and graduated response posture, all of which have had lasting effects on U.S. defense policy.

In the end the "technological imperative" is found wanting as an explanation for the fate of the BMD. Lyndon Johnson's concerns over the 1968 election, McNamara's attempts to placate military and congressional supporters of a massive ABM system by agreeing to a light system against a nonexistent Chinese threat, the Nixon-Kissinger policy of détente toward the Soviet Union and SALT spelled the demise of BMD. If nothing else, this study adds more evidence to the growing list of cases, from TFX to the B-1 and nuclear carriers, to show that interservice, domestic, and international political factors—not simplistic notions such as the technological imperative—remain the driving force behind major weapons decisions.

ROBERT H. TRICE
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The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present *by Douglas S. Blaufarb. New York, The Free Press, 1977. 356 pp. $12.95.*

A balanced, updated account of post–World War II counterinsurgency efforts is useful to have, and that is what Douglas Blaufarb has given us. His book provides an overview and analysis of the insurgencies in the Philippines and Malaya in one chapter, Thailand and Laos in one chapter each, and Vietnam, appropriately, in three chapters. The purpose is to describe why counterinsurgency efforts succeed or fail generally, and why outcomes emerged as they did in the specific cases addressed. The author clearly knows his subject—having lived with it for more than two decades working with the CIA—though his first-hand knowledge is reflected in the quality of his analysis rather than through first-person accounts or revelations about the events he discusses. Although the book succeeds very well within the narrow limits of its analysis, one may wonder whether we should continue to treat the subject of counterinsurgency within such limits.

The first part of the book, dealing with the postwar setting of Communist insurgency

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and the successful counterinsurgencies in the Philippines and Malaya, is most useful to those new to the literature. The reader is treated to neither new analytical insights nor original interpretations, but the judgments are sound and relevant to the main target, Vietnam. Counterinsurgency against the Huks and the Malay Communist party was successful largely because local governments were open to limited reform or already sufficiently competent (by virtue of colonial experience), and because sanctuaries and external support were absent in one case, and ethnically distinct insurgents were present in the other. The Americans and their South Vietnamese allies were not so fortunate.

The author treats the wars in Laos and Thailand in considerably more depth. Offering a somewhat overly sympathetic characterization of the counterinsurgency effort in Laos, he is critical of those who have criticized American involvement: "The idea that the Meo had a right to fight and sacrifice for their own vision of their future was dismissed as unreal and the U.S. decision to support them as contemptible. In addition to ignorance of the origin and course of the resistance, these criticisms reflected the venom of the opposition to Vietnam and the ambiguous outcome of the resistance (p. 167)."

Blaufarb is right, of course, to point out that the counterinsurgencies in Southeast Asia were no more monolithic than the communism that was the ideology of their opponents, but he also appears insensitive to the character of the critique of American involvement in Southeast Asia. If its premises are sound, that critique stands in spite of whatever virtues may be attributed to the Meo irregulars. By failing to address the more fundamental issues raised by the American presence, the author ultimately leaves the reader a bit unsatisfied at the end of those chapters dealing with Southeast Asia, and at the end of the book.

The problem with the treatment of the counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam is not that it lacks balance, or perspective, or useful prescription based on solid analysis: it has all of that. Blaufarb succinctly states the dilemma for the local government in South Vietnam, and for counterinsurgency: "Far-reaching reform was required and was pledged but, if carried out, threatened to undermine the arrangements, the deals, and the political understandings that precariously held the regime together—and so never went far enough" (p. 216). The author also correctly points to the unwillingness of U.S. military leaders to adjust to the counterinsurgency task, and their insistence on shaping the local military forces in their own image, as significant to the failure on the military side of the war. Even if these are not entirely original observations, they are indeed important to an explanation of why insurgency succeeded in Vietnam. They do not, however, speak directly to evaluations of U.S. interests in Southeast Asia, or to assessments of the proper use of American power and influence in light of those interests. If that is not what this book is about, it is nevertheless precisely what much of the debate over past U.S. counterinsurgency entanglements are about. One might have hoped that a book that is so well written, whose judgments on the political and military tactics of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts are so sound, might have ventured into the strategy of counterinsurgency and even the policy that informed it. As it is, we are left uncertain whether the author believes the era referred to in the title is, or ought to be, behind us.

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War: Controlling Escalation *by Richard Smoke. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1978. 419 pp. $18.50.*

The study of war covers a diverse landscape of theory and research on the causes and correlates of war. It is clear that the questions of why and how wars *begin* claim the bulk of scholarly attention. However, how wars expand, the investigation of war duration, war termination, and the consequences of war are all crucial to the overall study of international conflict. Richard Smoke has set out to help students of international conflict understand how war escalates after it has begun. He is disturbed by how little attention has been given to a comprehensive study of "escalation *processes* in war" (p. 7). Smoke wants to understand escalation so that it can be controlled. This operational goal is central to Smoke's enterprise, as he points out that the book is intended "both for decision-makers and working-level civilian and military officers, and scholars specializing in international relations . . ." (p. xi; see also Appendix A, "Operational Questions for Decision-Makers").

Smoke has produced a readable, well-organized, and carefully developed book, rich in historical detail but also broadly based in the contemporary international relations literature (see especially chapters 1, 2 and Appendix B, "The Research Methodology: Presuppositions and Rationale"). The book also makes valuable additions to the conceptualization and analysis of international conflict processes. The volume consists of three main sections. Part One discusses "The Problem of Escalation." Its three chapters are directed toward clarifying what "the problem" of escalation is. Chapter Two, "The Many Meanings of Escalation," is a useful and wide ranging exercise in concept clarification, breaking escalation into its several components by reviewing opposing images of the concept. In Chapter 3, "Understanding Escalation Control," Smoke outlines six clusters of questions he will employ to structure his analysis of five historical case studies using a "focused comparison" methodology. Cluster one, for example, inquires into the "salient limits" of the conflict; cluster three deals with the goals of decision makers. Part Two, "Case Studies in Escalation and Its Control," presents three cases where war *did not* escalate into much greater conflicts (the Spanish Civil War, the Austro-Prussian War, and the Franco-Prussian War); and two cases where it did (the Crimean War and the Seven Years War). Part Three, "Toward the Control of Escalation," consists of two chapters which "draw together many of the analytic observations . . . and derive some conclusions about the task of keeping escalation from going out of control" (p. 239).

The most disappointing aspect of the book is Smoke's failure either to summarize each case study *explicitly* and consistently, using his six question clusters, or to discuss each cluster separately, but comparing across all five cases. With that said, however, Smoke's work is an excellent example of the utility a case study approach can provide. Smoke's "focused comparison" illustrates the potentialities of case studies in both generating evidence with which to evaluate earlier work, and in generating conclusions that form the propositional basis for a later case study or quantitative research. The former point is illustrated by the discussion of Schelling's work in Chapter 9, "On the Assessment of Conflicts." The latter point covers Smoke's analytic conclusions, set out in Part Three. These include his argument that the "framework" of the conflict (the context or situation within which escalation does or does not occur) is much more important than past work would

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indicate; work which stresses the bargaining aspects of conflict escalation. Smoke also develops an analysis based on the processes of misperception—"conceptual failures"/"failures of analysis"—and suggests that much more attention needs to be paid to the policy maker's "field of expectation" (see Chapter 10). He suggests in Chapter 9 that escalation has the best chance of being controlled by promoting a holistic "systems thinking" approach among decision makers, perhaps best achieved through "conditional predicting" or a "preconditional" mode of analysis. In sum, this is a most useful book for the student of war. It will be difficult to write on escalation without referring to this work.

HARVEY STARR
Indiana University

The Structure of Violence: Armed Forces as Social Systems *by Maury D. Feld. Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, Inc., 1977. 203 pp. $12.50.*

Over the past two decades Maury Feld has published a number of essays that treat military organizations within the context of the larger societies to which they belong. This book pulls six of these essays together, and introduces them with a chapter Feld has written for this volume.

Most of these essays focus on the way the military and society interact. Societies shape their military institutions in their own image, but military institutions also help shape society. The interaction here is important because the military performs basic state security functions, and is, of course, dangerously well armed. Because of the interaction's importance, studying it becomes, in Feld's view, a very profitable way of coming to grips with change in society as well as in military organization.

The book's chapters provide a varied sample of what Feld has in mind. In Chapter 2 Feld develops a typology of military organizations, matches each type to an appropriate parent society, and examines the processes of change from one type to the next that occur when tensions arise between the military and society. Chapter 5 looks more narrowly at the tension between increasing military professionalism and the role officers are often called upon to play in state-building among Third World nations.

The best comes last, however. In the book's final two chapters, Feld treats the rise of military professionalism and the mass army in western society. Military professionalism got its start, he contends, in the Dutch Republic around 1585. Lacking a native feudal nobility to lead its revolt against Spain, the Dutch elite hired an officer corps, put it on steady wages, and subordinated it to state interests. Doing so not only produced a highly efficient military machine, but profoundly altered European perspectives on war, the military, and society. Before, war had been an unnatural event; with the Dutch example it became one of the state's standard regulatory functions.

When for a variety of reasons mass armies rose some two centuries later, European elites relied on the loyalty of the professional officers to hold these huge armed forces subordinate to the state. Military professionalism thus permitted these elites to expand political participation without threatening the existing order. If in 1585 war became a standard

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state function, after 1789 military service became a standard form of political obligation and participation.

These are not entirely new themes, although Feld pushes them about as far as they will go; one senses from these pages the implicit argument that the professional military was Europe's first truly modern organization, primary model for later political and organizational development. Clearly, these themes have significance far beyond the bounds of military sociology. They are well developed here, and would be quite useful to the historian, political scientist, or organizational theorist.

Despite the quality of some of its chapters, however, the book somehow leaves a bad impression. Arranging essays by date of publication does nothing for the coherence of Feld's argument. Chapter 3 contributes nothing to his theme, while Chapter 4 seems weak compared with others in the book. Both chapters could have been replaced with an essay on what the volunteer army says about the United States (although Feld hints that it is too early to say much on this subject). Finally, the text is littered with an unusually large number of typographical errors which detract from its impact.

Feld's demonstrated scholarship stands on its own, however, and deserves a wider audience than it has probably received. If in book form his work achieves wider circulation, then that may be justification enough for the book's publication.

THOMAS L. MCNAUGHER
The Rand Corporation

Tragic Choices *by Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1978. 252 pp. $9.95.*

This book is an analysis of approaches used in the United States to allocate scarce resources. To illuminate major shortcomings of alternative processes of allocation the authors focus on "particularly painful choices"—those which bring the values by which a society defines itself into conflict.

The methods of allotment in the distribution of scarce goods that Calabresi and Bobbitt examine include the market, accountable political processes, the lottery, and custom. What value trade-offs, they ask, are entailed in how each process determines how much of a scarce good is produced and who shall get that which is produced? The major limitation of the pure market approach they contend is that in affording preeminence to individual expressions of wants it fails to accommodate social goals. Market operations also run counter to some important concepts of egalitarianism; and reduce to a fixed price things which should be ascribed infinite value. The political process, in contrast, cannot readily give effect to individual desires, the authors note. Moreover it confronts conflicting egalitarian values. The lottery, which "allows us to choose when we can no longer tolerate choice" (p. 44), deifies absolute equality but in so doing offends other conceptions of egalitarianism and, indeed, other values which might be at stake in the choice, say, of who should go to war. Customs, Calabresi and Bobbitt suggest, are also a method of allocating scarce resources, but they represent less an approach than an attitude which consists of the avoidance of self-conscious choice. Where customs continue to be relied upon

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for allocational decisions despite what the authors refer to as a loss of innocence they bear heavy costs for the openness and honesty of societal interaction.

Both market and political processes can be modified, the authors explain, to counter their respective principal defects. But what is most interesting in what they have to say is that the modifications cannot significantly strengthen either of the approaches or lessen shortcomings. The process of allocation is an act signifying inequality. However accomplished, the allocation of scarce resources places value on some things over others, and pits the good to society against the good to an individual. We may limit the destructive effect of tragic choices, Calabresi and Bobbitt conclude, only by choosing to mix approaches over time.

This analysis of tragic choices is pertinent to an age in the throes of making a major shift in perspective from abundance to scarcity. But its utility is limited by its abstract discussion of the process of decision making—that is, divorced from any given structure of power—and by its static treatment of scarcity. As Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz pointed out a decade ago, there are "two faces of power" affecting not only how decisions are made but what becomes the object of explicit social choice.

Two other recent works dealing with social choice-making could be usefully read in conjunction with the Calabresi and Bobbitt study. The first, Charles Lindblom's *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977) discusses the strengths and weaknesses of authority systems and markets in more concrete terms than do Calabresi and Bobbitt; draws a tighter link between political and economic decision making; and offers a provocative look at varieties of government-market relations. The second work, *Social Limits to Growth* by Fred Hirsch (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), provides a dynamic conception of scarcity in advanced industrialized countries, the implication of which is that choices are more restricted and trade-offs costlier than the traditional menu offered by economic liberalism suggested. Hirsch argues that the process of economic growth has heightened rather than relieved the distributional struggle; that as the level of average consumption rises the satisfaction that individuals derive from goods and services depends in increasing measure not only on their own consumption but on consumption of others; and that as a consequence of change in the nature of economic growth we are confronted with structural strain on both the market mechanism and the political mechanism designed to regulate and supplement it.

CATHERINE GWIN
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Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems *by Charles E. Lindblom. New York, Basic Books, 1977. 403 pp. $15.00.*

Social scientists are, inevitably, taxonomists. Anthropologists tend to divide societies according to their prevailing kinship patterns; political scientists according to the way authority is distributed and exercised; economists by how goods and services are produced and distributed. *Politics and Markets* takes the economist's approach, but two things set it apart from most treatises on economics. First, it is truly comparative. It examines the

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salient features of different economic systems, rather than a particular facet—pricing, the organization of industry, or the pattern of investment—in one of them. Second, it proceeds from the assumption, which befits a Sterling Professor of Economics and Political Science at Yale, that the political scientist's and the economist's fields of study cannot really be separated. The result is a book that is genuinely original, because it both clarifies and advances beyond the categories of political and economic discourse that we have inherited from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

There are, according to Lindblom, three basic types of political-economic systems. There are those whose basis is exchange—the market systems of the industrial west and much of the developing world. There are those that depend centrally upon authority—the Communist countries. And there is the system, never fully realized but, in Lindblom's view, partly embodied in China, Cuba, and perhaps a few other places, whose driving force is neither fear nor material incentives, but persuasion. Lindblom terms this the "preceptoral" system.

Politics and Markets is an extended discussion of these three types. It emphasizes that neither is wholly distinct. In market societies individual firms are run by authority, not exchange; there is a clear-cut hierarchy of command. And even in Communist societies labor and consumer goods are distributed by market means. Only capital is allocated by authority rather than exchange.

The most controversial section of the book has proved to be its discussion of the political character of market societies. They are, Lindblom finds, less than fully democratic, due to the "privileged position" of business. Everybody in these societies is affected by the decisions that businessmen make, but there is almost no popular control over what they decide. Their resources make them unusually effective participants in the political process, which in turn enables them to preserve their privileged social position. Their efforts, Lindblom argues, have been largely responsible for keeping the serious discussion of alternative forms of political and economic organization off the political agenda of the advanced market societies of the West.

The most striking part of *Politics and Markets*, and perhaps also the part most open to question, is the designation of the "preceptoral" as the third major political-economic system. Such a system is, of course, entirely feasible in theory. But to suggest that it has existed, even in fragmented, diluted form entails taking seriously the claims of the Chinese, the Cubans, and others to have fashioned a "new man," who works not for pay or out of fear of punishment, but for lofty, altruistic, "revolutionary" purposes.

The evidence that any contemporary society has run any significant part of its economy on the basis of persuasion is, as Lindblom notes, extremely thin. Coercion, not persuasion, seems to be the motor of economic activity in societies whose preceptoral exhortations have been loudest. It may be that these exhortations, and the claims that they are successful, are not the harbingers of a new mode of social organization, but the final gasps of the secular utopian impulse that was most fully articulated in Europe in the last century but has been played out in Asia and Africa in this one. If so the preceptoral form of organization belongs to the past, not to the future of the world's political-economic systems, a future that *Politics and Markets* otherwise does a very great deal to illuminate.

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Myth, Oil, and Politics: Introduction to the Political Economy of Petroleum *by Charles F. Doran. New York, The Free Press, 1977. 226 pp. $12.95.*

The most important merit of this study is that it discusses most of the contentious issues associated with oil. This effort is, however, marred by an unsatisfactory overall framework and a weak analysis of some specific questions.

On matters of substance Doran makes the following arguments: It is fruitless to contend that oil prices are unfair because there is no satisfactory basis for judging fairness. The increase in oil prices has not been related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Corporate profits have not been excessive. Divestiture, breaking up vertical integration in the oil industry, will not bring down prices. It will be very difficult for the consuming countries to agree on a common strategy because their underlying characteristics are so different. The cohesion of OPEC will depend critically on the ability of industrialized countries, particularly the United States, to encourage an increase in non-OPEC supplies and a reduction of consumption.

While all of these arguments are concerned with oil, they are not related in any obvious analytic way. Doran has tried to cope with this problem by referring to widely held alternative positions as myths, which he defines as "a complex of beliefs and assertions professed by large groups of people that purports to explain reality and fulfills important functions of a psychological and political nature but that is false in significant, although often not very evident, respects" (p. 2). Now this is a dangerous business because it opens the possibility of explaining away opposing arguments in terms of political or psychological needs, rather than confronting them directly. Fortunately, Doran does not often succumb to this temptation, but using myths as a unifying concept obscures rather than illuminates fundamental disagreements.

In presenting his own arguments on specific issues Doran has adopted a style that more resembles a lawyer's brief than social science analysis. He tends to string together a number of points, some telling, some weak, without making distinctions as to their importance or trying to tie them together in a systematic way. In Chapter 1 there is a good discussion of alternative OPEC price strategies, but in Chapter 3, where the oil price increase of the early 1970s is explicated, the whole weight of explanation is placed on changing supply and demand conditions and the period from 1970 to 1975 is discussed in an undifferentiated way. Some important factors, such as the American government decision to undercut the oil companies' efforts to reach a cohesive position at Teheran, are not mentioned. In discussing divestiture, Doran notes that the oil industry is less concentrated than a number of other sectors, implying that it should not be singled out as a target of antitrust action. Given, however, the importance of oil it would not be illogical to focus on oil even if it is less concentrated. In Chapter 5 consumer country cohesion is seen as a function of similarity. Doran includes membership in various international organizations, population, land area, total imports and exports, birth rate, unemployment rate, net capital flow, and growth rate, among other variables, in a factor analysis that shows, not surprisingly, that the United States is different from other industrialized countries. Many of these variables simply reflect size. Since the author refers to Mancur Olson in another part of the book, it is not clear why he thinks similar, as opposed to different, characteristics will obviously lead to effective joint action, especially if countries share similar objectives.

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There are also some strains if not internal contradictions in this study; a point used to bolster one argument in one chapter is sometimes turned around to support another argument in a different part of the book. For instance, in Chapter 2, Doran contends that higher oil prices are not related to the Israeli-Arab conflict, while in the discussion of OPEC cohesion in Chapter 6 he maintains that the OPEC embargo was a "political shock" that showed how production cuts could lead to higher prices. On p. 17, in dismissing the contention that the competitive price is a benchmark for fairness Doran argues that "the fact that there is a relatively small number of fairly concentrated firms in the oil industry . . ." makes "it unlikely that the market will ever approach perfect or free, competition." On p. 76, in a discussion of why divestiture will not work, Doran states that the industry is "composed of hundreds of companies, many quite small and integrated. But the degree of concentration enjoyed by the twenty or so companies that are vertically integrated is not unusually large by industrial standards."

STEPHEN D. KRASNER
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Politics and the Professors: The Great Society in Perspective *by Henry J. Aaron. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1978. 185 pp. Cloth, $9.95; paper, $3.95.*

In this study Henry J. Aaron reviews the evolution of social thinking and policy during the 1960s and '70s. Focusing on the major domestic policy issues including poverty, discrimination, education, unemployment, and inflation, he seeks to explain the shift from the positivism which underlay the Great Society initiatives to the negativism of the 1970s. Aaron concludes that despite the close correlation between social science and public policy developments during the period, there was little cause and effect relationship, with scholarly thinking lagging behind rather than leading public changes.

The analysis of the poverty debates of the 1960s suggests that they were largely sterile. Aaron contrasts the "vicious cycle of poverty" notion with the reformist view that the poor are a constantly changing rather than a stable group, with poverty a temporary experience for most. He assesses the cultural vs. environmental, or internal vs. external notions of the causes of poverty, indicating that the debate has left very little intellectual residue. The rhetorical excesses of the war on poverty, and the failure of evaluation findings to support these claims, are seen as a major source of public negativism. The inadequacies of the poverty measure—its reliance on absolute rather than relative standards, its exclusion of in-kind income, and its static rather than dynamic perspective—are discussed. Theories of discrimination are then reviewed, particularly the debate between the genetic and environmental schools of thought.

The review of educational development begins by assessing the role of the human capital theory in selling educational programs as a worthwhile public investment. It assesses the Coleman report and its challenge to the notion that investments in schools make a difference. Finally, it turns to a discussion of the causes of inequality and the effectiveness of

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education in achieving equality. Aaron concludes by developing an "eclectic" view of education which blends the elements from competing theories.

Analyzing noneconomic policy developments, *Politics and the Professors* focuses on the debate between the structuralist and aggregate demand schools of economics in the 1960s. The Phillip's curve notion and its refinements are briefly discussed. The secondary labor market notion is contrasted with the neoclassical view of the world.

The final chapter seeks to assess the influence of these debates on public policy, concluding that politics and public values have had more influence than social science in shaping policy.

The analysis synthesizes a massive amount of literature. It is valuable as a guide to the past two decades of social thinking. Unfortunately, it falls short of substantially increasing understanding of the linkages between social science and policy.

First, there is little discussion of the mechanics of how research is generated, how intellectual consensus is reached, or how ideas are surfaced in policy forums. It does not discuss the important role of thinkers who ascend to policy positions.

Second, if policy making is viewed as an iterative and cyclical process, then intellectual developments may be a motive force behind policy initiatives and may serve as both the accelerator and the brake, even though debates are never resolved and cycles continue through time. From this perspective, social scientists may not determine the ultimate truth, but rather respond more quickly than the less informed.

Third, there is no measure of the power of ideas or the consensus of opinion. Aaron suggests neither the criteria used to assess the importance of ideas nor the standards by which the balance of intellectual option is determined. For almost every argument there are countless counterarguments. Because one viewpoint is popular with policy makers, does this mean that it is more correct, more reflective of consensus, or simply most acceptable to the public? This question may be difficult to answer, but it is hardly addressed in *Politics and the Professors*.

Fourth, it is as important to know why certain ideas and issues are *not* debated as why they are. For instance, family status has been largely ignored since the Moynihan thesis in the 1960s. Why does it not receive more attention? Likewise, unemployment figures continue to be used even though it is very clear that low wages and intermittent employment are a more serious and intractable problem. Why are we so reluctant to develop new indicators and why have we waited until the present to focus on the family issue?

Politics and the Professors makes easy and interesting reading, and it is a useful analysis, but it does not penetrate very far or provide a substantially better understanding of how social science can and should influence public policy.

ROBERT TAGGART
U. S. Department of Labor

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Doing Good: The Limits of Benevolence *by Willard Gaylin, Ira Glasser, Steven Marcus, and David Rothman. New York, Pantheon, 1978. 178 pp. $8.95.*

From the eighteenth century onwards, Americans have had a strong sense of the need for explicit constitutional and other protections of their civil liberties. They fought the Revolution in part to remove the abuses of British colonial power over their homes, their speech, their freedom of movement, and their right to due process. Since many Americans felt that even the Constitution did not go far enough, the Bill of Rights was added to protect them against a powerful government. Americans have always had a distrust of unchecked power, a distrust of too much authority even in the hands of their well-meaning fellow citizens.

When business also became powerful in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, new legal safeguards were enacted. And now, beginning in the 1960s and continuing into the present, there is a feeling in many quarters that the professions are too powerful and need to be restrained. This feeling applies not only to lawyers, who consort chiefly with the powerful corporations, but also to all the so-called "helping" and "benevolent" professions, such as doctors, judges of family and juvenile courts, social workers, and custodians of the aged, the poor, the mentally ill, and the dependent weak of every description. While it is granted that these professions proclaim only benevolent intentions for "the good" and "the needs" of the dependent, nonetheless it is seen that here, as everywhere in human life, means may become ends, good intentions sometimes yield bad results, and the basic civil liberties of the dependent are abused in the name of "doing good."

The book under review consists of an interesting set of four essays which address themselves in various ways to what the sub-title calls "the limits of benevolence." David Rothman, professor of history in Columbia and the guiding spirit of this enterprise, tells how the rational and philanthropic spirit and programs of the American progressives have resulted in a wide variety of abuses in the care of children, of the mentally retarded, and of the infirm old who live in nursing homes. Steven Marcus, professor of English in Columbia, has composed a moving document on the unintended evils that resulted for English peasants as a result of the Poor Laws. Ira Glasser, executive director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, speaking out not only against all the abuses of the civil liberties of the dependent but expressing his general disillusionment with the possibility of doing good through social programs in a subsection recommending "The Doctrine of Least Harm," concludes by setting forth three principles and many specific rights for "Liberty in the Welfare State." Finally, Willard Gaylin, psychiatrist and influential moral critic, discusses the origins and functions of dependency in the parent-child relationship and how dependency ought to operate in the larger social system. Dependency is inevitable, he says, and so is caring for the dependent. Like his colleagues, he would not like us to give up on caring for the socially dependent but only to make that caring less coercive.

This continually stimulating book can be read at two different levels. At the more concrete level, it can be read as an indictment of the abuse of power by a new set of powerful professions, the helping professions that have emerged in the twentieth century and that take care of the socially dependent. At a more abstract level, it can be read as an analysis of some very general social processes and paradoxes. For example, it can be read as an account of what Glasser calls the "adversarial relationship between power and liberty." Or

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it can be read as an account of what Robert Merton long ago, summing up the similar accounts of many preceding social thinkers, called "the unanticipated consequences of purposive social action." Or, finally, it can be read as an account of the conservatism of all social groups, "conservative" or "liberal," when they are challenged in their fundamental social values and interests. At both levels, the more concrete and the more abstract, this compact and brief book can be read with much moral and intellectual profit.

BERNARD BARBER
Barnard College
Columbia University

The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America *by Daniel J. Kevles. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1978. 489 pp. $15.95.*

In this study Daniel J. Kevles traces the birth, growth, and emergence of big science in the United States from the 1850s to the present. His delineation of the activities and accomplishments of many of the notable physicists of this era, Millikan, Michelson, Hale, Lawrence, Rabi, Oppenheimer, and others, constitutes a most interesting and scholarly treatise on a topic that should be better understood by decision makers in government, industry, and academia as well as by the common citizen whose taxes support a large fraction of such endeavors.

This history of the American scientific community commences post-Civil War with an examination of American institutes of higher learning, government agencies, and private industry. Much familiar ground is covered; the relative obscurity of Willard Gibbs, one of the major innovators in the study of statistical mechanics, hardly noticed at Yale during his lifetime, now revered with a building bearing his name; the persistent and eloquent pleas of Rowland for pure science and elitism: would you prefer "a cloud of mosquitoes, instead of eagles" (p. 43); and Steinmetz's revolutionization of the electrical industry at General Electric through the introduction of alternating current techniques, even though he was a Socialist. *The Physical Review*, the major journal for the reporting of scientific findings is launched at Cornell in the year 1893, and the American Physical Society is founded at Columbia in 1899. It was also the time of the creation of the National Bureau of Standards in 1901 through the efforts of S. W. Stratton, and the establishment of Carnegie Institution in 1902 with a $10 million gift by Andrew Carnegie which at that time equaled Harvard's entire endowment (p. 69).

A major change occurs with the advent of World War I when scientists apply their expertise to the war effort. The success of Millikan and his group in submarine detection (coupled with Thomas A. Edison's failures) signaled the recognition by the military-industrial complex, and ultimately by the lay public, of the utility of pure science. In fact, the detailing of this one episode should be obligatory reading, for it clearly delineates the limitation of the clever trial and error approach to solving problems and the necessity of the fundamental albeit sometimes esoteric approach of pure mathematics and physics. The experiences of the war also enlarged the horizons of physicists who "can never be fully content to return to the old routine of the days before the war" (Dean Woodbridge, p.

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155). This is the beginning of big science which culminates in a repeat performance of this scenario in World War II and its aftermath. In fact, this is one of the most telling points of the book—how history repeats itself with similar arguments, reactions, vis-à-vis science, its importance and support. In World War II the technical endeavors revolved around the development of radar, the proximity fuse, solid fuel rockets and, of course, the bomb. The postwar era gave rise to national laboratories such as Argonne, Berkeley, Brookhaven, Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and others, with the subsequent addition of Livermore, Stanford, and Fermilab. Again recognizing the need for the support of basic research the Office of Naval Research is quickly set up followed by the A.E.C. and finally the N.S.F. with Dr. Kevles chronicling the trials and tribulations of the establishment of these agencies in an excellent and detailed fashion.

The two other major themes which constantly recur are the oscillating attitude of the public toward science, from undue adulation to hostility and secondly, the continuous battle of elitism versus populism in the support and fostering of scientific endeavors. One notes the attitudes in the early 1920s where it stated in the *Saturday Evening Post* "Science is not a thing apart, it is the bedrock of business" (p. 173), the front page newspiece thesis of Einstein's pronouncement; the awe of the public toward the bomb builders—Oppenheimer and Teller—contrasted with in-between periods of animosity exemplified by R. Hutchins who in 1933 stated "the keys which were to open the gates of heaven have let us into a larger but more oppressive prison house. We think those keys were science and the free intelligence of man. They have failed us" (p. 239). This same theme has been reiterated in the 1970s by the conservationists and environmentalists with the same vehemence and feeling of betrayal. How contemporary the comment of Governor Atterby in the 1930s who considered most of pure science useless and who commented that "with a small amount of such brains as are now focussed on the speed with which the neutron penetrates the nucleus of the atom—the cost of the poor man's housing today could be cut in half." The elitism issue was present in the earliest times. It pitted Agassiz (pro) against Joseph Henry (against), it entered the congressional arena concerning federal funding of research, whether on the basis of merit which meant concentrating grants or through a so-called more democratic geographical distribution. This same issue reappears in 1918: Newlands's bill vs. the Smith-Howard bill (pp. 150–51) and even later concerning the bills to set up the A.E.C. (McMahon bill) and N.S.F. (1950).

In this short space it is not possible to expand on all the issues discussed in this work; however, the additional nuggets that make it worthwhile reading are numerous. These include vignettes of the personalities involved in those eventful times: Rabi, Oppenheimer, Lawrence, etc.; the attitudes toward German scientists in the two wars—Landé, Lenard, and Heisenberg; the understanding of the useful symbiotic relationship between experimental and theoretical physicists, the role of minority groups in this field and the personal internal conflicts of physicists vis-à-vis their activities—this being epitomized by the Fermi-Rabi minority annex on the development of thermonuclear weapons (p. 378).

As is evident, I consider this to be an excellent book, well documented (more critically in the early half) and written about a field that is too important to be left to muckrakers or uninformed or uncritical journalists. It is important history and it is hoped that Dr.

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Kevles and other people of similar abilities will go on and explore some of the basic recurring issues that affect science, man, and society.

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The Sponsor: Notes on a Modern Potentate *by Erik Barnouw. New York, Oxford University Press, 1978. 220 pp. $10.00.*

The dust jacket of Erik Barnouw's book shows the television image of a shoot-out with the puppet characters dangling from a dollar sign. The main villain of the piece, the sponsor who controls the dollar sign, is invisible. The picture is an apt illustration of Barnouw's main theme that the television industry is unobstrusively masterminded by big business sponsors, usually multinational corporations, that are primarily interested in making money and benefiting a worldwide military-industrial-political complex. How the television industry gradually and haphazardly fell under the dominance of this evil genie is described in the first part of the book. It is written with the polish and flair which is familiar to readers of Professor Barnouw's many prior works on the history of radio, television, and documentary film broadcasting.

The second part of the book presents a bill of particulars of the evil consequences of business domination. Barnouw charges that television commercials and the affluence depicted in television scenarios lead to a worldwide consumption binge which, in turn, produces wastes which foul the environment and cause cancer and other illnesses, as well as birth defects. Excessive consumption also leads to energy crises which encourage construction of atomic energy plants prone to defects and wastes which threaten the survival of the human species. The pressure to profitably produce goods to satisfy the demands artificially created by television leads to automation which, in turn, causes unemployment and condemns much of the world's population to a life of poverty and misery.

More immediately, television commercials induce people to eat unhealthful foods, consume harmful drugs and cosmetics, smoke excessively, and spend money beyond their means, following a buy-now-pay-later routine. Unavailability of free television time forces candidates for public office to condense their messages into brief commercials which trivialize politics. The high costs of these commercials largely restrict public offices to the wealthy and lay candidates open to the corrupting pressures of financial backers.

Television, as Barnouw describes it, presents a false image of the world in which good guys and bad guys are forever pitted against each other and settle their scores through violence. The minds of the hapless viewers, particularly children, willy-nilly absorb these simplistic, yet exciting, views of the world, even when skepticism enters the picture. Sponsor influences do not only determine what is shown; they also determine what is concealed from the public. To avoid sponsor displeasure, television programmers shun controversial public issues. Prime examples of inadequate coverage are the Vietnam war, the dangers of atomic energy production, and the worldwide influence of multinational

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corporations. In times of crisis, like the Vietnam war, diversionary programs are commonly used to distract public attention and instill a mood which supports government misdeeds. Spy thrillers served that purpose during the Vietnam war. They justified covert warfare, government secrecy, and lying as necessary means to cope with fiendish enemies.

Barnouw sees public television as a potential antidote to bad programming by the commercial channels. Lack of funds has thus far prevented it from exercising that role adequately. Barnouw recommends a guaranteed revenue source, free from congressional whims and private sector pressures, to give public television a chance to fulfill its potential. Cable television, laser beam technology, and satellites are other technical developments which may loosen the stranglehold which sponsors now have on television programming.

Barnouw's story is fascinating and frightening. But, like the television fare which he criticizes so eloquently, it presents a skewed and somewhat superficial picture of reality. It rests on a hypodermic model of audience effects which exaggerates the influence of television by assuming that exposure automatically leads to the intended effect. It blames television for a host of social ills, although these ills plagued society long before the television age and occur in places where television is still a rarity. For instance, the use of harmful cosmetics and drugs to enhance physical beauty and well-being dates back to prehistoric times and continues in areas untouched by electronic communication.

From a scholarly perspective, the book's greatest drawback lies in its failure to come to grips with the problems of program design, given the technical limits of the medium and the desires of the audience. Barnouw tells us very little about the shape which programs might take to become the educational medium for mass publics which he would like to see. He acknowledges that most current sophisticated cultural and informational programs lack mass audience appeal, but gives no clues how this might be changed. He does not even make a good case against the view that television is and ought to be largely a medium of entertainment that offers relief from boredom and tension. His broadsides against the sponsor fail to consider the fact that that potentate's throne is shared by the mass public whose flick of the dial determines what kinds of shows profit-oriented sponsors will offer. Until Barnouw tackles these problems innovatively, his exposé of sponsor power will bear little fruit in the real world of television programming.

DORIS A. GRABER
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Political Ideologies of Organized Labor: The New Deal Era *by Ruth L. Horowitz. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1978. 260 pp. $19.95.*

Labor has long been recognized as a major component of the New Deal coalition, and we normally think of labor as deeply committed to a philosophy of government activism. But the norm of today is not what used to be. To explain the difference and the transition is the main point of this inquiry into labor ideology. The centerpiece of the Horowitz study is the old AFL and its philosophy of "voluntarism." Her purpose is to "correct the

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overly simple idea . . . that organized labor uniformly and insistently clamored for the labor legislation passed during the New Deal . . ." (p. 10). On the contrary, Horowitz insists in her Preface, the leadership of the AFL, representing the largest body of organized labor at this time, "continuously registered unease about administration proposals for protective legislation. . . ."

At the heart of this voluntaristic labor ideology as described by Horowitz was a "set of notions which justified the absolute autonomy of labor organization from external influences and the virtues of obtaining economic gains to sustain labor's strength." With these assumptions adherents held a "negative attitude toward government and legislation . . ." (p. 42). Labor should do for itself and not depend upon government. There were exceptions recognized: child labor laws and laws regulating the use of prison labor and the influx of immigrants. There was even acceptance of a limited measure of political activism, although nonpartisan in nature and usually focused on local officials.

Voluntarism in its time made more sense than first appears. The AFL consisted of craft-based unions that had to survive in the largely hostile world of the pre-New Deal era. With business interests and values dominant, a negative attitude toward government on the part of labor was understandable. Still, it sounds strange to read of AFL president, Samuel Gompers, attacking legislation as tending to "soften the moral fiber of the people . . . there is also a loss of strong, red-blooded, rugged independence and will power . . ." (p. 34).

Whatever justification voluntarism had at one time, AFL leadership was slow to change when the political climate changed in the New Deal era. In successive chapters Horowitz documents the equivocation of AFL leaders confronted by legislation such as the National Recovery Act, the Wagner Act, Social Security, and fair labor standards legislation. She presents a persuasive case that the successful competition of the CIO in gaining new members in mass production industries and in supporting government activism responsive to these workers' desires weakened the hold of voluntarism in the AFL. We are able to follow the emergence of the labor philosophy of social and political activism that was to become dominant from that time onward.

One might wish, however, for a more condensed treatment of voluntarism. The extended treatment of it becomes repetitious and dull. One also wishes the author, a political scientist, had developed the tantalizing tidbits offered on labor's growing political activism in the New Deal era. A positive attitude toward government relates easily to the notion that labor should seek to mobilize its members and allies politically. Nonetheless, Horowitz has done what she set out to do and adds to our understanding of a historic change in labor's ideology.

HARRY HOLLOWAY
University of Oklahoma

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Congress in the American System *by Carl P. Chelf. Chicago, Nelson-Hall, Inc., 1977. 257 pp. Cloth, $13.95; paper, $7.95.*

The contemporary information explosion has included an extensive outburst of writing on Congress. Among the scholarly results have been a few major works whose new data, methods, analysis, concepts, and theory will provide illumination for many years. As studies on the frontier of systematic knowledge, they appropriately have been widely discussed and rigorously scrutinized, for their ambitions and influence are extensive.

The aim of the book reviewed here is more modest, and it should be evaluated accordingly. It is "designed both for the serious student of Congress and for the interested lay observer" and it "emphasizes the human and practical aspects of Congress" (p. vii). Since it is based not on new research but evidently on a distillation of the author's knowledge, the book offers more to high school and college students and the general public than to professional scholars in its general discussions of representation theory, congressional recruitment, internal organization and operations, committees, floor action, congressional relationships with other national political actors, and prescribed reforms.

As a textbook, this volume has some merit. Students in introductory courses would probably find it interesting reading and appreciate its flashes of humor. It provides a generally orthodox restatement of basic information about Congress.

But the book has deficiencies as a basic text on Congress. It is sometimes factually inaccurate, as in stating incorrectly that Sam J. Ervin was succeeded as a committee chairman by Edmund S. Muskie (p. 118). It contains truisms that are pedagogically useful but unimpressive in print. For example: "All things considered, the calibre of the Congress is probably about as good as could be expected" (p. 53). Similarly, the book is repetitive, telling the reader twice that one must be elected in order to be a statesman (pp. 5, 20), that Congress is no longer fun for many members (pp. 33, 52), and that the president speaks with one voice but the Congress with many (pp. 205, 215).

More important are some of the book's disturbing implications. It contains some questionable assertions with little or no supporting evidence. Among them: "Congress is dominated by a few powerful individuals, most of whom represent rural districts" (p. 16). Is Congress dominated? If so, by whom? Is their orientation rural? "Prospective appointees to high level federal positions are examined carefully in Congress and expected to make full and complete disclosures of all outside investments and financial interests" (p. 83). Is Bert Lance an example? "The old are legislating more and more for the young; the average age in the United States is under thirty while the average age of committee chairmen is sixty" (p. 114). Should children run for Congress to make it more representative? "Congress has been inclined to passively watch its power of the purse wither on the vine" (p. 210). How then did it pass the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act?

Throughout the book is a kind of time warp, with jumps from one era to another—from the first Congress in 1789 to the revolt against the Speaker in 1911 (p. 151), among the "recent cases" of Thomas Dodd, Joseph McCarthy, and Adam Powell (p. 83), from a generalization about how present committee chairmen operate to an anecdote about the Rules Committee chairmanship of Adolph Sabath (p. 108), who died in 1952. This suggests an underlying assumption that congressional processes are eternal and unchanging. From Capitol Hill, it doesn't always look that way. Indeed, with all the recent discussion

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of "congressional reassertion," there may be excessive focus on change. In any case, there should be a distinction between patterns that can shift and those that endure.*

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** The opinions expressed in this review are those of the reviewer and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Library of Congress.*

American Democratic Theory: Pluralism and Its Critics *by William Alton Kelso. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1978. 288 pp. $18.95.*

As conducted by the pluralists, the debate on pluralism is endless, moving in a circle, never advancing toward an examination of the policies, institutions, actual outputs, and imperatives of the corporate politicoeconomic system itself. This book is no exception.

The author faults the critics of pluralism for treating the "doctrine" as having only one form, *viz.*, the "laissez-faire pluralism" of writers like Dahl and Truman, consisting of private interest groups bargaining and checking each other in a self-regulating system. But supposedly there are two other forms: "corporate pluralism" which actually turns out to be a critique of the laissez-faire variety, developed by Lowi and McConnell who describe a polity fragmented into autonomous, unaccountable fiefs, and "public pluralism" a prescriptive model which rejects the assumptions of a self-regulating system and calls for the executive branch to regulate the give-and-take of interest groups from the top down while strengthening "marginal" interests from the bottom up.

If these latter two forms have not been treated by critics it is because the first (Lowi, McConnell) is *itself* a criticism of pluralism and the second is the author's personal creation now offered to us for the first time.

Kelso's prescription of "public pluralism" is not entirely novel, for what administration since the New Deal or certainly since the Great Society has not asserted its intention to regulate the haves and bring the have-nots into the game? His unexamined assumption is that the government *can* act independently of the systemic needs of the capitalist political economy, and that with the right intentions and leaders, public pluralist regulation can bring about the reforms most needed by the unorganized public and especially by its more exploited and oppressed elements. But it is this very assumption that has been opened to critical examination by critics such as Miliband, Domhoff, Bay, Kettler, Nichols, Petras, and many others whose writings receive no mention in this book.

Kelso dismisses the Marxist critique of pluralism, to the extent that he even recognizes it to exist, with a gratuitous stereotyped reference to unnamed "die-hard Marxists" (p. 64) who "are likely to argue" that institutional arrangements have no effect on resource allocations. I know of no Marxist including Marx himself who argues that. What Marxists *do* say is that one cannot develop a meaningful theoretical assessment of how and why resources are allocated without taking into account the actual distribution of wealth, the structured realities of class power and interest, and those systemic mechanisms and

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imperatives of the political economy that extend beyond particular institutional arrangements—which is not to say that the institutional arrangements have no effect.

Kelso compares pluralism with three other democratic models: polyarchy or government by competing elites; populism or rule by the majority, which turns out in his treatment to be rule by referendum; and participatory democracy or direct citizen involvement. He finds that public pluralism—his "normative model"—has a better promise of achievement (where?) than these three. And again, he comes to these conclusions without any examination of who actually gets what, when, and how.

Like most pluralists, he manifests the same fear of excessive advocacy and "unmediated" mass participation, and the same faith that something called "mediating" or "bargaining" (bargaining with what resources? in what context? for what purposes?) will provide the best method of policy making ("best" according to what interests?).

While Kelso says his advocacy of pluralism is a normative defense, he never really accomplishes that task because he fails to confront the questions of social justice, equality, and policy output which are the inescapable considerations of any normative evaluation of the political system. Ultimately my complaint is not that the pluralists fail to adopt explicitly normative stances (their value preferences and normative prejudices are, in any case, fairly well known), but that injected into their work are *implicit* normative positions which they themselves do not recognize when making claims for their supposedly nonnormative, value-free science. Like other pluralists, Kelso often parades his normative proclivities as if they were empirical assumptions. One can only wish he were as demanding of "proof" for the notions he agrees with as he is for the ones he disagrees with.

MICHAEL PARENTI
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Two Cheers for Capitalism *by Irving Kristol. New York, Basic Books, 1978. 274 pp. $10.00.*

Few collections of miscellaneous essays make good books. Irving Kristol's collage of thirty *Wall Street Journal* columns, four longer pieces from *The Public Interest* of which he is co-editor and co-founder, a *Commentary* article, and an item in *Imprimus* suffers glaringly from the characteristic defects of transmuted journalism. The first is repetition. With only small variations, Kristol's cast of villains—environmentalists, social welfare theorists, New Leftists, and economic planners—appear essay after essay, undermining the Republic in predictable ways. A second journalistic failing is caricature of opposing positions. According to Kristol, Galbraith wants to substitute his own preferences for those of the public. A fairer representation of Galbraith's position might have said that Galbraith wants to check commercial and advertising distortions of consumer preferences. Kristol describes McGovern's demogrant as $1,000 for everybody. In fact McGovern favored, however clumsily he expressed himself, a simple negative income tax which would have returned to the Treasury some or all of the demogrant received by the majority of Americans. All environmentalists are tagged with the excesses of a small minority. And so on. Finally, there is the matter, as Gunnar Myrdal said of John Maynard

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Keynes, of unnecessary originality. The rubric which comprehends all of Kristol's antagonists is the New Class "of those college-educated people whose skills and vocations proliferate in a 'post-industrial society' . . ." (p. 27). These "scientists, teachers and educational administrators, journalists and others in the communication industries, psychologists, social workers, those lawyers and doctors who make their careers in the expanding public sector, city planners, the staffs of the larger foundations, the upper levels of the government bureaucracy and so on" are not only "numerous" (p. 27). They are also "indispensable," "disproportionately powerful," "ambitious," and "frustrated" (p. 28). Where have we heard this before? Of course: in Schumpeter's *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, published in 1942. Schumpeter nowhere appears in this collection.

Still, even if an idea is borrowed without the courtesy of attribution, the harm done is slight, provided only that the idea remains plausible and powerful. Let us see. Since according to Kristol what the New Class wants above all is power and status, its members should be located increasingly on the political left. Kristol does his best to present himself as a member of a beleaguered minority of intellectual conservatives. The contemporary evidence unfortunately points in precisely the opposite direction. Economists of the Keynesian stripe whom Kristol darkly suspects of closet socialism have been drifting rightward. Charles Schultze's Harvard Godkin lectures of a year ago were a reaffirmation of the importance and efficiency of private markets. The American Enterprise Institute and the Hoover Institution are supporting increasing quantities of conservative scholarship. New conservative periodicals like Georgetown's *Review of Strategic and International Studies* join established neoconservative journals like *Commentary* and *The Public Interest*. My impression is that conservatives, old or neo, are faring much better in the competition for scarce academic positions than either radicals or liberals. In a conservative country, it is not astounding that conservative ideology is enjoying a boom. Kristol to the contrary notwithstanding, a conservative member of the New Class can reap rich rewards in status, influence upon politicians, peer approval, and, possibly not least, foundation grants and fees from lectures to business audiences. I wish Kristol were correct in his assessment of the so-called New Class. I much fear that he is dead wrong.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN
Lehman College

The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions

by William Julius Wilson. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1978. 204 pp. $12.50.

The thesis of this book is stated simply in the opening sentence: "Race relations in America have undergone fundamental changes in recent years, so much so that now the life chances of individual blacks have more to do with their economic class position than with their day-to-day encounters with whites."

There is good news here—for upper class blacks, that is. The civil rights revolution, and the rapid expansion of white-collar jobs in business and government, have opened to "talented and educated" blacks job opportunities "at least comparable to those of whites

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wth equivalent qualifications" (p. 151). The proportion of black workers in low-paying service, unskilled labor, and farm jobs shrank from 80 percent in 1940 to 36 percent in 1970. Corporate recruiters visited predominantly black colleges sixty times more often in 1970 than ten years earlier.

But there the good news ends. Income distribution among blacks is more unequal than among whites, and class differences appear to be widening. For an underclass that, while two-thirds white, includes one-third of the country's black population, Professor Wilson finds no gains, and his data (on broken homes, for instance) suggest a continuing worsening of status. His argument that the disproportionate black share of poverty is due not primarily to current racism but to "the historical consequences of racial oppression" (p. 154) will be of theoretical interest to academics, but will bring little solace to individual blacks trapped in deteriorating cities, confined to segregated housing and inferior schools, and victimized by crime.

In one of the most illuminating sections of the book (pp. 104–09), the author portrays the vicious circles of the ghetto economy. The only jobs available to the poorly educated, unskilled underclass are menial, low-paying, and often intermittent. But poor blacks have been caught up in the "revolution of rising expectations" like everybody else and, in addition, "have internalized the values emanating from the civil rights and black protest movements, values which promote black pride" (p. 108). Hence they view low-status jobs with disdain. Hence absenteeism, tardiness, and high turnover rates. And there are alternatives to regular work, like illegal activities and welfare. Employers complain that blacks prefer welfare to accepting work, yet it is because of the very value that poor blacks—like other groups—attach to work and economic advancement that unemployment and dead-end menial jobs lead to destruction of self-respect.

Having identified the employment problems of ghetto blacks as arising more from class than from race, the author's logic leads him at the end to call for a broad attack on inequality as it affects all races, for a national confrontation with "the pervasive and destructive features of class subordination" (p. 154).

This book presents no new data, but it skillfully weaves together the research findings of others from many disciplines. It effectively debunks the overoptimism of recent writings that have not looked beyond the aggregate statistics of black progress. It offers no solutions, but its theoretical analysis, presented in historical depth, at least points the search for solutions in the right direction. The writing is repetitive, and not without error. On p. 138, the author ascribes the initiation of the "War on Poverty" (which was declared in January 1964) in part to "the ghetto revolts of the late 1960s" (which did not begin until the summer of 1964). And some figures are badly garbled on p. 67.

For those who seek a realistic, restrained, and balanced presentation of the status and prospects of blacks in America, this little volume will admirably serve the purpose.

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Research to Answer What Blacks Ought to Have *by Warren M. Banner. Philadelphia and Ardmore, Dorrance & Company, 1977. 126 pp. $5.95.*

This volume's title suggests a rigorous, critical, normative, and empirical inquiry into the interests and goods of black people, but it turns out to be rather pretentious and, perhaps, even vacuous. Banner promises us "profound research" (p. 9) presented in "simple language . . . to make it easy to read by the average person" (p. viii). Unfortunately, there is little in this book to attract the attention of the scholarly community, and one doubts whether it will be of much interest to the general public.

This book is marked by the commonplace and the anecdote. Banner informs us that "research is first and foremost a disciplined approach in the search for facts [as if facts were entities amenable to search]—and facts, as such, must stand the test of being true in a given time [obviously], or . . . they are not facts" (p. 10). "Facts stand for the period they cover, and until data not available at that time are found. Knowledge unfolds as man grows" (p. 108). I doubt that anyone would dispute these statements, but when he goes on to state that ". . . although there may be differences of opinion regarding the interpretation of the data in a report, *there can be no question about the facts*" (p. 110; my italics). Banner falls victim to the common error of fusing fact and certainty, failing to appreciate the logical and empirical significance of the synthetic nature of the former and the analytic quality of the latter. Finally, "the aim or intent of a research proposal should be clearly stated, readily understood, and never in doubt or fuzzy . . . [The] aim, scope, and procedure of the research should be clear. . . . The bare facts may seem indicative of the truth but may not tell the full story. . . . Regardless of the situation or group under observation, the socioeconomic researcher will employ basically the same method of inquiry used by other scientists; that is, he will determine and define the problem to be considered, outline the procedure and make preliminary tests to determine its applicability . . . compile and analyze the data gathered, prepare the summary, draw conclusions, and make recommendations" (pp. 33, 52, 78, 106). All of this is, of course, well known to anyone with the barest acquaintance with research activity.

Banner believes that "research in the economic aspects of race relations is scientific" (p. 34). But precisely what is it about such research that makes it scientific? Banner is distressingly silent on this question. He simply appropriates the favorable emotive meaning of the term *scientific*, and proceeds to present several familiar points under its cover. For example, he informs us that during the era of slavery many whites, and even some blacks, subscribed to the stereotype of blacks as lazy, fun-loving breeders; that blacks of integrity are more likely to be sensitive to the interests of black people than "those who consider themselves the majority of the population" (p. 16); that the trust and confidence of the members of a community being studied are crucial to the quality of the data that researchers in the field will obtain. All of this simply acquaints us with the familiar, and one searches in vain for the "scientific" in the discussion accompanying each point.

Banner is concerned with research to answer the question what blacks ought to have. But what ought blacks to have? This question cannot be answered satisfactorily unless one confronts certain tough moral and ethical problems concerning human nature and the rules that ground the social institutions which order our daily lives. Banner sets aside this difficulty on the grounds that he is concerned with scientific research pertaining to

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the black community—failing to appreciate fully the significance of the normative anchor of all scientific inquiry.

It is not the purpose of this review to discuss the nature of scientific inquiry, but, at a minimum, one should be able to demarcate and isolate the fundamental axiomatic assumptions as well as the hypotheses grounded in them, the techniques of data acquisition and organization, the methods of their analysis and/or synthesis, and the criteria of relevance applied in making judgments based on the hypotheses and data in research that is truly scientific. One would, however, obtain only very modest results if one were to expend energy scrutinizing Banner's work for these elements of scientific inquiry.

The high point of this volume is its autobiographical anecdotes and homilies. These are not without value, for they provide useful insights concerning the difficulties and problems that one is likely to encounter in doing research in the black community. They do, for example, serve to illustrate how the suspicions, distrust, and skepticism that one often encounters in field work may be ameliorated, if not eliminated. And this may well constitute a sufficient reason to recommend the reading of this book, especially to researchers doing, or contemplating, field work in the black community.

In sum, Banner's work does not live up to the promise of its lofty title. If accurate diagnosis, correct prescription, and concerted action are essential to the improvement of the lot of black people in this society, Banner has little to offer us. We should all be well served if we were to really familiarize ourselves with the diagnoses of the *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*—a decade after its initial publication—and proceed to take the concerted actions necessary to implement its prescriptions.

WINSTON VAN HORNE
Ohio University

The Ungovernable City: The Politics of Urban Problems and Policy Making *by Douglas Yates. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1977. 219 pp. $15.00.*

In this study the author offers his explanation for the failure of central city governments to manage and solve their most pressing problems. His focus is on the administrative and bureaucratic aspects of local government. The thesis of the book is that the functions of urban governments are unique and distinctive within the American political system. Bureaucratic politics lies at the heart of urban governance. Local governments, unlike the policy-making systems at the other levels of government, are primarily involved with the delivery of services; the delivery of direct services as police, fire, education, and sanitation. The consequence of the city's unique function leads, in the author's words, to "street-fighting pluralism" (p. 33) or "the extreme pluralism of urban politics" (p. xiii). The mayor and his administrators are unable to effectively control day-to-day interactions at the street level; at the same time, they lack the authority and resources needed for implementing coherent policies and programs.

The author's argument is well-developed. He first analyzes the distinctive characteristics of urban governance and persuasively distinguishes local-level functions and prob-

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lems from those dominating the agenda at the federal and state levels. He next reviews the historical development of the urban service delivery system, concluding that "a city hall-dominated approach to policy making and management" (p. 177) has become dysfunctional. During the machine era, urban governments undertook the technologically easier task of constructing the city's physical plant and managed social problems through the personalized services of the political party. Local governments today are much more heavily involved in intractable social problems while confronting collective demands for improved and more equitable distribution of services. Subsequent chapters focus on the policy-making process as viewed from the vantage point of the mayor. They stress City Hall's inability to control either its own agenda or the decision-making process. (The latter is an excellent refutation of Norton Long's "ecology of games" framework, arguing that the local policy-making system is far more unstructured, polarized, irrational, and dysfunctional). The author's prescription follows from his analysis, namely, the devolution of mayoral responsibility. "Services with a strong neighborhood impact (like police, fire, and education) are obvious candidates for decentralized administration. Problems that are inherently resource problems or ones that involve major equity issues (transportation, housing, welfare, and educational financing) are obvious candidates for delegation to higher-level government" (p. 192).

The Ungovernable City is an important book for urbanists. Its significance derives from the cogency of the analysis and its bureaucratic focus. Yates's argument is persuasive, as he marshals his data and organizes it in support of his point of view. More importantly, the focus of the book on the administrative aspects of urban governance, particularly at the street level, is particularly noteworthy. It joins other recent studies which stress the autonomy of the front-line bureaucrat, with its attendant consequences. It supports the concerns of many urbanists, who have been critical of the growing centrifugal forces in local political systems. However, it then diverges from the conclusion of most of these analysts by stressing that the mayor's office cannot serve as the centralizing linchpin. According to Yates, the current failure of mayoral leadership stems from structural factors for which we have no remedy.

Unfortunately, Yates does not sufficiently address the issue of the utility of his theoretical perspective in understanding the urban malaise. Yates uses a bureaucratic perspective and argues that administrative relationships and policy-making processes lie at the core of the central cities' difficulties. He writes that the primary purpose of the book is to develop "an argument about what is wrong with the city and about what might be done to alleviate urban policy problems" (p. xi).

However, he never defines and defends his perception of the core policy problems of the city and how their solution relates to administrative structures and processes. There have been many other approaches used by urbanists in attempting to explain and solve the city's problems. To compare Yates's perspective with competing approaches, we must first understand his causal or theoretical model. By failing to delineate "what is wrong with the city," he leaves the reader without criteria for evaluating his perspective. Yates's focus on the policy-making process provides his readers with many significant insights. However, as a result of his failure to explicate the relationship between the core problems

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of the central city and its administration, the import of the study is primarily at a descriptive rather than a theoretical level.

STEPHEN DAVID
Fordham University

Police Work: The Social Organization of Policing *by Peter K. Manning. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1977. 418 pp. $19.95.*

Especially during the past decade, what police do or should do has stimulated considerable interest and commentary. Comparatively less attention has focused on what police symbolize. This is a curious omission given the potent symbols which police uniforms, badges, and rituals connote and an important oversight given the general observations by Erving Goffman, Murray Edelman, and others that images and symbols are often more significant than the particular actions from which they arise.

Influenced by these precepts, Peter K. Manning, professor of sociology and psychiatry at Michigan State University, has written *Police Work: The Social Organization of Policing*, an analysis of the symbolic elements in policing. According to Manning, the police symbolize, among other things, "the presence of the civil body politic in everyday life" (p. 4), the maintenance of the status quo, and the capacity to deter acts against the public order.

Consistent with these images, police have resorted to "dramatic management of the appearance of effectiveness" (p. 20) to persuade the public of their worth. Among the strategies are a "rhetoric of professionalism" and an emphasis on rational and efficient bureaucratic organization relying on sophisticated technology and omnipresent statistics.

Manning argues that the reality of police work contradicts the public image. Instead of a rational legal system, policing is based on "situationally justified action" (p. 140). And contrary to police administrative theory, the street level of policing does not reflect the policies of top administrators, and information about what really happens on the street does not reach those administrators. More fundamentally, Manning accuses the police of propagating the myth that their main task is crime control, thereby misleading the public about the true nature of police work, much of it oriented to handling family disputes, accidents, and noisy neighbors. Not only does stress on crime control raise public expectations which the police cannot hope to meet, it generates ambivalence among police officers who feel they are not doing real police work. Furthermore, it causes the police to misallocate their resources.

The research base for this book is not entirely clear. On the one hand, the book jacket and Chapter One claim the book is "based upon extensive fieldwork" (p. 20) in England and the United States, but the preface says more modestly that the "primary source of data" was a "brief but highly informative period of time riding with, talking to, and learning from a group of policemen in a subdivision of the London Metropolitan Police" (p. xiv). Although the descriptions of policing in this section of London are interesting, they add little that is new to the body of knowledge on the police. Clearly, Manning has explored this literature thoroughly, but it is his interpretations, not his original research, which are important.

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And it must be the interpretations not the style on which the book stands unless the reader relishes things "ineluctable" and "dramaturgical." Or sentences such as "Police work can be conceptualized as the actual distribution of police energy in the form of time allocated to given tasks . . ." (p. 14).

Manning's analysis of the symbolic aspects of policing is a contribution to understanding the police role. But he sometimes paints with a rather broad brush. If many departments revel in fancy new equipment and manipulate statistics, there are others which stress the human service functions of the police and train and deploy accordingly. While properly skeptical of the claims of police professionalism, the book ignores the impact of a new generation of police chiefs and police recruits and does not consider the possible effects of the trend toward requiring college education. Reflecting this tone, the book flatly and uncritically reports a ten-year-old reference that to become a detective in New York City an officer "must shoot someone" (p. 156).

American policing has not reached the millennium. Large segments of it do deceive the public and themselves, but the images and strategies of American police, not to mention the British, are far more complex and dynamic than suggested here.

JAMES P. GIFFORD
University of Santa Clara

The Quest for Justice: The Politics of School Finance Reform *by Richard Lehne. New York, Longman, 1978. 246 pp. Cloth, $11.95; paper, $4.95.*

In this excellent case study of the politics of school finance reform in New Jersey, the author has presented us with a rare achievement, a book that is at once highly useful for the general reader and very valuable for the advanced analyst of state and local government. *The Quest for Justice* is based upon ninety interviews with participants in the struggle for school finance reform, opinion surveys done by the New Jersey Poll at Rutgers University, additional polling of involved interest groups (appendices A and B), and extensive secondary research. Bringing to bear a developed understanding of two complex areas of policy (education and finance), Professor Lehne displays a subtle feel for the political process as he illustrates how the major political actors and institutions in New Jersey sought to restructure educational finance and, in doing so, challenge some fundamental premises of politics in that state.

In February 1970, when the first complaint in *Robinson* v. *Cahill* was filed, litigation in this area seemed a quixotic enterprise. Arising out of the exigencies of Jersey City politics, the case seemed more a symbolic challenge to the inequities of basing educational finance on the local property tax than a realistic attempt at change. At first encouraged by events in California and then dismayed by the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the *Rodriguez* case, Harold Ruvolt, the young attorney who represented Jersey City, was finally vindicated when the state Supreme Court found support for his view in the educational clause of the state constitution.

A long struggle ensued over the means to implement the court's opinion that it was a state responsibility to guarantee a "thorough and efficient" educational system in each lo-

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cal New Jersey school district. Matters were complicated when, in the midst of the fight, the chief justice and much of the membership of the state high court changed, the incumbent governor was defeated, and a new legislature was elected. Even after an educational plan was developed, there was bitter resistance in the State Senate to its financing through a newly imposed income tax. Several court imposed deadlines passed; only after the Supreme Court actually closed all the schools in the state, on July 1, 1976, did enough pressure build so that the tax package could be passed.

The major theoretical contribution of *The Quest for Justice* is in its conceptualization of the role of litigation in the political process. Most political scientists have looked at the courts as another political arena, a place where issues are resolved. Drawing upon recent work by Roger Cobb and others, Lehne points out that, in fact, the courts often set the agenda for the political branches. In this case, for example, judicial participation "made the issue persistent, ambiguous, immediate, visible, legitimate, and intrusive" (p. 207). Perhaps most crucially, agenda setting through litigation denies governors and legislators the control of timing, the ability to delay dealing with a hot issue that they do not wish to face. Interesting too is the insight that an agenda setting role allows courts to be activist, to force change, while still leaving the content of policy to the governor and the legislature.

In most states, efforts to reform school finance through litigation still continue. For the participants in those efforts, as well as for students and citizens who will be affected by their outcome, Lehne's well-written analysis of the New Jersey experience should be required reading. It is a first-rate book.

GERALD BENJAMIN
State University of New York at New Paltz

The Builders: Houses, People, Neighborhoods, Governments, Money *by Martin Mayer. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1978. 468 pp. $15.00.*

Housing is one of America's most important but least understood industries. All families are affected by its capabilities, yet few are aware of the complex institutional relationships that determine what it produces. In fact, the term "industry" gives too structured an impression of the fragmented reality; for decision making is scattered among a wide variety of institutions, large and small, national and local, public and private. Each brings to the building process a different perspective, a different expertise, and a different set of demands. In the end, it is the consumer who decides among, and pays for, the resultant structures. Since the end of World War II the average consumer has enjoyed an ever rising standard of housing. The recent inflationary spiral in housing costs, however, has resulted in structures of dwindling standards at much higher prices.

It is timely, therefore, for the publication of a book which examines the housing industry in depth. In *The Builders,* Martin Mayer provides a broad survey of the industry and attempts to clarify its present state. He also offers policy suggestions. As he did in his previous books on major institutions (for example, *The Lawyers, The Bankers),* Mayer aims

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his writing at a wide audience. He skillfully avoids the use of technical terms and presents his material in a colorful and anecdotal style.

Mayer begins with a wide-ranging history of the nation's considerable housing accomplishments. He then describes our present urban pattern ("The Exploded Metropolis"). Successful and unsuccessful examples of housing development are highlighted, in order to demonstrate how the public and private sectors interact. The author cites many classic housing studies and quotes a number of leading builders and experts. Next, Mayer turns to a detailed explanation of the ways that builders construct and promote housing. In his final section, the author assesses federal housing subsidies and finds them wanting. His view is that "housing poverty as we have known it in the past two hundred years is in fact scarce in America. The government programs that have *really* improved the housing of the lower half of the income distribution are not the subsidy programs but the unsubsidized mortgage-insurance and mortgage-guarantee programs" (p. 420). He concludes that subsidies should be redefined to reduce their inflationary effect. Several methods are suggested to do this; if they are utilized, Mayer predicts that ". . . the great beast of the marketplace will bestir itself to produce for the large majority of the residents of a rich country" (p. 430).

These opinions are shared by a number of housing experts; just as many disagree, though. All share an uneasiness about the cost and effectiveness of housing subsidies, but there is no consensus on a better approach. Mayer's recommended approach does not provide new breakthroughs, and its workability is questionable.

The book's strongest chapters are those devoted to housing rehabilitation, public housing, private rental housing, and housing finance. Each of these covers both the broad issues and the technical matters of concern. Many of the other chapters are entertainingly presented but lack the same clear organization and logical sequence. They touch on various aspects of their subjects, yet do not establish a firm enough basis for the conclusions that follow. Also, the discussions of construction techniques seem too detailed, while there is not enough on the basics of private housing markets. That information would help readers to understand better Mayer's final observations on how public subsidies affect the market. With these qualifications, *The Builders* furnishes a popular and factual introduction to the housing field.

ROBERT W. PONTE
Princeton University

Councils of Government: A Study of Political Incrementalism *by Nelson Wikstrom. Chicago, Nelson-Hall Inc., 1977. 173 pp. $11.95.*

Professor Wikstrom's book is a reform-oriented study that extols the virtues of COGs. He argues that the one-government approach for metropolitan areas is no longer a politically feasible method of reorganization. He also contends that the decentralized local government system of most metropolitan areas does not necessarily lead to urban problems. Against this backdrop of government organization, Professor Wikstrom advances

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his thesis that rigorous structural reform is neither needed nor desired since COGs provide an ideal, responsible, democratic mechanism for program coordination, policy direction, and management in the metropolis.

This volume deals primarily with the initiation and proliferation phase of COGs, indicating that from a handful in the late 1950s COGs have multiplied to about 450 currently. Professor Wikstrom indicates there is no single reason for this proliferation, but suggests that both local political factors in the form of local government officials desiring a forum within which to discuss regional issues and extra regional factors, primarily evidenced by federal grant programs, were the stimulating factors.

This book focuses primarily upon ten COGs for most of the generalizations from a national perspective concerning COG attributes. Interview data collected in 1966–67 in Hartford, New Haven, and Norwich-New London, Connecticut constitute the base for assessing local support and opposition. All the information on COG formation, activities, and functional concerns is descriptive. Most of the information appears to have come from either COG pamphlets and reports, or the files of The National Association of Regional Councils. As one might expect, this information offers little grist for a balanced analytical assessment of either the dynamics of COG decision making or the policies pursued.

The book would have been noticeably strengthened if Professor Wikstrom had supplemented his general comments concerning "all" COGs with an in-depth analysis of a single COG. By focusing upon a large and dynamic organization such as WASH-COG in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, many of the interesting questions about the creation and workings of COGs could have been raised within a real working organization. As it now stands, the general observations offered do not really apply to any of the 450 COGs, but stand as an "average" assessment of one observer. For example, Wikstrom concludes that the "A-95 review process has not worked perfectly, given the often consensual nature of council bodies and their dependence on their member units. We can hardly expect that this process will be carried out significantly better in the future. Nevertheless, the A-95 process has engendered greater regional coordination and made local governments more conscious of regional considerations and needs." Interesting. However, there is no documentation to support this observation. There are many observations in this book which are not supported by any evidence save Professor Wikstrom's that there is value in COGs if for no other reason than that they are the only politically feasible local government reform that currently exists.

Make no mistake, Professor Wikstrom is a strong advocate of COGs. He concludes by indicating that councils of government over the past twenty years have collectively, and in most instances, individually demonstrated their utility and value. What is needed now is the systematic testing of this conclusion.

VINCENT L. MARANDO
The University of Maryland

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At the Grass Roots in the Garden State: Reform and Regular Democrats in New Jersey *by Vicki Granet Semel. Cranbury, N.J., Associated University Press, 1978. 287 pp. $18.50.*

At the outset note that this title is somewhat misleading; the book has relatively little to say about low-level political activity in New Jersey. Rather it is a study of two sets of Democratic party committee members, half of them being members of the "New Democratic Coalition" and the other half being "Regulars." More particularly it is a study based upon a long questionnaire with responses from about 1,300 party workers. The sixty-two items in the survey took in a broad range of potentially informative aspects of the political motivations, careers, and the social status and especially the attitudes of respondents.

My early reaction to the book was that it represented another instance of the publication of a too-little-revised dissertation. The book conforms to the standard format for dissertations: "setting the problem," "surveying the literature," "hypotheses to be tested," and so on. The development of the dissertation was as predictable as the style a traditional poet would follow in writing a sonnet.

Alas, the second impression of the book was equally dreary. The author has committed so many writing errors that one wonders about the editorial staff of the publishing house responsible for the book. It is peppered with the kinds of errors one chastises one's undergraduate students for making. (For example, "Much of their activities . . ." p. 55; "these groups found politics and politicians a rather disreputable bunch . . ." p. 116; "Much of this quagmire exists over the various meanings researchers have employed . . ." p. 188.) Words are misused, awkward sentences and muddy passages that resist interpretation come with numbing regularity. (I am tempted to suggest that readers might do well to ignore the prose entirely and read the three dozen tables closely.)

Despite its faults the book began to look better about halfway through my reading of it. Once one got by the expected kinds of fully expected differences between the two groups, more interesting observations followed. Thus, one is not surprised to discover that reform Democrats were more liberally oriented than Regulars. And the occupational and status differences are also predictable; reformers were on the higher rungs; regulars tended to be on the lower ones. More interestingly, however, Ms. Semel found that her reformers did not fit the patterns that James Q. Wilson discerned in his *Amateur Democrat.* Where Wilson found his amateurs to be "Morning Glories" (in the inimitable language of the colorful George Washington Plunkitt) that bloomed briefly and soon faded away, Semel found that her reformers were in politics for the long haul. They were also ready to compromise for worthwhile political objectives.

Moreover, the author concludes that the political attitudes found in this large sample suggest that the "end of ideology" is not upon us; nor do those attitudes suggest that we have the kind of consensus politics that interest group liberalism supposedly involves. Instead she perceives an issue-oriented politics based on class distinctions. She finds evidence to suggest we face conflicts now that are the product not of abundance but of scarcity in economic resources. In some respects her conclusions resemble those of V. O. Key in his posthumously published book, *The Responsible Electorate.*

It may be that the date of her survey (1970) exaggerated the concern with issues because of the polarization of politics owing to the Vietnam war, but whatever the timing

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of her evidence there are interesting inferences here about reform politics that challenge a number of accepted "truths" about reform.

DUANE LOCKARD
Princeton University

Crisis on the Left: Cold War Politics and American Liberals, 1947–1954 *by Mary Sperling McAuliffe. Amherst, Mass., The University of Massachusetts Press, 1978. 204 pp. $12.50.*

Professor Mary McAuliffe has achieved the improbable feat of writing a book on American liberalism from 1947 to 1954 which told me absolutely nothing I didn't know already. This, however, is not evidence of my omniscience, but of her triviality. Her thesis is familiar: the advent of the cold war led to a split in liberal ranks over the issue of communism, and the anticommunists provided, as a Marxist would put it, "objective" support for the right-wing forces. In her words, "one of the major ironies of the period was the unexpected role which liberals played, first in constructing a new liberalism which rejected the American left, and then in accepting some of the basic assumptions and tactics of the Red Scare itself" (p. 147).

Let me put my cards on the table: as one of the founders of Americans for Democratic Action (later national chairman), a leader in the anti-Stalinist caucus in the American Veterans Committee, a militant opponent of Henry Wallace's 1948 presidential candidacy, and a strong supporter of booting the Stalinist unions out of the C.I.O., I may qualify as the paradigmatic cold war liberal McAuliffe has in her cross-hairs. On the other hand, her meticulous refusal to cite my public statements is interesting precisely because they completely skew her sample.

I confess as I read this work I could not help chuckling: she has unerringly oversimplified a number of the most complex moral and political issues imaginable. It was rather like a tone-deaf critic's review of Béla Bartók. There was an intriguing network of personal relationships reaching back into the 1920s and '30s which, to take but one example, played a vital role in Roger Baldwin's conversion from the prince of popular fronters to the scourge of Stalinists in the American Civil Liberties Union. Lucille Milner's woebegone *Education of an American Liberal* hinted at this personality factor, but revealed only the tip of the iceberg.

Probably Professor McAuliffe's biggest problem is her definition of her categories. Whenever she says "popular front liberal," for instance, one must substitute "Stalinist" or "fellow traveler." Similarly she is incapable of differentiating left from East: a "left wing industrial union council" should therefore be translated as a "Stalinist dominated" body. I. F. Stone and Corliss Lamont were not "independent radicals"; to me they were dedicated apologists for Soviet totalitarianism.

Although there were a number of noncommunists in it, Wallace's Progressive party was a Stalinist creation. Wallace, as he later admitted, didn't quite know what was going on, but the party had an ideological governess (Lew Frank) watching him day and night. If McAuliffe had traced the history of the "Macedonian resolution" at the Wallace Con-

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vention, she might have got a clue. Approved unanimously by the Platform Committee, it called for Macedonian autonomy. Lee Pressman, who had been out of the room when this action took place, spotted it immediately as a Titoist provocation and, without further discussion, simply deleted it from the committee's recommendations to the floor!

Space inhibits further exploration of her categorical chaos, but what of the charge that cold war liberals gave aid and comfort to the McCarthyites? Alas, there is some truth in it, but I doubt if McAuliffe grasps the nuances. To maintain, as we in the American Veterans Committee, the A.D.A., and A.C.L.U. did, that membership was barred to totalitarians was not to urge that fascists, Stalinists, Trotskyists, or Ku Kluxers be shot at sunrise. As private organizations we had as much right to bar characters who rejected our fundamental principles as, say, the Catholic Church has to deny communion to Moonies.

However, when leading liberal political figures lined up behind such squalid measures as the 1950 McCarran Act and the 1954 Communist Control Bill (both of which, along with the Smith Act, I denounced as unconstitutional at the time), we had a disgraceful scene. All that can be said in extenuation is that a substantial number of cold war liberals bitterly opposed these and related measures—it was A.D.A.'s Jim Loeb who epitomized our contempt for political cowardice when he said, "it's not the heat, but the timidity."

JOHN P. ROCHE
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Taxation and Political Change in the Young Nation, 1781–1833 *by Dall W. Forsythe. New York, Columbia University Press, 1977. 167 pp. $15.00.*

Dall W. Forsythe's slim volume is an adaptation of a dissertation which, according to the book jacket, recently won the E. E. Schattschneider Award of the American Political Science Association, "given annually for the best dissertation in the general field of American government and politics." *Taxation and Political Change* is for the most part a well-written and thoughtful book that is likely to be of interest to historians for the political science uses it makes of well-known historical data and to political scientists for the uses it makes of these data to sustain its analytical generalizations.

Believing that the reason for studying political change is "to build better theories to account for past patterns of transformation," Mr. Forsythe, a former assistant professor of political science in Columbia University, offers several modest modifications of extant theories of state power that he has extracted from the historical evidence. His conclusion that his particular taxonomic scheme offers a clearer understanding of earlier political developments as well as a "firmer base for speculation" about the future is clearly argued, as is his interesting judgment that British attempts at enforcement of the Townshend Acts just prior to the outbreak of the American Revolution illustrate his contention that "heavy applications of coercion often weaken the voluntary base for compliance, and diminish state legitimacy." Indifferent as they often are to the long-range theoretical implications of the events they study, historians are likely to be charmed by Professor Forsythe's penchant for drawing precisely such implications from the record, as by the intel-

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ligence he displays in developing his conclusions. They are likely to be less enthusiastic about the thinness of his historical evidence and his use of a jargon that he evidently feels adds weight to his argument.

Relying as he does on a small number of secondary sources for the historical evidence that underlies his interpretations, Mr. Forsythe unwittingly offers embarrassing oversimplifications and in some cases downright error. The Hamiltonian economic program and the controversy it engendered or the tariff debate of the Jacksonian years were far more complex, far less susceptible to simple economic determinist interpretation, than they appear to be in Mr. Forsythe's pages. His observation that "Americans in the middle of the eighteenth century were quite prosperous" would surprise James Henretta, Gary B. Nash, Allan Kulikoff, Alice H. Jones, and the other specialists who have recently been demonstrating quite the contrary. The weakness of his data base unavoidably detracts from the force of the implications he has drawn from it. He who would rely on historians' empirical efforts in creating his political science theories must take pains to consult a broad range of such efforts—certainly a broader range than Professor Forsythe has consulted.

Perhaps good reason and not mere modishness leads Mr. Forsythe to prefer the term "extractive capacity" to tax power or for him to tax the reader's patience with long explanations of what he means by "regime" or "crisis." (He of course means something different from what most of us mean when we use these terms.) But is there really a need for "decisional locus," "compliance predictors," "habit triggers," or a "typology . . . based on a pair of dichotomous variables"? I should hope that the discourse of even so arcane a specialty as political science need not stray so unhappily from general usage.

In Professor Forsythe's defense it should be noted that at times he simply takes over the language as well as the concepts of Charles Tilly, Samuel Finer, David Easton, and the other scholars whose ideas interest him. I should hope that in his future work this gifted and perceptive young scholar, if he strains at all, would strain not for portentous effect but rather to communicate his own ideas as clearly as possible. As it is, his first book for all its flaws is a stimulating and valuable piece of work that illuminates both the past and the present.

EDWARD PESSEN
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The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology *by Lance Banning. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1978. 307 pp. $15.00.*

It was probably just a matter of time before a study such as this one made its appearance. It is a natural extension and culmination of two converging lines of argument, associated principally with Bernard Bailyn, J.G.A. Pocock, and Gordon S. Wood, concerning the American history of the Whig tradition of eighteenth-century Britain. In what in my estimation is a convincing central proposition, Banning argues that Jefferson's Democratic-Republican party rested on "a revival and Americanization of British opposition thought" (p. 93), specifically that strain of Whig thought which Pocock has identified as a neo-Har-

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ringtonian "Country" ideology. The domestication of this imported ideology, in the author's view, had been completed by the end of 1792, after which it became the political science of a party which saw the venerable hobgoblins of "liberticide," corruption, and conspiracy in every act and policy of Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists.

That such an interpretation is likely to occasion little surprise is due to the influence of earlier works in the same line of interpretation. But this should not detract from Banning's real achievements, for he has done more than simply apply an analysis ready to hand. In carefully nuanced and qualified presentations, he has explored the many forms which "Country" thought assumed in a provincial setting, especially its application to electoral and financial questions. He insists, moreover, that the issues themselves made less difference to political debate than the categories of perception and expectation that were brought to them by men steeped in British thought. Banning also provides additional substance for the growing conviction among historians that what has been characterized as the "classical age" of American politics—indeed, by the measure of ideology, the revolutionary era itself—ended not in the late 1780s but sometime shortly after 1815. By that time—its achievements great, its limitations glaring, and the irrelevance of its customary attitudes increasingly clear, even to its own adherents—the "Country" party had held power through four administrations.

Though it is not his main intention, Banning throws Hamilton's thought and position into new relief. He depicts the first secretary of the treasury as the chief bearer of the British "Court" tradition, albeit an altered one, in the United States. In fact, in one of the high points of the study, Banning shows how Hamilton's program, quickly drawing forth the worst "Country" fears, almost inevitably won Republican characterization as an intentional strategy of Walpolean corruption and ministerial intrigue. Yet we are left with a serious problem by this interpretation—one which Banning seems to sense (p. 280), only to back away from. And that is how to deal with the "countrification" by 1815 of the Federalists, who by then were imputing to the Republicans the very same intentions of power seeking and the suppression of liberty which Jefferson had ascribed to them. If, as seems to be the case, the "Country" tradition became the classic posture of American politics in the nineteenth century, it is important to know what happened to it after it had become common political property during the War of 1812, who carried it, and what social circumstances sustained it.

It is my belief, however, that to undertake such an inquiry now is unnecessary, for the general outlines of such an analysis have long been before us. Instead, we might well call a halt for the time being to the tracings of opposition themes in American political thought, to which this is a distinguished contribution. There was more to the American mind at the time than strains of Whig dissent. Other lines of inquiry, other modes of thought, made their way across the Atlantic in the eighteenth century. What reception they received, where they lodged, how (if at all) they influenced the Revolution: these are the questions now to be addressed. It is reassuring to see that some young scholars, such as Drew McCoy and Joyce Appleby, are once again investigating the career of British political economy in the New World. Perhaps, once again, John Locke and liberalism will put in an appearance in our historical literature, from which they have recently been banished, along with the issue of property, which, one might conclude these days, scarcely concerned the Founding Fathers. Furthermore, we know altogether too little about moral

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philosophy in provincial and early national America, or about utilitarianism. We need to learn much more. In the meantime, this book is an important addition to lines of inquiry which have been pursued to such great effect for the past fifteen years.

JAMES M. BANNER, JR.
Princeton University

Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945–1976 *by Geoffrey Pridham. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1978. 371 pp. $19.95.*

This comprehensive survey of a leading West German political party fills a lacuna in the burgeoning literature on the political system of the Federal Republic. Perhaps not too surprisingly in view of their political orientation, many academicians are fascinated by political movements of the Left, and tend to neglect the study of rival conservative movements that play an equally significant role in the body politic. A major survey of the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian affiliate, the Christian Social Union, has not appeared in German or English, except for the works of H.G. Wieck and Arnold Heidenheimer published in the 1950s.

The author, lecturer in European politics at the University of Bristol, devotes about two-thirds of the book to a historical approach and one-third to a description of the structure of the CDU, with less emphasis on the CSU. One wishes for less space devoted to the historical and more to the organizational approach because the formation of the party during the Occupation era and the period of Adenauer's rule (1949–1963) has been assessed in other studies, while little has appeared recently on its composition and structure.

Nevertheless, the historical survey is useful, for it deals not only with the protracted Adenauer reign, but it also concentrates on his successors who governed the nation from 1963 to 1969, and on the party which from 1969 to 1972 formed a "reluctant" opposition and from 1972 to 1976 a "renovated" opposition. As the author notes, the emphasis in the historical overview is not on the content of government policies when the CDU/CSU was the senior governing party, but on the party's responsibility in the formulation of such policies. Such an emphasis is valuable because it is missing too often in works on German foreign and domestic politics that deal with the governing period of the CDU/CSU. The author touches on the ideological basis of party actions, but fails to provide enough details on its "conservative orientation" (p. 62).

Yet Pridham ably assesses the causes for the party's decline in the 1960s as new sociopolitical developments produced victories for the rival Social Democratic Party and put the CDU/CSU into an unaccustomed opposition role. He correctly points out that the party only reluctantly adapted to such a role given the historical linkage between the governing political elite and the state, and the population's bias against any political opposition challenging the legitimacy of the state and its governing organs. Ironically, this attitude had been promoted by the CDU/CSU when it was the governing party in the first two decades of the Federal Republic. But there were other problems from 1969 to 1972.

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Once out of office, the party could not easily settle rivalries among its leaders, had trouble responding to government initiatives, and found it difficult to adapt to a rapidly changing political environment. Brandt's smashing victory in 1972 meant that the CDU/CSU had to come to terms with its opposition role, reappraise its position, and move on to a constructive dialogue with the social-liberal governing coalition.

In this section devoted to the composition and structure of the CDU and CSU, Pridham concentrates on their organization, membership, auxiliary organizations, voter appeal, and election campaigns. He ably deals with the serious problems of party cohesion and political integration, the growth of bureaucracy, and the continuing tensions between central headquarters and the regional units. But little space is devoted to the recruitment patterns and profiles of party leaders, and to the organizational schema of the CDU and CSU. For instance, references abound to the regional branches, but no details on their executive organs or their specific powers are provided. Nor will the reader learn about the base—the party's activities at the local level, techniques of membership recruitment, or rank and file attitudes about the party. This lacuna is unfortunate, especially since the author interviewed a number of leaders at local and regional levels.

Despite criticisms of emphases and coverage, a vote of thanks is due the author for having provided a first-class, scholarly, objective, and fairly comprehensive account based on valuable source materials and interviews. The book deserves wide attention.

GERARD BRAUNTHAL
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Representation in Italy: Institutionalized Tradition and Electoral Choice *by Samuel H. Barnes. Chicago, University of Chigaco Press, 1977. 187 pp. $16.00.*

Italy at the Polls: The Parliamentary Elections of 1976 *edited by Howard R. Penniman. Washington, D.C., The American Enterprise Institute, 1977. 386 pp. $5.75.*

These books make very valuable and, it happens, complementary contributions to the understanding of contemporary politics in Italy. Samuel Barnes's work is one of a series of studies, sharing a common research design, on representation in individual countries. It is based on surveys of elite and mass attitudes and behavior at the time of the 1968 parliamentary elections in Italy. In the course of illuminating a number of important and hitherto little studied aspects of representation in Italy, Barnes also provides vital insights into the bases of the remarkable continuity in voting patterns which has characterized Italian politics for most of the postwar period. That continuity in important respects was shattered in 1976, so it is natural that the contributors to *Italy at the Polls* should be concerned primarily with electoral change.

Barnes argues convincingly that representation in Italy involves much more than the conventional notion of representatives' congruence with their constituents' preferences on the policy issues of the day. The question of what is represented in Italy must be un-

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derstood in the context of the traditions which form the fundamental basis of cleavage in Italian society and politics. The two dominant traditions in Italy today Barnes identifies as Catholicism and the left. In the electoral arena, these traditions find expression in political parties—the Christian Democratic party for Catholicism, the Communist party (predominantly) for the left. The traditions are not bounded by the parties they express, however, for the traditions cannot be understood in narrowly political or electoral terms. Much more broadly, they involve "sets of expectations about life in general that are held by large numbers of people, expectations that are transmitted through the family, formal organizations, and numerous informal ways. . . . They are patterns of thinking and acting that originated in concrete historical situations, have become institutionalized, and are perpetuated in various ways" (pp. 18, 21). Indeed, because the traditions are so much more than political, many people in Italy are caught up in politics through no particular effort of their own, as a result of their involvement in the diffuse social networks of organizational and informal ties associated with each tradition.

Barnes shows that involvement in the social networks of Catholicism or of the left constitutes the most important variable in explaining partisan identification in Italy—more important, for example, than social class, occupation, region, or sex. At the same time, the pervasiveness and strength of the institutionalized traditions, and their success in guiding new bases of cleavage into existing political channels, go far toward explaining the impressive stability in voting behavior which has been the hallmark of the Italian party system.

Barnes is surely correct in emphasizing the role of the traditions in structuring Italian political behavior. It would seem, however, that he overstates his case, for his analysis provides little basis for understanding how Italian electoral politics might change in any significant degree. (The principal exception is a brief discussion of the possibility that the secularization of Italian society might have a major impact on the DC.) Yet we know that since the 1968 surveys on which Barnes's work is based, very substantial changes in fact have taken place. Perhaps one key to understanding these changes lies in the important structural differences between the Catholic and left organizational networks, differences which Barnes alludes to but minimizes (p. 22). Surely, the fact that the organizational structures of the left tradition are much more explicitly political than those of the Catholic world is very consequential. While undoubtedly habit and tradition play a role in people's decisions to join left organizations, their decisions much more frequently entail a purposive awareness of the contemporary political implications of membership than is true of involvement in the diffuse social network of the DC. Moreover, Barnes pictures the political parties as practically dependent variables with respect to their traditions. While in some ways this view may be applicable to the DC, it is very misleading in the case of the PCI. The Communist party is not simply the electoral vehicle of the left tradition—it is the organizational backbone of that tradition, which gives structure and direction to the left network as a whole. And of course, the party expresses a set of concerns which are highly political and highly contemporary. In short, it may be that in a real sense the left tradition is more "modern" than its Catholic counterpart. This would help explain why, as Giacomo Sani notes in his contribution to *Italy at the Polls*, "the propensity to favor a party of the left is greatest within those segments of the population most af-

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fected by the modern dynamics of Italian society: the young, the urban, the better educated" (p. 121).

The substantial gains made by the PCI were of course the most striking outcome of the 1976 elections, which are extensively analyzed in the Penniman volume. This book should be regarded as essential reading for anyone seeking to understand Italian party politics in the second half of the 1970s. The ten essays in the book cover a great deal of territory. In addition to Giacomo Sani's analysis of the determinants of the vote, there are chapters on each of the major parties and one on the minor parties. Additional essays explain the Italian electoral process and the role of the mass media and of foreign policy issues in the campaign.

In his introductory essay Joseph LaPalombara ably sketches the background to the 1976 elections, showing how prolonged economic crisis, political scandals, and the extensive radicalization of youth and labor since the end of the 1960s produced a situation which one would think would make life insecure for any governing party. The continuing secularization of Italian society, as evidenced by the 1974 divorce referendum, was another long-term factor working against the DC. Of course election results are more than a simple reflection of political events and social and economic trends: the reactions of the political parties to change constitute a crucial variable which is thoroughly explored by several of the contributors. Giuseppe Di Palma and Gianfranco Pasquino, for example, document how the Christian Democratic and Socialist parties demonstrated a persistent incapacity to respond effectively to the changed conditions of the 1970s. On the other hand, the Communists were at least partially successful in one of their major long-term political goals—the redefinition of the issues of partisan cleavage in Italy. For most of the postwar period the clash between the Catholic and left traditions had been defined in terms of the confrontation between Western-style democracy and Soviet-oriented authoritarianism. By 1976, the PCI had convinced more electors than ever before that this was not in fact what Italian domestic politics was about. Yet the Communists' success in this regard was incomplete: fear of communism by many moderate voters who were not traditionally oriented to the DC evidently induced many of them to turn to that party even as the DC was losing part of its traditional electorate to the left. As a result, the Christian Democrats emerged once again as Italy's largest party, with an electoral base which if anything, would predispose it even less toward accommodation with the Communists. As Samuel Barnes notes in his concluding essay, nothing as yet has been resolved.

ANTHONY F. GRECO
Columbia University

P'yongyang between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958–1975 *by Chin O. Chung. University, Ala., University of Alabama Press, 1978. 230 pp. $15.00.*

The Sino-Soviet battle for hegemony in the international Communist movement beginning in the late 1950s afforded leaders of several of the smaller Communist countries an

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opportunity to enlarge their own autonomy. In the short run, however, pressures from both Moscow and Peking confronted these self-same leaders with difficult choices as they attempted to avoid offending either of their jealous patrons. The theme of this monograph is the largely successful effort of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) under Kim Il-song to chart a course away from either exclusive Soviet or Chinese dependency into more open waters. Not unexpectedly, this has required a good deal of tacking to and fro in response to cross-winds from Moscow and Peking.

Chung's method is largely descriptive. Each of his chapters briefly recapitulates the major developments in the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship from the 1950s through 1975 and then details DPRK reactions to these developments. Pyongyang's alignment in the Sino-Soviet conflict has swung from a basically "pro-Chinese" position through a "pro-Soviet" orientation to one of increased independence and the assertion of a distinctive Korean path of development while managing to maintain cordial relations with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic. Although other works (notably Robert Scalapino's and Chong Sik Lee's magisterial *Communism in Korea*) have discussed DPRK relations with China and the Soviet Union, Chung's is the first work to focus specifically on this question and as such it performs a useful service. However, after so many years of the Sino-Soviet dispute, it now seems that we have a right to demand somewhat more of an author dealing with Chung's theme than he in fact provides, for while his account is relatively rich in detail it is rather lacking in analysis. In chapter summaries and occasionally along the way he makes some attempt to explain Pyongyang's changing course as the Sino-Soviet dispute unfolds. He suggests in effect that Pyongyang's (ideology) heart has been in Peking while its (national security) head has inclined toward Moscow, its main supplier of modern military goods. At times he suggests cultural affinities between the DPRK and China and the similarity of their stages of revolution as explanations for Pyongyang's behavior. But given the zigzag course North Korea has pursued since 1958 neither of these factors has much explanatory power.

What Professor Chung fails to do is provide convincing explanations of the proximate political, economic, military, and other factors which have shaped DPRK behavior in the specific circumstances when policy decisions had to be made. Nor does he give us much analysis of the specific weight of particular factors and how this weight may have changed across the past two decades. For example, while he suggests briefly that the increasing introduction of sophisticated weapons systems into the Korean peninsula has drawn Pyongyang toward Moscow, one would like much more detail on how this effect can be traced over time. An even more basic question is how much of DPRK behavior has been reactive and how much initiative has Pyongyang taken? By addressing these kinds of questions scholars of Korean affairs can take us at least a stage or two farther along the road to understanding of the DPRK's policies toward its larger neighbors.

STEVEN I. LEVINE
Columbia University

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Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages: The Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China *by Thomas P. Bernstein. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977. 371 pp. $17.50.*

In this thoughtful and carefully researched work Professor Bernstein analyzes the growth and development of one of China's most distinctive social programs: the permanent transfer of urban lower-middle school and upper-middle school graduates to China's suburban and rural villages. Professor Bernstein utilizes a variety of sources including statements made by Chinese leaders at different times to develop an overview of the main trends of the program and also press reports and transcripts of radio broadcasts in order to identify and discuss problems related to the program's implementation. Finally, he relies upon interviews with *émigrés* conducted in Hong Kong and elsewhere to flesh out the data gleaned from official sources. The result is a thorough, honest, and convincing overview that stands as an authoritative study of this important problem. The work also suggests a large number of important topics for further research.

Professor Bernstein begins with analysis of the goals and politics of the transfer program. Transfers are undertaken to relieve problems of urban underemployment, as a means of inculcating "socialist" values within the younger segment of China's urban population, and as a means of speeding the development of rural and frontier areas. We are informed that the first of these goals is the most important, and that the second and third may well be collateral goals developed ex post facto. This discussion is followed by a consideration of how youth are mobilized to go to the countryside. The author describes conflicting pressures upon youth and their families and analyzes how local school, factory, party, Youth League, and mass organizations attempt to deal with this problem. There is also some discussion of the pressures upon local leaders of the transfer program as they decide whom to send "down" and to what area. We are left here with an impression that local leaders frequently choose the path of least resistance with the result that certain urban centers tend to send youth to certain areas within or near the province in which they reside. The chapter on finding remedies to problems of adapting to rural life considers the evolution of different means and modes of solving problems of housing, remunerating, and integrating youth into nonurban environments. Here we note a largely reactive approach until 1973 after which the problem was tackled in a more systematic manner. Party officials took a much more directive role in both the mobilization and integration aspects of the transfer process. Professor Bernstein concludes, however, that integration has not been terribly successful and that the best result has been achieved among those youth who are settled on state farms or on farms run by the Peoples' Liberation Army. The discussion of the contribution of urban youth to rural development is less helpful, perhaps because of a lack of clarity in the definition of what is meant by "rural development." In any case, we learn that the contribution of resettled youth to agricultural production is marginal at best and that urban youth do not apply their educational advantage in the fields of scientific experiment and medical care to a significant degree. How these relate to notions of rural development is never explained with much sophistication. Similarly, we are not told whether student recalcitrance or simply poor planning is the cause of this condition although both possible causes are mentioned. The subsequent discussion of the stability of the settlement reflects the fact that the Chinese them-

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selves have problems in determining who may return to the cities and for what purposes. Professor Bernstein also notes that, based upon performance in the Cultural Revolution, a significant percentage of youth seek by all possible means to secure reassignment to the urban sector. Despite its impressive success, the transfer program continues to engender pressures that require attention of the leadership.

If there is a problem with this book it is seen in a lack of conceptual clarity and overlapping definitions. For example, in the third chapter the author uses the terms *mobilization* and *compliance* in ways that suggest a view of China as a *mobilization system*. Yet these are never really developed nor are they defined. Had Professor Bernstein developed and integrated the concepts more fully, his analysis may well have been more sharp. It would certainly have been more focused. A similar problem, alluded to above, involves definition of the term *development*. We are never clear whether development refers to economic expansion, changed attitudes and behavior, or a combination of the two. Again more precise definition and its consistent application may well have produced a different evaluation of the data. We should also note that the author provides very little in the way of historical background. Transfers of urban youth have existed in a variety of guises since the early 1950s. Surely the reader is entitled to know whether previous experience influences the current transfer program and if so in what ways.

However, none of these problems detracts in significant ways from the essential value of the book. *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages* stands as an impressive compendium of information on the program of transfer of urban youth to the countryside. It is in fact one of the more important and most useful volumes on contemporary China to appear in recent years.

RONALD N. MONTAPERTO
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A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962 *by Alistair Horne. New York, The Viking Press, 1977. 604 pp. $19.95.*

Before World War II, when an Algerian problem could hardly be said to have existed, Ferhat Abbas, one of the future leaders of the struggle for Algerian independence, delivered himself of the judgment, "I would not die for the Algerian nation, because it does not exist" (p. 404). This represented a totally correct appraisal, for present-day Algeria, as it now appears on the African map, is unquestionably a French creation, even more than India is a British. There is no doubt that it is France that made Algeria and introduced her into the modern world.

Why then an agonizing and unusually harsh eight-year struggle ending in complete Algerian independence? The answer is best expressed in the observation of Robert Aron: "France did much for Algeria, but too little for the Algerians" (p. 65). The Algerian problem was in addition made especially difficult of resolution by a number of other factors. For one thing, Algeria had, constitutionally, been assimilated to France herself. Even the liberal Mendès-France, who disentangled France from the Tunisian and Algerian protectorates, felt that where Algeria was concerned, *"ici, c'est la France."* Also, there was in

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Algeria a European population, one-tenth of the total when the revolt broke out in 1954; many of these people felt at once as authentically French as Algerian.

In addition, the revolt broke out on the very morrow of the final French surrender in Indo-China, the result of another harsh war resulting in ultimate defeat. That defeat, coming on top of that of 1940, understandably set quite low the prestige of French arms. But, conversely, the effect of these humiliations on the French army was to make it all the more anxious to retrieve its standing. That condition contributed not a little to the character of the Algerian war and to the methods used in its prosecution.

The professional army, Massu's *paras* for example, could with some justification feel that they had won the battle of Algiers, but the difficulty lay in this contrast: "France was strong, militarily, in Algeria, but weak, politically, at home; the F.L.N. was weak, militarily, at home, but strong, politically, abroad" (p. 230). As the war dragged on, and as French forces in Algeria came to exceed the half million mark, conscripts included, awareness of it became greater in France, where it produced a variety of reactions ranging from intransigence to boredom. But the final impact was very great, for together, the army and the European Algerians, the *pieds noirs*, came to constitute a threat to the regime itself. This was in May 1958.

The Fourth Republic was brought down and de Gaulle returned to power. His initial prestige was enormous in all quarters, Algerian muslims not excluded, but it was based on an ambiguous misunderstanding. As a consequence, unable to capitalize on the initial momentum, it took him another four years to resolve the dilemma. His own views may not have been altogether clear at first, and his merit lay in acknowledging the inevitable, even if that meant for him the tragedy of having to break his beloved army in order to spare France the greater tragedy of civil war.

It is a tragic tale that Horne unfolds. The wealth of detail is at times almost overwhelming and the emphasis might on occasion have differed, but the thoroughness of his research and the balance of his judgments make this work one that will stand the test of time. He has produced a case study of a phenomenon that, when the record of our time comes to be written with adequate perspective, will appear as the obverse of its predecessor phase, that of colonial imperialism, the undoing perhaps worse than the initial performance.

René Albrecht-Carrié
Columbia University

Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy *by Michael C. Hudson, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977. 434 pp. $22.50.*

One of the interesting developments for students of comparative politics in the mid-1970s has been the growing stability of the regimes in the Arab world. Thus, after experiencing a plethora of coups in the 1950s and '60s, Syria and Iraq seem now to have settled down under their Ba'athist governments; monarchies such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait continue to thrive (the latter two having successfully survived transition periods after the death of their monarchs); and Egypt, the Sudan, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco

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all have rulers who have been in power at least since 1970, with many having been in control much earlier than that. What explains their relative stability in an area heretofore known for its frequently changing governments? Some political scientists have argued that the leaders in these regimes have at last gained legitimacy from their populations, and this achievement has enabled them to stay in power. Others, including the author of this book, Michael C. Hudson, are not so sure. While explaining in detail the quest of the Arab leaders to gain legitimacy from their peoples he somewhat reluctantly concludes that the cause of the current stability in the Arab countries may be as much in their leaders' "high coercive capacity" (p. 391) as in any genuine success in achieving legitimacy. This, to Hudson, is unfortunate since he clearly favors the ideals of participatory democracy. The theme of Hudson's book is that without genuine participatory democracy, no Arab regime can gain true legitimacy in the modern age.

In what is both a comprehensive analysis of Arab regimes and a sociological analysis of the components of legitimacy in the Arab world, Hudson examines a number of possible models as to how legitimacy might be achieved in the modern era. These include a "transformational" model whereby the traditional regimes are totally transformed (usually by revolution); the "Mosaic" model in which traditional loyalties remain even during a period of modernization; and the social mobilization model (a modified form of which Hudson sees as the most valid) where the masses are mobilized and brought into support of the regime. After introductory chapters evaluating the central components of Arab political culture, the (highly negative) legacy of imperialism, and the complex nature of modernization in the Arab world (his best chapter), Hudson proceeds to analyze both the Arab republics and the traditional monarchies, utilizing as his central criterion the degree of legitimacy each regime has attained. Hudson's sympathies in this analysis clearly lie with the Arab republics (particularly Libya, Iraq, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [South Yemen]), although he notes that these regimes still have a long way to go to give their populations genuine participation in the government process. Hudson is considerably more critical of such monarchies as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, but at the same time he emphasizes (correctly in my view) the great significance of the personal element in the degree of legitimacy each monarchical regime has attained.

In general, Hudson's analysis is very sound and his discussion of Arab political culture is successful in correcting some of the superficial and fallacious assertions often made about the subject. Yet in consciously seeking to present Arab political culture in such a way as to show that it contains the basic prerequisites for legitimate political systems (in the Western participatory sense) Hudson occasionally goes a bit too far. Thus his discussion of the fate of minorities in the Arab world is more favorable to the host Arab societies than would appear to be the case. The lot of the Jewish communities in the Arab world in the period from the rise of Mohammed to the nineteenth century was, for example, much less halcyon than Hudson indicates; and the Kurds in Iraq have considerably less autonomy than he suggests. Similarly, Hudson makes no mention of the Iraqi massacre of Assyrians in 1932, yet another indication of the difficult position many Middle Eastern minorities find themselves in in the highly nationalistic twentieth century.

Another area in which I would somewhat disagree with Hudson is in his treatment of the salience of the Palestinian issue in inter-Arab politics. After proclaiming himself

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(p. 117) a partisan of the Palestinian Arab cause (and a pro-Palestinian/and anti-Israel interpretation of events runs throughout the book), Hudson goes on to frequently proclaim the overriding significance of the Palestinian issue in every Arab leader's search for legitimacy. While I quite agree that the Palestinian issue lies at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that it is an important issue in inter-Arab politics, it is doubtful whether Anwar Sadat would have risked his trip to Jerusalem, or received such a tumultuous welcome from the Egyptian populace when he returned home, or even have obtained the tacit support of Saudi Arabia for his peace initiative, if the Palestinian issue was of the supreme significance attributed to it by Hudson.

Aside from these relatively minor criticisms, however, I have no hesitation in strongly recommending this book to students of Arab politics. Given that Hudson presupposes considerable knowledge of the Arab states and their political institutions, the book will best serve specialists in the field. They should find it of great interest not only for the type of data which Hudson presents, but for his novel manner of organizing his material around the concept of legitimacy.

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Baltimore Hebrew College

Diversity and Development in Southeast Asia: The Coming Decade *by Guy J. Pauker, Frank H. Golay, and Cynthia H. Enloe. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1977. 191 pp. $5.95.*

This book is one of some twenty-five to thirty projected volumes in the "1980s Project" undertaken by the Council on Foreign Relations. Each study focuses on an issue, or a constellation of issues, likely to have significant policy implications in the 1980s and beyond, and the studies are intended for audiences without specialized knowledge of the particular subjects chosen. To be fair to the authors and the publisher, this reviewer will therefore try to criticize this study within this framework.

After a Foreword by the former and present directors of the 1980s Project (Edward L. Morse and Richard H. Ullman), Catherine Gwin, a project fellow, provides a brief essay introducing the reader to the region and to the subjects to be covered by the three authors. Guy J. Pauker (a senior staff member at RAND and a frequent author of studies on international relations and domestic politics in Southeast Asia) assumes responsibility for almost half of the substantive portion of the book. Pauker, in an introduction and five chapters, deals with geography, social structure, political development, outside involvements, "hegemonial aspirants" within the area, and the north-south conflict within the Southeast Asian context. Golay (a recognized Southeast Asia economist at Cornell University) follows with four chapters focusing more specifically on the economic and resource factors likely to affect development goals and strategies, regionalism, and the north-south dialogue. Enloe (an associate professor at Clark University who has recently published extensively on communalism and politics in Southeast Asia) concludes the study with a brief section on "ethnic diversity," which she interprets broadly to include any identifiable primordial group characterized by a uniqueness in race, language, reli-

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gion, tribal ties, etc. The authors are able and recognized scholars, and while much of the material is a distillation of their previous writings it is nevertheless interesting, accurate, useful, and occasionally provocative. It is also an inexpensive book that can be read in a few hours.

So much for the contents of *Diversity and Development in Southeast Asia;* how well does it achieve the goals of the 1980s Project? Here I have several reservations.

Format. For most of the studies published thus far the 1980s Project has chosen a multiple author format. A book written by a committee is a tricky undertaking at best. Occasionally, but only occasionally, one comes off as a well-integrated and cohesive study, but such a success requires careful planning, coordination, consultation, and frequent rewriting. More often a committee book comes out as a series of individual contributions more or less tied together by a broadly common subject or theme. *Diversity and Development in Southeast Asia* is much more the latter than the former. It suffers from considerable duplication of effort as necessary explanations and descriptions are repeated unnecessarily. On several occasions the same factual base leads to considerably different conclusions, and while disagreement may be both realistic and healthy some further discussions of the differences would be much more satisfying. Even on minor matters there is evidence of a lack of overall coordination and planning. Golay has supplied a brief annotated bibliography at the conclusion of his section; the other two authors did not. Pauker and Golay make at least limited use of bibliographical footnotes; Enloe does not. Pauker obviously had access to the manuscripts written by Golay and Enloe, but there is little evidence that they consulted Pauker's manuscript.

Future Orientation. Despite the book's subtitle, "The Coming Decade," most of the study deals with the past and present, not the future. Pauker is the most daring of the three authors (though some of his provocative—and pessimistic—predictions need to be better grounded in data if they are to convince this reviewer), and in some of the most provocative paragraphs of the book he challenges the more conservative predictions of Golay, who, in oversimplified terms, projects the known 1970s into the unknown 1980s with few major alterations. Enloe has the most trouble dealing with the future, and even in her brief chapter on "The Shape of Future Conflict" (pp. 157–66) she devotes most of the space to a historical recitation of previous ethnic conflicts. However, after finding that only one author took the subtitle seriously, and finding his provocative predictions less than convincing, I am tempted to question the goal itself more than the authors' reluctance to pursue it.

Diversity and Development in Southeast Asia provides interesting and useful background material for understanding some of the significant problems facing the states of Southeast Asia. It breaks little if any new ground and provides few significant insights into the future that awaits the area. It will doubtlessly have considerable appeal for nonspecialist readers who have time to read only one book on the region, and it will find its way onto the reading lists of many undergraduate students in international relations, foreign policy, and comparative politics. In short, it is a useful but not a significant book.

ROBERT O. TILMAN
North Carolina State University

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China and the Major Powers in East Asia *by A. Doak Barnett. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1977. 416 pp. Cloth, $12.95; paper, $5.95.*

The central thesis and major conclusion of this generally excellent overview is that ". . . even though many factors—ideological, political, cultural, and economic—have helped to shape Chinese foreign policy, broad strategic and military-security considerations have been of overriding importance" (p. 254; also pp. 6 and 18). Combining historical narrative and political analysis, Barnett traces the evolution of China's policies toward and relations with the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States. Although the chapters on bilateral relations contain little new information, they effectively illustrate the differences in Peking's approach to each of the other powers.

According to Barnett, fear of the United States played a major role in Peking's decision to align itself with the Soviet Union in the 1950s. China reaped important military, economic, and other benefits from the alliance, but incurred unwanted dependence and political vulnerability in the process. The relationship was heavily one-sided. Moscow could—and did—meddle extensively in Chinese affairs, but Peking had virtually no reciprocal influence on Soviet policy. Barnett argues that issues of military security were more important to the souring of relations than were ideological differences, and that the lack of other avenues of influence led China to employ polemics in an attempt to reverse Moscow's "erroneous" and "revisionist" policies. He notes that although China's leaders badly miscalculated the consequences of their actions, the severity and impact of Khrushchev's reaction strengthened their resolve to avoid significant future economic or political dependency on any nation. The characterization of Sino-Soviet relations presented in this book is essentially that China must pay close attention to the Soviet Union and has grounds to fear Moscow's intentions, but that there is little Peking can do to have a direct influence on Soviet behavior.

Barnett's discussion of Sino-Japanese relations reveals a very different picture. Whereas China made only minimal and largely counterproductive efforts to influence Soviet political decisions, varied, sensitive, and flexible tactics were employed to win the support of carefully selected groups in Japan. During the 1950s, the promise of increased trade was used to lure Japan's corporate and political leaders away from their attachments to Taiwan and America's China policy, while dissatisfaction with Japenese policies resulted in reductions in bilateral trade. Beginning about 1960, however, China began to view trade with Japan more in economic than in political terms, since alternatives had to be found to replace the Soviet connection. This further reduced Peking's ability to influence Japanese politics, but Chinese policy was still characterized by flexibility and responsiveness to changes in the Japanese and international political environment. Barnett concludes, however, that Japan is much more important to China than vice versa, and that Peking's influence remains rather limited.

The chapter on Sino-American relations presents one of the best available summaries of evolving Chinese policies. Barnett outlines the somewhat paradoxical shift in China's approach to the United States from one of considerable flexibility when the two countries were adversaries to one of increasing rigidity, at least in public pronouncements, as relations improved. Just as the Soviet Union was seen as a counter to the United States in the 1950s, so the United States has been viewed as a check on Russian ambitions and aggres-

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sive designs since 1968-69. The Taiwan dilemma, of course, is still the principal obstacle to fully normalized relations between Washington and Peking. Barnett argues that normalization is important to forestall unwanted political consequences for all the major East Asian powers as the result of shifts in the current balance. He also suggests that China is likely to prove more flexible in practice than public statements indicate.

China and the Major Powers in East Asia will be most useful as a text in courses on Chinese foreign policy or to complement more specialized readings on Soviet, Japanese, and American policies since 1949. The well-written narrative provides a concise and relatively uncontroversial overview of Chinese initiatives and responses vis-à-vis these countries, and the "Notes" contain an excellent bibliography for those interested in greater detail. This book synthesizes many of Barnett's earlier writings on China's domestic politics and foreign policies, and though it contains little that will be new to China scholars, even the specialist will benefit from the effective way ideas and insights are presented.

THOMAS FINGAR
Stanford University

Peasant Politics: Struggle in a Dominican Village *by Kenneth Evan Sharpe. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. 263 pp. $15.00*

Kenneth Sharpe's outstanding book presents the most troubling of paradoxes. Ostensibly, it tells a happy success story—the organization of two cooperatives by the peasants of Jaida Arriba in the Dominican Republic that broke the strangling economic grip of the village middlemen. The detailed process and results of the peasants' efforts, however, suggest a very gloomy outlook for other peasants who might seek similar successes.

Like most peasants throughout the world, the people in Jaida Arriba lived very close to the margin of survival. The amount of land available was not changing significantly, while 61 percent of the families had more than six children. Any unexpected emergency demanding cash, such as a serious illness, could lead to dire circumstances, sometimes even the tragic death of a child.

Prior to the peasants' initiative in building the cooperatives, the accepted strategy to deal with their precarious situation was to seek cash and credit advances from the shopkeeper middlemen of the village. These middlemen exerted tremendous economic control in the village by establishing the prices for retail merchandise in their shops. They also marketed the peasants' main crop, coffee, and set the prices for this commodity in the village. Once the cooperative venture got started, a sizable portion of the peasants was able to sell its coffee at much higher prices through the marketing cooperative, to buy daily needs at much lower prices in the cooperative store, and to receive cash advances without later paying exorbitant interest.

Sharpe's concern is to explain why a new ideology rejecting the old middleman strategy began to take root in 1967 and why it did not develop before then. Why did the peasants come to see what had been perceived as a private malaise as a public problem? Why did some peasants accept the cooperatives and others reject them? How did the peasants create enough power to break the control of the middlemen?

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One of the important instruments of the middlemen's control is a monopoly of information. Prior to 1968, the peasants did not know the city prices for the products they bought or the prices the exporting houses paid for coffee. The middlemen were not seen as a problem. It was outside forces—the bishop, a priest, an agronomist, a local government agent—that broke that monopoly of information. As the middlemen became defined as a public problem, these outside forces offered an alternative strategy to deal with the peasants' precarious situation: cooperatives.

For the cooperatives to succeed, however, a whole series of improbable circumstances had to occur. One middleman, who was especially respected, gave up his position and dedicated himself totally to the cooperatives, bringing with him important leadership qualities and know-how that the peasants lacked. One of the outside government agents was able to win confidence because of his peasant background and because he risked his job to defend them. In addition, he used his incredible network of well-placed friends, one an important exporter and another the secretary of agriculture, to insure the survival of the marketing cooperative at moments when its existence was severely threatened. One middleman, who could have used his political power to generate police violence and government pressure, abstained from doing so. All the middlemen did not take the unified action in denying all credit that could have broken the cooperatives.

Success, then, came as a result of a series of fortunate circumstances that peasants elsewhere simply cannot count on. And even the success in Jaida Arriba had its limits. The cooperatives could not generate sufficient capital internally to meet their pre-harvest cash needs. They became dependent on unreliable outside institutions to supply that capital and on outside agents—the new brokers—to deal with that complex world outside the village. Most importantly, the cooperatives proved to be no solution at all for two-thirds of the village households, the poor peasants who had little or no productive land.

I can think of no other monograph that portrays the dilemmas of peasant life so realistically and vividly. Anyone interested in the nature of social control and social change will find this book illuminating. I only hope that Johns Hopkins University Press will make it available in a soft-cover edition so that it can be widely used in the classroom.

JOEL S. MIGDAL
Harvard University

The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System *by Robert L. Rothstein. New York, Columbia University Press, 1977. 384 pp. $16.50.*

Rothstein's sweeping discourse is stimulating, rewarding, and disappointing. The latter complaint is inevitable because no book of such heroic thematic scope could satisfy all the expectations it generates. *The Weak in the World of the Strong* ambles reflectively, cautiously, and discursively through the entire scene of interaction between international system, domestic decision making, and economic development in the Third World. The book yields a great deal of sensible commentary and speculation, a number of brilliant fillips, some fascinating but insufficiently substantiated generalizations, and a few banalities.

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It is an ambitious integrative essay rather than original research. Experts may question interpretations and specific assertions, but should welcome the book as an addition to the comprehensive syntheses that frame the range of debate on international political economy. It is also appropriate reading for general students of international relations looking for a balanced overview, although they might do well to ingest the specifics under the tutelage of informed critics or in conjunction with other works from Marxist or mercantilist viewpoints.

Rothstein's point of departure is the conviction that Third World countries' economic options cannot be analyzed solely in terms of the constraints of the international system, but must be seen as the product of interaction between those constraints and internal pressures on decision and choice. The more particular arguments are too numerous to capsulize simply. Among them are the following: The early vogue of doctrines of rapid industrialization through import substitution failed as development strategy and, if anything, produced reactionary results—more social inequality and reinforcement of the political status quo. Dependence is inevitable for poor countries; the challenge is to create a more realistic calculus of choice within that limitation. Focusing on reduction of the international gap between rich and poor is hopeless. LDCs cannot compete equally in the international system and help from the strong, such as foreign aid or the generalized system of preferences that flowed from UNCTAD, has had negligible results. LDCs lack the power to transform the system; their only weapon is unity, but disparities in their interests reduce the quest for that unity to assertion of impossible "maximum common denominator" (more accurately, "least common multiple") demands (pp. 17, 48–49). Realism about hopes for progress demands focusing more on internal choices.

Third World elites are too insecure to risk fundamental change or to invest in long-term solutions that provide no quick payoff. But "rising expectations" is the elites' problem; the "realism of the masses" (pp. 188–189) suggests that domestic demands can be satisfied without foreclosing growth. These countries need decentralized, quasi-indicative planning, oriented to incremental improvement through redistribution *with* growth. This combination would be made possible by a reorientation toward a labor-intensive "bicycle culture" or more self-reliance (but not autarky), as opposed to either the "Madison Avenue" (p. 265) consumption culture of the First World or the socially and economically costly revolutionary models of the Second World.

The substantive weaknesses of the book derive from its scope. A number of interesting cross-national generalizations are presented with only a case or two cited in support. Rothstein recognizes that Third World countries are not all alike, but he differentiates them much better economically than politically. Are all elites insecure? to the same degree? more than western or communist elites? Do all types of regimes bear out his argument? Which polities are more or less likely to be able to adopt his prescriptions? This dimension of the book would have benefited from integrating the perspectives of political development theory, especially Huntington's preeminent *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Some sort of disaggregation or schematization—according to geography, issue-area, regime, or degree of stability—would make the treatment of domestic constraints more persuasive. The biggest problem with the book is that the economic analysis is sufficient for political scientists (though not for

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economists), but the political analysis is suspect. The final section on norms attempts to reconcile the divergent implications of moralism (Rothstein believes the strong have an obligation to help the weak) and realism, and is not convincing. The author lacks illusions about how much charity the LDCs can expect, but offers only weak reeds as proposals for how to encourage the necessary magnanimity of the strong countries.

The book suffers from flaccid bulk. The length would be justifiable if more empirical data were included, but repetition and unnecessarily obvious qualifications pervade the essay. A tighter editorial rein would have saved the reader time and improved the coherence and cogency of the book. There is also an annoying stylistic plethora of "*I* believe . . ." and "it seems to *me*"; in some paragraphs the first person pronoun pops up three times. All considered, the book is uneven and flawed, but a provocative and useful contribution to the literature of general criticism.

RICHARD K. BETTS
The Brookings Institution

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

Biographical Dictionary of the Federal Judiciary *compiled by Harold Chase et al. Detroit, Gale Research Company, 1978. 381 pp. $38.00.*

Biographical Directory of the Governors of the United States *edited by Robert Sobel and John Raimo. Westport, Conn., Meckler Books, 1978. 1785 pp. $195.00.*

Circular Letter of Congressmen to their Constituents 1789–1829, vols. I–III *edited by Noble E. Cunningham, Jr. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1978. 1634 pp. $75.00.*

Essays on Philosophy and the Classics by John Stuart Mill *edited by J.M. Robson. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1978. 578 pp. $35.00.*

Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds for Fiscal Year 1977, vols. 1–53 *compiled by the Community Services Administration. Silver Spring, Md., Community Services Administration, 1978. $12.00 per volume.*

Historic Documents of 1977 *edited by Patricia Ann O'Connor. Washington, D. C., Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1978. 969 pp. $37.00.*

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An Inventory of Federal Income Transfer Programs, Fiscal Year 1977 *by William J. Lawrence and Stephen Leeds. White Plains, N. Y., The Institute for Socioeconomic Studies, 1978. 219 pp. $12.00.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 25: 1912 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978. 672 pp. $25.00.*

Presidency 1977 *prepared by the staff of the Congressional Quarterly Inc. Washington, D. C., Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1978. 196 pp. $5.25.*

The Soviet Union 1975–76: Domestic Policy, Economics, Foreign Policy *edited by Wolfgang Berner et al. New York, Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1978. 308 pp. $18.50.*

World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1978 *compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. New York, Crane, Russak & Company, 1978. 518 pp. $42.50.*

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Correspondence

Social and Political Movements in Western Europe

To the Editor:

I am writing to reply to some of the points raised in the review (PSQ, Winter 1977–78) of the book I edited with William Paterson, *Social and Political Movements in Western Europe*. I do not wish to comment on the general remarks in the review, although the fact that a different approach was chosen than the reviewer would wish seems to me to be a legitimate difference of emphasis. I am glad, for example, to have included a chapter on European movements in preference to feminist movements.

However, as regards my own chapter on Fascist and Nazi movements the reviewer obscured what I wrote about. The purposes of the chapter, which are connected with the broader intention of the book to discuss the interaction of movements and political systems, are to consider the role of these movements in relation to the decline of traditional authorities, and to analyze the intramovement conflicts in the process of consolidating power.

The reviewer brushes aside these concerns and instead raises untutored questions in Sunday School terms: "How did Hitler attain his almost demonic possession of the German soul?"

Moreover he is confused about the conclusion. I did not imply that the linking of populist aspirations and the interests of established elites were the consequences of Nazism; *rather that as a consequence of the linkup*, Fascism/Nazism were "not revolutionary movements which created new conditions of society, but forces negating the possibilities of social modernization by enforcing stability through totalitarian controls" (pp. 57–58). What I stressed were the ambiguities of radical political change.

It may be relevant to add that although anti-Semitism and Nazi mass murder were not the focal points of analysis, they were not ignored. Having written on the topics elsewhere, I wished to concentrate on other aspects of the problem area in this chapter.

Martin Kolinsky
The University of Birmingham

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Mr. Wilkinson replies:

Martin Kolinsky's special pleading on behalf of his chapter on Fascist and Nazi movements is unconvincing. His chapter has the declared aim of comparing the Nazi movement with Italian Fascism. Yet on his own admission it plays down, or almost entirely ignores, the Nazis' obsession with anti-Semitism and racialist doctrine and their career of mass terror and genocide. Nor does it consider the unique impact of Hitler's personality and leadership. By dismissing such matters as "untutored questions" Kolinsky's chapter fails to bring out the crucial differences between the movements he purports to compare. In this reviewer's opinion contributors to a general work of this nature covering *Social and Political Movements in Western Europe* have a duty to their readers to maintain a minimal level of historical balance and perspective. It is simply not good enough to expect the student reader to know that these important aspects are dealt with in another book.

However, despite my criticisms of this particularly disappointing chapter I still stand by my favorable assessment of the book as a whole, and many of its individual contributions.

PAUL WILKINSON
University College, Cardiff

POWER AND CLASS IN AFRICA

To the Editor:

For those sins of omission and for those matters incomplete in *Power and Class in Africa* for which I am charged by your reviewer, I could quietly suffer with some grace and less guilt—pity indeed for the eager critic perpetually disappointed by books authors never intended to write. However, your reviewer's praise cannot be endured in silence.

"Markovitz' book," he tells us, "is an important effort" that has succeeded in rejecting "the dominant paradigm" and replacing it with another: "With this book we can see the passing of the old guard—both in studies of Africa and in works on the Third World in general." He has declared me the winner in what I thought was going to be a prolonged struggle so that he can then chastise me for not getting down to the really serious business of the thousands of case studies that obviously must be done. I am therefore less than overwhelmed by your reviewer's solicitude for my not having "seized the chance" provided by—what?—the very book that I did write. That was indeed clumsy of me.

The declaration of their obsolescence and irrelevancy will indeed alarm, if not amuse, the majority of the members of the profession who do follow the "dominant paradigm." It also obscures the point of the book which cannot be gleaned from the review even though my thesis was almost embarrassingly simple: African states are not falling apart; from any historical perspective, what is remarkable is the rapidity with which stability has been achieved; but this is not necessarily a cause for rejoicing, not without first determining who is ruling and for what purposes. These propositions, as straightforward as they may appear, have nevertheless flown in the face of more widely acclaimed approaches. I have not demolished these contrary positions or "scientifically" demonstrated the superiority of an alternative model. I have however argued, with as much vigor and

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evidence as present knowledge allows, an alternative vision and an alternative conceptual framework, one capable of suggesting problems and avenues for future investigations.

My conception of the "organizational bourgeoisie," for example, is not descriptive or positional. It differs from theories of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and of the "new class" and argues the importance of familial arrangements, takes into account various types of traditional societies and attempts to assess the conflicting pulls of ethnicity, community and class . . .

In his attack on both radical and mainstream analysts, your reviewer alone knows the position of "truth." That, I find to be disturbing.

IRVING LEONARD MARKOVITZ
Queens College, City University of New York

Mr. Samoff replies:

It is difficult to know how to respond to Professor Markovitz' wounded pride, since I think he has written quite a useful book (one which I assign regularly to my classes). His is a major step forward in general works on African politics, and for that he merits our commendation.

Professor Markovitz is surely correct that the struggle to overcome the modernization literature will be long and hard, especially so because dominant schools of thought are displaced through societal, not solely intellectual, challenges. My point, however, was that the appearance of a text from a major publishing house that rejected the modernization approach indeed signaled its demise; not produced its demise, but foretold it. Since this must be the twentieth book on my shelf with the title or sub-title, political economy of Africa, and since all those volumes reject the modernization literature (for rather differing reasons), the signs are all about us. The study of Africa is being rewritten.

Having saluted the author on the importance of his contribution, I took up my task as reviewer: to set this work in some larger context. My point here was that it seemed to me that the study of Africa needed to be not only rewritten, but reconceptualized. My fear is that unless the radical critics challenge the basic tenets and methodologies of positivist social science, one day they too will seem as far from being able to grasp (and change!) reality as do the modernizationists today. A difficult task, yes, but nonetheless an essential one. There is, in fact, exciting work of this sort currently under way.

As I suggested in my review, Professor Markovitz' work is perceptive, sensitive, and basically correct. That is precisely why he is so successful in showing us what was wrong with his predecessors' efforts. Yet neither in his book, nor in his rejoinder to my review, does he draw on his vast array of case studies or on his sensitivity to the reality of Africa's stability (or should we say stagnation) to begin to develop the theoretical structure that will permit us to go beyond his critique. He has provided an alternative image of Africa, one that is clearer and more accurate. Now what we need is an alternative understanding, so that we do not remain prisoners of our photographic apparatus, however skilled is the photographer in manipulating it.

JOEL SAMOFF
University of Michigan

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Societal Overload

To the Editor:

In his article "Societal Overload" in the Winter 1977-78 issue of *PSQ*, Amitai Etzioni calls attention to the fact that "neoconservative social scientists have recently begun to take a major part in the public dialogue about the present state of American society" (p. 607). The neoconservatives—individuals such as Daniel Bell, Robert Nisbet, Samuel Huntington, Nelson Polsby, and James Q. Wilson—believe that American society has become overloaded in large measure because of the demands placed upon it in the 1960s, especially by blacks in Nisbet's view, and its attempts to satisfy them. "As an antidote" to this state of affairs, "the neoconservative prescription is to curtail the scope of missions pursued by the society as a whole, partially dismantle the government as the main societal tool, adopt more moderate expectations, and advance only carefully pretested programs" (p. 607). The neoconservative solution to the problem of societal overload is a *reduction* of the constituent elements of the mass of the overload. As the new guardians of the *status quo*, the neoconservatives proclaim the virtue of "less is best," a good Aristotelian position if one has already "made it" in the society.

Etzioni opposes the neoconservatives, and advances what may be called a progressive liberal democratic view. He favors structural modifications that will *increase* the society's capacity to carry the heavy load placed upon it. This view should be quite attractive to those who believe that we ought to increase our society's capacity to satisfy the demands placed on it. But will an increase of societal capacity in consequence of structural modifications (p. 610) solve the problem of overload by *real* rather than apparent demand satisfaction? Consider, for example, the demands of unemployed black people.

On January 10 of this year, Lester Thurow, in an article "For Wage Subsidies to Help Fight Unemployment" in *The New York Times*, called attention to the awfully disquieting phenomenon of the persistent high unemployment rate of blacks. If one scrutinizes the unemployment statistics since the Korean War, one finds that each year, without exception, the unemployment rate of blacks is *at least* twice that of whites. Moreover, white males, ages twenty-five to fifty-five—the most productive years of most people's lives—have consistently enjoyed at least a *three to one advantage* over their black counterparts of *not* being unemployed. Like Thurow, Anthony Lewis recognizes the social and moral significance of these statistics, and in publishing the figures listed below,

	1956	*1977*
Unemployed white males (25-55)	2.6	3.7
Unemployed white teenagers	10.1	15.0
Unemployed white adult women	3.7	6.2
Unemployed black teenagers	18.2	39.5
Unemployed black adults	7.5	11.1

he sought to dramatize through *The New York Times* (January 12, 1978) the inequitable gap between white and black unemployment rates.

The advantage of whites over blacks in not being unemployed is a generational phenomenon, which is not likely to change in consequence of structural modifications that simply serve to increase the society's capacity to satisfy more and more demands of *un-*

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equals. Put differently, structural modifications may well serve to increase the capacity of our society to satisfy demands, *without eliminating the inequitable advantages*—grounded in the social logic of race in our society, enjoyed by some demanders over others. The structural modifications, for example, changes in the electoral system, alteration of a range of legal relationships, and changes in corporate as well as institutional entities, to date have not rectified the gross and undue disadvantage suffered by blacks in the area of unemployment, and this cannot be confuted.

If ours were an egalitarian society in practice as well as in principle, the problem of overload (if this is really an empirical rather than a metaphorical problem, which I doubt) should be solved if we increased the society's capacity to satisfy more and more demands. Sadly, the undue inegalitarian practices which have been routinized in the society render this highly improbable. The inegalitarianism that Etzioni identifies in the marketplace permeates the society as a whole, and is not changed fundamentally in consequence of manipulations that simply modify existing structural arrangements. An increase in the capacity of the society to satisfy more demands will *not* alter the undue advantage of whites over blacks in escaping the scourge of unemployment, given the historical pattern of the distribution of burdens and benefits between the races.

And so, whether the progressive liberal democratic formula using "*more*," or the neoconservative formula employing "*less*," is utilized to solve the apparent problem of societal overload, the prospect for black people remains the "*same*," a higher probability of being unemployed than their white fellow citizens.

WINSTON VAN HORNE
Ohio University

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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